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Once criticised as ‘seemingly’ oblivious of the political and historical concerns of the 
state (Osofisan, 2007; Adesokan, 2009b; Alamu, 2010; Okome, 2010; Mistry & 
Ellapen, 2013), some southern Nigerian filmmakers have begun reversing such critical 
narratives through negotiated images of the country’s political history. In spite of that, 
academic attention to such videos remains on the margins of textual or isolated audience 
analyses. This research questions the motivations, narrative techniques, underlying 
ideologies and reception of video films that construct Nigeria’s political past between 
1967 and 1998, two significant moments in the country’s postcolonial history. This is 
achieved through contextual and post-structuralist readings of the films as popular art as 
well as semi-structured interviews of filmmakers and film journalists. The study found 
that historicizing an ethnically-diverse postcolonial state such as Nigeria through the 
agency of film is fraught with potential dangers, most of which cannot be mitigated by 
the filmmakers. Each stage of the production/consumption process is compounded by 
societal factors including filmmaker’s background, finance, audience and censorship. 
Also evident from the findings is that popular Nigerian videos sustain and subvert the 
dominant narratives on popular arts to gain economic advantage. Whereas some 
filmmakers endorse politicians’ practices, others subvert authoritarian regimes through 
metaphoric filmic codes (negotiated images) intelligible to audiences and deployed by 
the producers in order to circumvent censorship. Interrogating film journalists in 
addition to filmmakers served as an antidote to film producers’ self-reporting. By 
examining the reception of films through the lens of journalists, this study makes no 
generalisable claims on audiences, but delivers an original methodological approach to 
understanding films made in the past, about the past. Thus, the study proposes opening 
up the methodological approaches to Nollywood to accommodate film texts, producers 









1.1 Setting out the Agenda 
This chapter describes the rationale, contextual, theoretical and design framework that 
guided the research. It attends to the objectives, questions and the development of the 
research method particularly that related to the fourth research question. As discussed 
below and in subsequent chapters, the subject of constructing a political past in Nigeria 
is seldom approached by filmmakers and consequently by scholars. The research 
therefore provides plausible reasons for electing or ignoring historical and political 
filmic representations.  
Since the 1990s, the growth of the southern Nigerian film industry (Nollywood) 
has attracted vibrant debates and scholarship on the popular video culture in English-
speaking West Africa. One of such debates is the apolitical nature of the video 
narratives (Haynes, 2006; Adesokan, 2009b; Okome, 2010; Mistry & Ellapen, 2013), 
which sets them in sharp contrast to the 1970s/80s films, and to the wider context of 
African cinema. In the Nigerian film literature of the period, Hyginus Ekwuazi (1991) 
and Jonathan Haynes (1995) hinted at the political critiques of Wole Soyinka (Kongi’s 
Harvest, 1970) and the overt political messages in several of Eddie Ugbomah’s 
celluloid films made before 1990. But the culture of political commentary in and 
through films was broken in the 1990s due to military dictatorship (Haynes, 2006). 
While describing the filmmakers as “sticking to known subjects and formulae, which 
does not include political matters” (2006: 513), Haynes traced the trajectory that a 
selection of new politically informed films followed. The new path, Haynes noted, was 
the result of the end of Nigeria’s military rule, which meant that artistic repression was 
arguably a thing of the past. This qualitative study contributes to the literature on 
Nigerian films as political critiques by identifying few but specific examples of the 
filmmaker’s ‘voice’ in re-telling ‘actual’ events of Nigeria’s political history from 1967 
to 1998. As discussed below, representation, the system by which meaning is 
constructed is important in understanding how images and sounds symbolise reality. 
And it is the politics of representation with specific reference to history that is the focus 
of this research.  
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Video film scholars have often adopted a holistic or selective approach in 
espousing the operations and productions of the Nigerian film industry with a few 
examinations of political critiques and representation of history within film. Indeed, 
only Haynes (1999, 2003, 2006), Garritano (2000), Okoye (2007a), Adesokan (2009b), 
and Ugochukwu (2014) are the most prominent examples of research effort on 
filmmakers’ foray into political representations of the past. These forerunners have left 
out some of the video films that depict critical landmarks in Nigeria’s political history 
namely the 1967-70 Civil War and the end of violent military rule with the death of 
General Sani Abacha in 1998, hence the choice of the temporal boundaries. Also absent 
in existing literature are the motivations and reception of such political commentaries as 
evidenced by Haynes’ (2006) assertion that “the effects of the video films on their 
audiences and the motivations of their makers are effectively unknowable” (p. 530). By 
these absences, the debate on Nigerian film and political constructions is incomplete 
and requires updating, a task of the present study.  
This qualitative study seeks specifically to establish the motivation, narrative 
techniques, ideologies and reception of Nigerian video films engaging with a national 
and political past (1967-1998). It analyzes the facets of representation in (semi) 
indigenous films: Battle of Love (2001), Across the Niger (2004), Oil Village (2001), 
Anini (2005), Stubborn Grasshopper 1&2 (2001), and Half of a Yellow Sun (2013). A 
close examination of these films which portray the filmmakers’ views of the Nigerian 
Civil War in Battle of Love and Across the Niger, the Ken Saro-Wiwa story in Oil 
Village, Lawrence Anini’s robbery escapade in Anini, General Abacha’s ascent to 
power and exit thereof in Stubborn Grasshopper, and the Nigerian-British portrayal of 
the Nigerian Civil War in Half of a Yellow Sun is the primary concern of this research. 
The rationale for selecting narratives of national political events and public figures from 
Nigeria’s Civil War to the end of oppressive military rule owes to the fact that they have 
been documented in other media and traditional history texts (Obi, 1994; Haynes, 2006; 
Falola & Heaton, 2008), and can be readily referenced. But they have been notoriously 
absent from popular video films. The reasons for this absence are well documented in 
the fifth chapter below.  
To be clear, the scope of this study encompasses English-language video films 
depicting postcolonial Nigerian government’s actions, and reactions traceable to 
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successive military regimes (1967 onwards) as well as activities performed by 
institutions set up by the country’s successive governments such as the Nigeria Police 
Force (NPF) or the Nigerian Army (NA). Also within this study’s purview are films that 
deal with the explicit and oblique treatment and references to the business of 
governance, state security and national integration. This includes, for instance, the 
Federal Military Government’s (FMG) decision to go to war with a secessionist 
southeastern group of Nigeria in 1967 (the details of which are provided in chapter 
two), the military directives and policies of the Heads of State between 1967 and 1998 
(also in the second chapter), especially as portrayed in the films. Of course, the selective 
approaches of filmmakers reveal that some cases of governance are privileged, leaving 
out of the filmic gaze such figures as General Obasanjo, Shehu Yar’Adua, Shehu 
Shagari and Muhammed Buhari, who were at the helm of affairs from 1975-1985. 
Coincidentally, the period in question is dominated by military regimes with six out of 
eight Heads of State rising to political power through coup d’états. The filmmakers’ 
conception of the political past reflects “a concern with good governance and ethical 
conduct in civil matters that cuts across ethnic and other cultural boundaries” (Adesokan 
2009b: 601).  
The study focuses on films made in the southern part of Nigeria. Ostensibly 
absent from the research design are Hausa films. Two reasons are responsible for this. 
First, the civil unrest in northern Nigeria in recent years caused by Muslim 
fundamentalists makes travel and movement within the region imprudent. Efforts to 
secure assistance from officials at the Nigerian Film Corporation (NFC) without 
travelling to the northern city of Jos were futile. Second, the filmmaking practice of 
southerners differs from that of the northerners who are heavily influenced by Indian 
melodramatic films (Larkin, 2008). Therefore, even though the study is aware of the 
increasing importance of political films from other parts of the country, its main focus is 
on the films from the south western part of Nigeria (Lagos).  
The southern Nigerian films are fascinating in how they combine official and 
unofficial versions of the political past. They are set between 2001 and 2013, and adopt 
a contemporariness that, arguably challenges the notion of historical films. While they 
may not fit the descriptions of western historical films as theorized by Robert 
Rosenstone (1995), they do depict recognizable and verifiable periods and people, 
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whose footprints remain in the political arena of contemporary Nigeria. This research 
will analyse the representation of ‘history’ in such Nigerian films.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the Study 
The present study engages with the debate and representation of history – and their 
implications for social transformation – as produced in postcolonial Nigerian films in a 
retrospective manner. The rewritten past can best be understood in terms of motivations, 
attitudes, feelings and reactions uttered by the protagonists themselves (Schwandt, 
2000), hence the choice of qualitative research methods further explained below.  
The immediate objectives of this research are as follows: 
1. to investigate the motivation of filmmakers’ construction of 1967-1998 Nigeria 
in their video films; 
2. to identify and evaluate the narrative techniques evident in select video-films’ 
historical representations;   
3. to critically examine the ideology promoted or subverted in the video films 
representing the past; 
4. to evaluate film journalists’ reception of fictionalized narratives of historically 
significant events and people  
The objectives stated above are pertinent to the discussions of video films and historical 
constructions and they directly informed the formulation of the research questions 
below.  
  
1.3 Research Questions 
In this research, I am interested in the question: why and how have Nigerian filmmakers 
represented the country’s key historical and political moments? The research question, 
with its various implications for social change, is sub-divided as follows:  
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1) What factors have motivated Nigerian filmmakers in representing national 
events from 1967-1998, and why?   
2) What narrative techniques have Nigerian filmmakers used to reconstruct the 
historical processes under study? 
3) In what ways do the films promote or subvert the dominant ideology of the 
historical period they represent?  
4) What reception do film journalists give to the fictionalized narratives of 
historically significant events and people?  
 
1.4 Originality and Justification for the Study 
The constructions of the past on film have been the subject of academic debate for 
several decades now. Robert Rosenstone and Robert Brent Toplin amongst others have 
devoted their academic endeavours to justifying historical films as legitimate ways of 
doing history. Although this project is not designed to tow the lines of the two historians 
mentioned above, their works have laid the foundation for reflecting, even if mildly, on 
the nature and properties of representing the past on screen. In Africa, the subject is 
gaining grounds at least within the last two and a half decades. Written from historians’ 
perspectives, the aptly titled African History on Screen (2007) provides relevant 
information, based on Rosenstone’s (2006) ground-laying work, on the extent of 
historical depictions of Africa and its people with no mention of Nigerian history and 
Nigerian film. The contributors to the volume focused on the celluloid filmmaking 
practice of Francophone Africa and on films made by Europeans on African subjects. In 
the light of this ommision, Nollywood’s attempt at representing the past ought to be 
brought to the fore, and will be achieved through the prism of popular cinema.  
Nichols (2001) and Shafik (2007) have provided justification for the study of 
popular cinema. Nichols made a distinction between the documentary (social 
representation films) and the feature film (fictionalized portrayals of wishes, dreams, 
nightmares and dreads).  The latter he claimed, “gives a sense of what we wish, or fear, 
reality itself might be or become” (Nichols, 2001: 1) as opposed to what it already is. 
Similarly, Shafik observed: 
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No wonder popular cinema, contrary to the individualist and 
sophisticated art house film, is characterized by its strong appeal to the 
masses, due to …its recurrent dramatic patterns, ritualized performances 
and some almost archetypal, yet contradictory stereotypes. Being the 
products of its producers’ and consumers’ inner reality…it offers 
seemingly trivial, but also blatant and dismissive representations that 
seem constantly to oscillate between realist referentiality and symbolical, 
metaphorical, and allegorical codings…(2007: 2) 
 
Both authors made a case for researching the portrayal of reality in feature films and 
popular cinema, not necessarily the representation of the past. But Shafik’s point makes 
reference to the various ways by which reality can be represented or mediated as in the 
case of the filmmaker. The important consideration is that the seemingly trivial nature 
of popular cinema has produced a tendency to disregard it, but this study takes up 
Nichols’, Shafik’s and other scholars’ calls to engage with popular cinema.  
As highlighted in the opening statements, there have been two approaches to the 
study of Nollywood. First, scholars such as Haynes and Okome (2000) Haynes (2000, 
2007c), Barrot (2008), Hugo (2009) have presented holistic examinations of the video-
film industry, analyzing the themes, geography, setting, iconography, criticisms and 
even the socio-political contexts of production. This is what is referred to as holistic in 
the sense that such scholars’ intellectual ‘camera’ pans the entire spectrum of the 
emerging industry. Second, others including Adejunmobi (2002), Akpabio (2007), 
Ayakaroma (2007), Okome (2007), Wendl (2007), Esan (2008), Chowdhury et al 
(2008), Alamu (2010), Lobato (2010) and Sereda (2010) have been selective in their 
analyses of Nollywood, paying more attention to one of genres, iconography, audiences, 
economics or creative technology rather than bits of everything in one essay like the 
first group. However, little attention has been directed at examining and analyzing the 
political past as represented in Nollywood.  It is this gap that the present study seeks to 
fill bearing in mind that African historical films reflect the spirit with which filmmakers 
of early African cinema sought to reconnect with the past, and their implications for the 
present. 
The identified gap in academic literature is partly the result of Nigerian 
filmmakers’ preference for melodramatic genre, which largely reflects the daily 
concerns and aspirations of the people. Although Nigerian filmmakers have reflected on 
politics (Death of a Black President, 1983), slave trade (Sitanda, 2007), political 
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corruption (Arugba 2008), the Niger Delta crises (Liquid Black Gold, 2008) for 
instance, few have dealt with specific national and historical moments from 1967-1998. 
Even so, those few have yet to be analyzed and documented in any scholarly fashion, 
hence the scant literature on films representing the past. 
 
1.5 Theoretical Framework  
There are many theoretical persuasions that can be brought in to guide the study of 
Nigerian filmmakers and how they re-enact their national political past? What is crucial 
though is that African and specifically, Nigerian films ought to be examined on their 
own terms rather than imposing western film theories or drawing parallels and 
comparisons with Hollywood (Ukadike, 2014; Petty, 2012; Haynes, 2000; Schmidt, 
1997). That is why the study of Nigerian video films has been fittingly subsumed in 
studies of African popular arts drawing from Karin Barber’s (1987, 1997a, 2014) essays 
on the subject, and extended by several scholars including but not limited to Haynes 
(2000), Haynes and Okome (2000) and Abah (2009). The reflections on African popular 
arts as sites of power, acceptance, resistance and regulation will be revisited in the 
course of this work. According to Barber (1987), “if we are now trying to see history 
and politics from the other side of the African social tapestry, popular art forms are vital 
to this endeavour” (pp. 3-4). This “other side” is that occupied by the majority of 
Africans, who have neither access nor control of the official channels of public 
communication.  
The conceptual model of this research is based on the need to interrogate the 
generative and interpretative properties of popular video films that represent history. By 
generative is meant the dynamics and politics of representing the past on video with the 
possibilities inherent in the medium, whereas the interpretative properties are the tools 
that make them capable of signifying (Hall, 2013). This suggests the relationship 
between producers and consumers of video films (popular arts), which according to 
Barber (2014) emerges from a “common repertoire” (p. xx) of knowledge. These works 
of art are “created in order to be commented upon, interpreted and re-created” (p. xxi). 
The relationship between producers and consumers, between generation and 
interpretation is neither straightforward nor static. It is negotiated through material signs 
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and objects, and inflected by each one’s ‘frameworks of knowledge’ (Hall 2001, 2013). 
One relies on the other, yet each is distinct. These relatively new artistic expressions of 
political history, which Atton (2002) refers to as ‘alternative media’, bear special traits 
that make them capable of expressing (signifying) the conflicts and assumptions 
inherent in depicting a political past. Barber’s (1987) reference to sub-texts and imagery 
in popular arts reinforces the special traits employed by their producers to communicate 
in ways that the audience understands.  
In examining the generative properties of historical representation, I examine 
first the motivation and second the techniques of narration. The first enables the agency 
of the cultural producer, which is much neglected, subtly implied or treated in isolation 
in academic discourse, to emerge strongly.  The second permits an interpretation that 
fuses with ideological critique and consumers’ readings of the films. This allows the 
researcher to address the questions of motivation, narratives, ideology and reception in 
an original way. It eschews the textual analyses that focus on products or works in the 
way that Barber (1987) does because of its marginal attention to the people who 
produce and consume such products. The latter, she examines elsewhere, but there is a 
range of benefits derivable from the combination of texts, filmmakers and audiences, 
which this study engages in.  
Recent studies on political history in film such as Hesling (2001) and Ebbrecht 
(2007) uncover the narrative structure of historical films. They present interesting 
comparisons of German, American and British techniques in the depictions of historical 
figures, locations and events. On the one hand, Hesling asserted that films interrogate 
the past with their own questions and strategies, which has direct implications for the 
answers and explanations that such films produce. On the other hand, Ebbrecht pointed 
out that in Germany, television historical documentaries were fusing properties of 
documentaries with feature films to make them more accessible to popular taste and 
imagination. This idea has been extended to other parts of the world including Africa, 
and particularly in the work of Francoise Pfaff. From inception, Franco-phone African 
filmmakers have been involved in enacting historical events on film.  Pfaff (1992) 
identified a number of films which represent history from an African perspective as 
opposed to the European and American examples discussed by Hesling. Cham (2004) 
also noted that “historicizing African […] events has emerged a prominent trait of 
19 
 
African film culture” (p.49). Pfaff’s (2004) later work draws examples from African 
films such as Emitai (1971), Ceddo (1976), Sarraounia (1986), Heritage…Africa (1987) 
and Camp de Thiaroye (1988). 
For the purposes of this study, insights from post-colonial theory will be merged 
with theories of African popular arts to provide the basis of discussion. In discussing 
theories of African film, Murphy (2000) has insightfully questioned various theories of 
African cinema beginning with issues of authenticity, orality, cultural materialism and 
ending in the domains of postcolonial theory. He advocates the position of the latter as 
providing the most effective framework for appreciating African film given the similar 
colonial histories of African states and the various ideological standpoints of African 
cineastes. However, postcolonial theory alone cannot provide a determinate foundation 
for discussing Nigerian video films although it will certainly shed light on the social and 
political contexts of video-film production in Britain’s former colony.  
Murphy’s (2000) case for the usefulness of postcolonial theory in unpacking the 
commonalities existent in African arts and culture recognises the differences inherent in 
various African states and cultures. He observes that “post-colonialism explores links 
between African cultures in the light of their shared history of colonial exploitation and 
their rebellion against this oppression (without assuming that this shared experience is 
identical in every African state)” (p.248). Nigerian filmmakers were not motivated by a 
decolonization agenda (which postcolonial theories largely examine) as were their 
counterparts in the Francophone African countries. What perhaps they sought to resist 
through their political films is their own government’s repression, corruption and lack 
of accountability.  Murphy’s position is in harmony with Bhabha’s (1994) view, which 
states that “postcolonial criticism bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces of 
cultural representation involved in the contest for political and social authority within 
the modern world order” (p. 171). These positions require further comments on 
postcolonialism, which will be reflected on in subsequent sections of this study.  
African cinema has also been classified as Third World cinema (Russell, 1998, 
Sholat and Stam, 1994; Gabriel, 1991) but the Nigerian filmmaking model does not sit 
well within that paradigm because it has not been concerned with rewriting colonial 
history. Unlike their literary counterparts, Nigerian filmmakers initially concerned 
themselves with the daily aspirations, anxieties and modes of contemporary existence in 
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rural and urban spaces of Nigeria (Haynes 2000), and sought to portray the daily lived 
experiences of the masses (Abah 2009; Okome 2010).   
Textual analyses and ideology critique will draw on the contextual and post-
structuralist views which, as Kellner (n.d.) notes, expresses a “multiplicity of voices 
rather than as the enunciation of one single ideological voice which is then to be 
specified and attacked” (p. 12). This approach is useful because films emerge from 
social contexts that might influence the representation of images and sounds (and 
consequently their interpretation) even when the producers are ignorant of such 
influences as Barber (1987) affirms, and as is shown below.  
 
1.6 Methodological Approach  
Qualitative research enables the in-depth interrogation of social activities and 
interactions in their natural – or constructed – settings. Marshall and Rossman (1999) 
follow the ‘natural settings’ thought, contrasting it with research undertaken in 
laboratories. According to them, the qualitative form of research is not only carried out 
with people where they live; it is also “pragmatic, interpretive and grounded in the lived 
experiences of people” (p. 2).  The idea that qualitative research belongs to natural 
settings may be problematised when using interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) 
and other methods of data collection. Except in impromptu situations, the mere notice of 
interview served to a prospective interviewee causes a number of reactions that may 
interfere with the ‘naturalness’ of the setting (McQueen & Knussen (2002). Besides, 
Shipman (1972: xi) noted that the research situation “is necessarily artificial”. For the 
purposes of this study, natural settings refer to places where people normally are, live, 
work and recreate.  
Copies of the six films reviewed in this study were obtained from film markets 
in Lagos, Nigeria after efforts to secure comprehensive lists of films from the Nigerian 
Film Corporation (NFC) and the National Film and Video Census Board (NFVCB) 
failed. It was envisaged that a list from these film agencies would provide the basis for 
sampling. As yet, such comprehensive catalogues of video films depicting the period 
under study from which the researcher could draw a sample is non-existent. The 
selection of the films was, therefore, based on: 1) availability of copies in the film 
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markets (sadly, a strong preservation culture in Nigeria is non-existent; some of the 
films made in the early 1990s have gone into extinction and not even the producers of 
such works can provide them); 2) their portrayals of the social and political events of 
1967-1998; 3) produced or directed by Nigerian filmmakers. Preliminary research and 
interviews helped to ascertain the choices made.   
The past can be represented based on available data and representations in other 
media. To probe the research questions stated above, two main techniques will be 
deployed: textual analysis and semi-structured interviews. Stuart Hall (1997) refers to 
textuality as a source of meaning and as that from which the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of meaning can be deduced. This calls for a post-structuralist approach to 
unpacking the meanings in the film texts. As a legitimate means of interrogating film 
texts, textual analyses have been performed by Haynes (1995-2014), Okome (2007), 
Mushengyezi (2009), Austin (2010), Cieplak (2010) in which they analysed 
representations of fundamentalist ideology, memory, genocide, femininity and identity 
in African and non-African films to reveal the multiple layers of meanings inherent in 
them.  
Because interpreting media productions is a complex task due to the multiple 
meanings that a film text may carry, interviews with the film directors and producers 
will enrich the discussions of the films. Besides, it will enable the researcher overcome 
the dominant text-based readings of such texts as most of the literature on Nigerian 
films reveal. The political economy of representation and production, the prospects and 
challenges they had to contend with are variables, which can be obtained through in-
depth interviews. Film scholars like Pfaff (1992), Ukadike (2002), Esonwanne (2008) 
and McCluskey (2009) have equally interviewed filmmakers on their art to provide 
nuanced readings that transcend the interpretation of images on the screen. A total of 
thirty-five 50-minute recorded interviews with film directors, producers and ancillary 
members of the crew whose contributions are note-worthy were conducted. The 
interviews comprised a minimum of 20 open-ended questions derived from the research 
questions stated above. The researcher also raised follow up questions based on initial 
responses from the filmmakers on the production and distribution of the films. 
The reception of the films will also be assessed through interviews with 
Nigerian journalists selected on the basis of the snowball sampling method. According 
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to Miles and Huberman (1994), the snowball or chain sampling “identifies cases of 
interest from people who know people who know what cases are information-rich” (p. 
28). This is similar to Marshall and Rossman’s (1999) term ‘elite interviewing’ (p. 113). 
Elite here is not necessarily the best educated or wealthiest intellectuals but individuals 
who could be referred to as experts because of the work they do or have been doing. 
Such interviews are conducted with “individuals considered to be … well-informed 
people in an organisation or community; they are selected for interviews on the basis of 
their expertise in areas relevant to the research” Marshall and Rossman (ibid) and they 
are identified by the researcher through referrals. A different set of thirteen 60-minute 
interviews were conducted with film journalists/arts and culture editors of major 
newspapers in Lagos – the nation’s commercial centre and birthplace of Nollywood.  
In the following sections, further rationale for adopting journalists as audiences 
in this study is provided. It suffices to state here that the information obtained from 
journalists will also provide useful data for exhaustively discussing films, most of which 
were made in the past and whose far-flung spectators are now inaccessible. The 
members of the viewing audience who are closest to the film industry are journalists. As 
such, they possess a wealth of information about the selected films that the general 
audience lacks. The journalists maintain weekly columns in the newspapers on the 
operations of the industry, and get invited to film premieres and awards ceremonies. 
These journalists write in national daily newspapers such as The Guardian, The Punch, 
This Day, Vanguard, Nigerian Tribune, Business Day, Entertainment Express, The 
Nation, National Mirror and Saturday Independent, having covered the arts and creative 
industries for a minimum of 5 years. Although journalists’ views usually reflect those of 
the institutions they work for, research triangulation allows the researcher to mitigate 
the biases of a single method.  
 
1.7 Developing an Appropriate Research Design  
The necessity of this section arose from the critical comments by scholars attending 
conferences in which preliminary findings of this research were presented. Studying the 
reception of films made between 2001 and 2005 in the absence of substantial 
documentary evidence posed a challenge. It was therefore considered crucial to 
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demonstrate how the voice of journalists might be a legitimate response to a 
methodological impasse in doing qualitative research.  
David Silverman (2005) noted that, “[A]n insistence that any research…should 
follow a purely quantitative logic would simply rule out the study of many interesting 
phenomena relating to what people actually do in their day-to-day lives…and private 
places” (p. 6). In comparison to the annual output of video-films, the historically 
themed ones are almost negligible which suggests that a qualitative reading and analysis 
of film texts, and interviews will appropriately respond to the research questions above. 
As noted by Marshall and Rossman (1999), qualitative researchers fare better with small 
sizes of participants. Furthermore, Denzin and Lincoln (2000:10) cited in Silverman 
(2005) argue that:  
qualitative investigators…get closer to the actor’s perspective through 
detailed interviewing and observation…quantitative researchers are 
seldom able to capture their subjects’ perspectives because they have to 
rely on more remote, inferential empirical methods and materials. (p. 10) 
 
In determining the research methodology, a pilot study was conducted in February 
2012. The study entailed reading six historically themed films, analysing them, 
screening them before groups of graduate and undergraduate students, interviewing the 
film directors, and conducting focus group discussions on the films. An unsuccessful 
attempt was also made to generate interest in the six films with the use of Facebook in 
2012. First, there was a general wall post and there was no response from friends I 
asked for comments because of a lack of interest in the films. Second, I posted the 
comments on films on other people’s walls with the intention of attracting responses 
from their friends. That also failed. The alternative was to write individual mails to 
acquaintances to invite them to screenings and discussions. The aim of the pilot was to 
test the suitability of the proposed qualitative research methods and to identify their 
weaknesses with the hope of mitigating them (Shipman 1972, Silverman 2010).  
Students between the ages of 20 and 40 were chosen for the pilot because this 
group of people constitute the bulk of today’s movie going population. Besides, it was 
convenient for the researcher to engage with an already ‘formed’ group since the 
common purpose of obtaining a 1st or 2nd degree brought them together. The level of 
familiarity among the student-participants encouraged unhindered discussion about the 
24 
 
films, which was beneficial to the research agenda. Three-quarters described themselves 
as Yorubas (one of the major Nigerian ethnic groups) and the other quarter were a mix 
of Hausa, Urhobo, Igbo and Efik. There were screenings and discussions (open to all) 
of:  
Afonja (2002) – 9 MSc students 
Liquid Black Gold (2008) – 12 MSc students 
Anini (2005) – 26 undergraduate students 
The recruitment for this exercise was based on the invitees’ professional relationship 
with the film industry.  At two focus group discussions, snapshots of scenes from the 
films above were projected to the group and discussions were held afterwards. It was 
observed that snapshots of films are poor substitutes for a viewing experience, which 
had implications for the kinds of responses the participants made.  
Group one: 10 people (screenwriter, screenwriting students, film reporter/critic, 
business man with an interest in film production, aspiring film director, three PhD 
candidates researching Nollywood) 
Group two:  three people (business man, two film aficionados) 
Although the pilot study yielded insights to the understanding of what ‘historical films’ 
mean to young Nigerians, revealed the disenchantment of youth viewers who disdain 
Nollywood video films, and showed up the enthusiasm of film directors, the pilot 
emphasized the limitations of the method. Assembling participants for film screenings 
and group interviews, thereafter, proved to be problematic, because both viewing and 
discussion of a film required a minimum of three hours which some of the MSc students 
could not afford. The result was a drop in the number who started viewing from 15 to 
nine and less. Even though they were properly briefed on the nature of the research and 
my expectations in an e-mail, participants strolled in minutes after the film had started; 
they walked in and out of the room during screening, sometimes noisily. Because it was 
a constructed setting, some participants were cautious of my presence and even 
enquired as to what sort of responses they should make. I simply informed them to 
watch as if they were at home. Observations were made during the viewing, and verbal 
as well as non-verbal communicative practices were recorded.  
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At the screening of Afonja, a Yoruba language film, the spectators were pleased 
with the setting, the props and the war costume. They disagreed on the particular 
version of the story seen, noting that the 19th century narrative of the takeover of the 
Yoruba kingdom as depicted in Afonja was not entirely accurate. The non-Yoruba 
members of the audience were more sympathetic to the story which they described as 
being rich in Yoruba culture and language. While the Liquid Black Gold screened, the 
viewers laughed often at the corrupt practices exhibited by the community chiefs, 
scowled at the opening lecture between the protagonist and his wife as well as at the 
anachronism that placed militants in a military-controlled Niger Delta. Compared to 
Afonja, the Liquid Black Gold was strongly criticised for what the viewers called 
“insufficient research and trivialization of the complexities of the Niger Delta conflict” 
(post-screening discussion). This was not the case with Anini, which was warmly 
received by the students. They were pleased with the sound track, the pidgin (a 
combination of English and indigenous language) and the acting which was described 
as believable and representative of the real story. Majority of the students who saw 
Anini did not witness the actual 1986/7 events in Benin City, but they confirmed having 
heard the stories about the armed robbery in the past.  
After each screening, the researcher asked questions about themes, acting, 
dialogue, points of view and the political undertones of the films. Throughout the 
discussion, I was perceived as a Nollywood emissary because of my perceived 
sympathy towards the filmmakers. As a result of my interactions with the filmmakers, 
which I made known to the participants, I was often asked to “tell them to make better 
films”. Emphasis was laid on the participants’ understanding of a political/historical 
film and whether they would call the ones before them by that title. The responses 
always tried to draw a comparison with Hollywood (with Titanic as the classic historical 
genre), or referred to Sango or dismissed the films as being talky and documentary-like. 
More importantly, fewer people agreed to stay on to discuss the films, which suggested 
that too much demands on their time had been made. The alternative of asking 
participants to see the films at their convenience before attending a focus group 
discussion was not viable due to the unavailability of the films. This sent me back to the 
drawing board to re-plan the data collection procedures as well as learn to ask questions 
in the ‘language’ of the interviewees as is suggested by Silverman (2010). Finally, 
individual interviews of filmmakers and journalists (representing the viewing audience) 
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seemed more realistic and achievable. Further justification on the inclusion of 
journalists’ perspective in this study – an original contribution to a methodological 
question – is provided in the seventh chapter.  
 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
After an introductory chapter that lays out the research agenda with its contextual and 
theoretical framework, amongst other sub- but no less important elements, the second 
and third chapters follow. Both chapters are extended discussions of concepts and 
theories guiding the research. Technically, they constitute the literature review and 
provide further guidance to the reader on the subsequent chapters. The fourth chapter 
identified early political and historical filmmaking in Nigeria by examining the 
motivation, narrative techniques, ideology and reception of the films. It was considered 
necessary to structure chapters five to eight around the research questions. Chapter five 
deals the first research question, six with the second and so on. This was to ensure 
accountability to such an extent that questions raised in the first chapter were 
sufficiently discussed in later chapters. The last chapter, nine, ties up discussions, 
provides areas for further interrogation and reiterates the academic contribution made in 
this work.  
To avoid repetitive entries of interview locations, it is important to state that all 
the interviews reported in this study were carried out in Lagos by the researcher. There 
were also email, telephone, Skype and Whatsapp interviews. These alternatives to face-
to-face, most of which the interviews are, arose at the request of the interviewees who 
were travelling, had pressing deadlines to meet, were ill or were not based in Lagos at 
the time the information was sought. I use the term ‘personal communication’ to denote 








CONTEXTUAL REVIEW OF 1967-1998 NIGERIA 
2.1 Introduction 
The political history of Nigeria is well documented in an astonishing number of history 
books and policy documents. It is pertinent to repeat certain relevant aspects of it here, 
and thus situate the reader in the contexts depicted in the films. This chapter therefore 
seeks to provide the national context of the period between 1967 and 1998. What 
Nigeria was like as a post-colonial state in that span of 32 years is of importance to the 
overall objectives of the study. It is believed that such an understanding will shed light 
on the filmmakers’ representations in their films. Brief examinations of the political, 
economic and socio-cultural situations follow.   
   
2.2 Brief Introduction to the Period before 1967 (events that led to 1967) 
The role of the British colonial government is often emphasized in the structuring of the 
Nigerian State, often in disapproving terms. It is a commonly held belief that the 
British, upon their exit from Nigeria, gave power to the northerners, who in turn would 
serve the former’s interests. Achebe wrote, “it is now widely known that Sir James 
Robertson played an important role in overseeing the elections (or lack of) at 
independence, throwing his weight behind Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who had been 
tapped to become Nigeria’s first prime minister”  (2012: 50). This northern prominence 
might not have been a direct cause of the Nigerian Civil War, but it contributed to the 
ethnic problems, fears, nepotism and corruption pertetuated in the north, and which the 
‘Igbo coup plotters’ resisted. Llyod (1970) and Atofarati (1992) highlight the blame 
Nigerians impose on Britain for the present socio-political order of the country. As 
noted by the latter:  
The former colonial master decided to keep the country one in order to 
effectively control her vital resources for their economic interests.  Thus, 
for administrative convenience the Northern and Southern Nigeria were 
amalgamated in 1914. Thereafter the only thing this people had in 
common was the name of their country since each side had different 
administrative set - up. This alone was an insufficient basis for true 
unity. (Atofarati, 1992: para 3)  
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Nationalist sentiments grew on the basis of ethnic and tribal lines rather than on national 
interests and unity. In the 1950s, both British and Nigerians imagined that the western-
type multi-party system of governance was feasible in Nigeria, but Isichei (1981) 
observed that the system broke down with “amazing rapidity” (p. 468) due to ethnic 
affiliations and the winner-take-all theory (ibid). However, I argue that ethnicity and 
one of its offspring, namely nepotism was primarily responsible for the state of affairs 
in Nigerian politics prior to 1967. Since the 1958 constitution regionalised the country, 
citizens held onto their regional identity as the national creed. At the same time, the 
ugly embers of tribalism and sectionalism had been fanned into a deadly flame by all 
the political leaders.  These leaders rode on the crest of this cancerous tribalism and 
ignorance of the people to power, at the expense of national unity and the nation. 
Chinua Achebe in his last memories of the war remembered this: 
The structure of the country was such that there was an inbuilt power 
struggle among the ethnic groups, and of course those who were in 
power wanted to stay in power. The easiest and simplest way to retain it, 
even in a limited area, was to appeal to tribal sentiments, so they were 
egregiously exploited in the 1950s and 1960s. (Achebe, 2012: 51)  
 
Nigeria had a federal system of government with northern, southern and western regions 
being governed separately, but accountable to the central government. Several factors 
coalesced to usher the young independent nation that Nigeria was into her first military 
coup in January 1966. After gaining independence from British Colonial rule in October 
1960, Nigeria’s First Republic (1960-1966) was characterised by factors such as 
political instability, fear of domination and its consequent marginalisation. Toyin Falola 
and Matthew Heaton in their book, A History of Nigeria, provide a fairly detailed 
account of the political, economic and social factors that led the military to intervene. 
They wrote: 
The fear that emerged in the 1960s was that of “domination”. 
Southerners feared that an NPC-controlled government representing the 
interests of the Northern Region would divert resources to the north, cut 
southerners out of their position in the administration and the military 
and gradually Islamise the country. Northerners feared that southern 
“domination” by Awolowo’s Action Group and Azikiwe’s newly 
renamed National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) would 
allocate resources to the more developed Western and Eastern Regions, 
which would prevent the north from ever developing in a competitive 
way. (Falola and Heaton 2008: 165) 
29 
 
These fears, together with uneven ethnic representations in the army, doctored census 
figures, heavily rigged or boycotted elections, insincere political affiliations and the 
reduction in the price of cocoa in the Western region led to riots. This infuriated the 
Igbos who, by then, were “tired of the inability of the federal system to keep the peace 
and work in the best interests of all Nigerians...” (Falola and Heaton 2008: 172). 
Besides, on assumption of office after Nzeogwu’s coup, Gen. Aguiyi Ironsi, through a 
decree in 1966, abolished the political parties and the regions and unified the civil 
service. This, in addition to Ironsi’s heavy association with Igbo officers, escalated the 
fears of the northerners who believed in the federal system because it guaranteed their 
protection. Elizabeth Isichei, in an earlier account of Nigerian history, also provides a 
record of ethnic fears within Nigeria that gave rise to the Igbo-Hausa attacks. Quoting 
the northerners according to A. Kirk-Greene (1966), she observed: 
We all have our fears of one another. Some fear that opportunities in 
their own areas are limited and they would therefore wish to expand and 
venture unhampered in other parts. Some fear the sheer weight of 
numbers of other parts which they feel could be used to the detriment of 
their own interests. Some fear the sheer weight of skills and the 
aggressive drive of other groups (Isichei 1983: 469)  
 
In 1967 when the two-and-half-year Nigerian Civil War (6 July 1967 – 15 January 
1970) broke out, Nigeria was under the military rule of General Yakubu Gowon who 
ascended to power on August 1, 1966 following a July counter-coup d’etat. That coup 
was a response to the January 15, 1966 coup that eliminated the civilian Hausas from 
power. Gowon took over the reins of power from General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi 
(January – July 1966) and was himself later ousted by northerners who gave power to 
Murtala Mohammed in July 1975. A point which is never omitted in the discourse of 
the January and July 1966 coup is ethnicity, tribalism and corruption. Successive coup 
plotters justify their motivation by claiming to rid the nation from tribalism, disunity 
and widespread corruption. Whereas the southern Igbos spearheaded the first coup, the 
northern Hausas masterminded the latter to rein in the powers of the southern Igbos in a 
revenge coup (Achebe, 2012). The January coup was largely executed by young Igbo 
soldiers, popularly known as the “five majors” (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 172) namely 
Nzeogwu, Ifeajuna, Okafor, Anuforo, all Igbos and Ademoyega, a Yoruba man while 
the July coup had behind it a number of northern soldiers, chief among them, General 
Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma.  
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On May 24, 1966, the Federal Government under Aguiyi-Ironsi announced the 
abolishment of the federal system, a ban on political parties and the unification of the 
civil service. The consequence of this is best understood in the words of Enwefah: 
Aguiyi-Ironsi’s decrees and his intended civil service reform strikes fear 
among aggrieved northerners. During May, June and July, hundreds of 
Igbos are beaten and murdered in the northern cities of Kaduna, Kano, 
Jos, Sokoto, Zaria and Bauchi amidst serious agitations for the ouster of 
Aguiyi-Ironsi and the return of federalism. Ibos flee the north for their 
eastern region homeland (2012: 63)  
 
Although the decree was rescinded, the killing of the Ibos continued till September and 
October, during which a massacre that claimed over 30,000 Ibo lives ensued. Achebe 
(2012) pointed out that the “northerners turned on Igbo civilians living in the North and 
unleashed waves of brutal massacres that...was describe[d] as a pogrom” (p. 82). At the 
same time, the Ibos unleashed a vengeance on the northerners who resided in the eastern 
region. A government intervention was sorely needed at this point to assuage tensions 
and restore peace to the regions. But that did not happen until a meeting of the Supreme 
Military Council of Nigeria was convened in a neutral territory in neighbouring Aburi, 
Ghana in January 1967. Achebe (2012: 85-86) documents the topics discussed at the 
meeting, some of the resolutions that were reached following deliberations by the FMG 
and the Eastern Government, particularly that of “emerging from these deliberations 
with Nigeria intact as a confederation of the regions” (p. 86), and the subsequent failure 
to implement resolutions two months after the meeting. When Gowon called for a 
constitutional reform in compliance with the Aburi agreement, “members of the federal 
civil service galvanised themselves in energetic opposition to the agreements of the 
Aburi Accord” (Achebe 2012: 86). The perceived or actual resistance to implementing 
the Aburi Accord, with the multiple interpretations that such an (in)action received 
contributed to the Civil War. 
 
2.3 Political Situation in Nigeria 1967-1976 
The history of Nigeria since independence is rife with ethnic and regional cleavages, 
and this was manifested in the civil war. About 40 years later, it would take on religious 
undertones led by the Boko Haram group. In January 1967, the then Head of the FMG, 
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Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Gen. Odimegwu Ojukwu, Governor of the Eastern Region and 
other members of the Supreme Military Council met in Aburi, Ghana. The meeting was 
led by the Chairman of the Ghana National Liberation Council, Lt. Gen. J.A.Ankrah. As 
stated above, the agreements reached at the meeting were given different interpretations 
by the FMG and the eastern region leader, Ojukwu (Atofarati, 1992). 
Enraged by the assassinations of the Igbos in northern Nigeria, the non-
compliance of Gowon to the Ibo demands, and particularly by the creation of a 12-state 
federal structure on May 27, 1967, General Odimegwu Ojukwu declared an independent 
Biafran State on May 30, 1967 and led a secessionist movement. This was intended to 
separate the southern parts of the country from the north. Ojukwu instructed the Igbos in 
the north to emigrate southwards and vice versa. The Federal Military Government 
(FMG) frowned at such a move and under the directives of the Head of State fought 
back to re-unite the country. Gen. Gowon’s creation of new states in which the three 
regions and the capital territory were divided into twelve new states was a move to 
placate the minority regions and weaken Ojukwu’s hold on the south easterners. During 
the war, there were casualties on each side even though the Nigerian army was 
ostensibly stronger than their Biafran counterpart. The FMG took strategic political and 
economic steps including blockades and currency change to force a re-integration of the 
Biafrans to Nigeria. In 1968, “Nigeria introduced newly designed currency notes in a 
move to stop Biafra’s use of the Nigerian pounds to buy arms abroad. By January 30, 
the Biafran government issued its own currency, the Biafran Pound and postage stamps 
as well in response to Nigeria’s abolition of its old currency” (Enwefah, 2012: 92). The 
areas around the country that were cordoned off made import and export of food and 
requisite war items impossible for the Biafrans while the currency change rendered 
Biafrans’ money useless. Thus, they were deprived of even the most basic needs.  
The Biafrans called out to the international community, claiming that “Gowon’s 
policies were proof of his genocidal conspiracy among the Igbo” (Falola and Heaton 
2008:  177). The cries of genocide drew the attention of the previously aloof African, 
European and Asian countries. Help came although the countries that intervened did not 
lose sight of their own political interests and position in global leadership. According to 
Falola and Heaton, the then USSR supported the FMG and “China, seeing a chance to 
challenge the USSR for leadership of the communist world, also expressed its sympathy 
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for Biafra...” (2008: 178). Aid also came in the form of food and medicines through the 
Catholic Church and the International Red Cross.  
On October 1, 1969, FG released from prison, Soyinka who openly supported 
Biafra (Enwefah 2012:132). January 9, 1970, Ojukwu responding to his advisers flees 
Biafra through the Uli airstrip to exile in Ivory Coast. He leaves Major Gen. Phillip 
Effiong in charge of the Biafrans. The next day, Effiong broadcasts Biafrans peaceful 
negotiation with Nigeria, desiring a resolution of the Civil War. Six days later, January 
15, Gowon broadcasts his ‘no victor, no vanquished’ speech, grants amnesty to Biafrans 
and in the following months, the Biafran region is reinstated as the East Central State on 
an equal standing with the other 11 states. Ukpabi Asika continues being the 
administrator as was in 1967.  
Several other significant events occurred within this period such as the release of 
the first indigenous film, an adaptation of Wole Soyinka’s Kongi’s Harvest as well as 
Nigeria’s belonging to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). But 
it is necessary to limit these accounts to the political events that have a bearing on the 
films under study. The construction for the National Theatre, one of the expected sites 
for the Second Festival of Black Arts and Culture began in June 1973.   
Gowon was severely criticised for flagrant government expenditure for the 
national census whose results were eventually repealed and for the cement scandal and 
corruption among other practices that ran contrary to his nine-point programme upon 
assumption of office (Isichei 1983, Falola and Heaton 2008). 
In July 1975, Gowon was eliminated in a bloodless coup while he was attending 
the Organisation of African Unity Summit in Uganda. That brought 37-year old Gen. 
Murtala Mohammed to power and ushered in the third military regime in Nigeria’s 
history. Amongst other political efforts, Gen. Mohammed dismissed several senior 
officers who served in the Gowon regime and replaced them with supposedly loyal 
military officers. He also repealed the 1973 census figures and, for national planning 
purposes, reverted to the 1963 results. Mohammed announced plans to return to civilian 
rule by October 1, 1979. His government was short-lived because in February 1976, he 
was assassinated by Lt. Col. Buka Dimka on his way to his office in Dodan Barracks, 
Lagos and power went to the Chief of Staff, Olusegun Obasanjo. Mohammed’s 
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assassination was partly a result of the announcement he made to demobilise the 
enormous army formed during the civil war. Even though he was high-handed in his 
operations and strategy, Gen. Murtala Mohammed enjoyed widespread popularity 
among Nigerians including his adversaries. Isichei (1983) observes that he “was more 
popular than any earlier Nigerian Head of State... and was mourned as no other Nigerian 
leader had as yet been mourned” (p. 476). The local and international airports in Lagos 
are named after him. His assassination also inspired Eddie Igboma’s celluloid film 
Death of a Black President (1983). 
 
2.4 Significant Events of 1977-1986 
The death of Gen. Murtala Mohammed led to the country’s fourth military regime 
headed by Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo. He towed the path of his predecessor and 
continued to push for the return to civilian rule in 1979. This government recorded a 
number of successes including hosting the Second World Black and African Festival of 
Arts and Culture (FESTAC) in January 1977, the establishment of a public broadcaster, 
the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), the incorporation of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in April 1977, a prominent role in other African 
entities’ liberation struggle. This period witnessed oil boom, heavy petroleum income 
and its squandering.  
In September 1978, the FG lifted the ban on politics. The Federal Electoral 
Commission (FEDECO) registered five political parties in preparation for the coming 
year’s elections. These were the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), the National Party of 
Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Great Nigeria Peoples Party 
(GNPP) and the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP). A new constitution is also adopted to 
pave the way for the second republic (Enwefah 2012: 179). In 1979, apart from taking 
over British Petroleum then operating in Nigeria, and thus stabilising the economy, 
presidential elections were held on August 11 with Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN 
emerging the winner. Although Chief Obafemi Awolowo of UPN contested the results 
in court, a decision was taken in favour of Shagari (Isichei 1983: 479). In his inaugural 
speech, Shagari infused hope with the ‘One Nation, One Destiny, One Nigeria’ mantra 
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(Enwefah 2012: 187). During Shagari’s reign, in 1980, an NNPC scandal involving 
Gulf, Mobil and Shell was uncovered, and sanctions are imposed on the oil companies.  
A number of ethnic, regional or religious riots undermined national security 
during this period. In December 1980, Maitatsine, a Muslim fundamentalist sect which 
drew membership from Cameroon, Chad and Niger provoked religious riots in Kano. 
Not even the governor’s residence could withstand the protests, which claims thousands 
of lives. Maitatsine, named after its founder, was an extremist group that rejected 
reading any book other than the Quran. Equally dreadful was the Ife/Modakeke crisis in 
south-west Nigeria, which erupted in April 1981 leaving several hundreds dead and 
property destroyed. In October of the same year, the Maitatsine uprising had reached 
Maiduguri in Borno State. Even in the following years, this group did not relent, but 
kept on rioting in Yola and other parts of the north. There was also widespread violence 
in parts of Ondo State in western Nigeria brought on by electoral machinations in 
August 1983.  
At midnight on December 31, 1983, soldiers struck again, displacing Shagari in 
another coup, thus marking the end of the Second Republic. The military claimed that 
they acted out of national interests. There were mixed feelings of relief and joy as well 
as fears of the future. Major General Mohammed Buhari became the next Head of State 
having served as Petroleum Minister in the Obasanjo military regime. Buhari was said 
to be high-handed in the promulgation of decrees, and in punishing wrongdoing 
sometimes in disproportionate measures (Enwefah 2012: 208-210). His regime sent 
journalists (Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor) to jail for offences against Decree 4, 
which forbade ‘false reporting’.  It was not long before General Ibrahim Badamosi 
Babangida, a northerner ousted Buhari in yet another bloodless coup. Achieved on 
August 27, 1985, Enwefah wrote of the coup, “it brings relief to rising tension over 
escalating political repression and deteriorating economic conditions” (p. 211). 
Babangida had to declare a state of national economic emergency during which the 
importation of rice was banned for a period of time.  His government unraveled a coup 
attempt led by Major Gen. Mamman Vasta who was later executed with his 
accomplices. 
January 1 saw the removal of 80 percent of petroleum subsidy, an action which 
was to recur several times in the economic life of the state. The regime of Babangida 
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continued in a very characteristic military fashion with arbitrary and unilateral decision 
making, heightened media control and even political assassinations. He is said to have 
made the most radical economic policy reforms (Enwefah, 2012). And, without any 
consultation, Nigeria became the 45th member of the Organisation of Islamic Countries 
(OIC). Dele Giwa, editor in chief of Newswatch was killed in October through a letter 
bomb delivered to his house.  
Also in 1986, a notorious armed robber, Lawrence Anini, emerged, and in Robin 
Hood-styled robbery aided the poor with his spoils. He belonged to a gang that also 
accommodated a son of the Benin royal family, Kingsley Eweka. The Anini episode is 
important for the unease it set President Babangida in, and more so because filmmaker 
Henry Legemah portrayed the events of that character in his 2005 film, Anini, which is 
reviewed in chapters five and six in this study. In December 1986, after several failed 
attempts and a disturbing record of criminal exploits, Anini was apprehended by the 
police. Never before in the history of Nigeria has an armed robber so confounded and 
intimidated the Police Force as did Lawrence Anini and his gang. He was executed in 
January 1987.  
 
2.5 Socio-political Context of 1987-1998 
In 1987, the Federal Government decided to inaugurate a Constitution Drafting 
Committee (CDC), another socio-economic initiative towing the lines of previous 
governments. Apart from the 1978 Jaji Declaration by Obasanjo, the Ethical Revolution 
of Shagari and the War Against Indiscipline (WAI) by Buhari, the Babangida 
government spawned the Mass Mobilisation for Self Reliance, Social Justice and 
Economic Recovery (MAMSER). It had as one objective the mobilisation of Nigerians 
to take the country to greater heights, whatever that meant.  
To Babangida’s credit, however, was the opening up of the polity to political 
debate, which Buhari abrogated as well as the establishment in 1989 of two political 
parties: the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention 
(NRC) with a view to returning the country to civilian rule in 1990. It is not certain if 
Babangida genuinely desired the exit of the military from political power since he 
remained in office till 1993 when pressure from the international community 
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heightened. Ajayi (2007) suggests that the military had other agenda, which were not in 
keeping with the handover to a civilian government. Furthermore, during Babangida’s 
regime, the 1989 Constitution prepared under the chairmanship of Justice Anthony 
Aniagolu was promulgated. Amongst other provisions is the change of tenure of 
presidents and governors from one six-year term to two four-year terms.  
For some time, the questions of ethnicity gave way to ambition and the quest for 
political power. On the morning of April 22, 1990, Major Gen. Gideon Orkar’s coup 
attempt was foiled and together with his collaborators, was later executed. The 
following year, 1991, saw national instability in the April and October religious crises 
in Katsina and Kano respectively. In the south, state infrastructure developed (Third 
Mainland Bridge on June 29), oil income and expenditure were shrouded, and the 
British journalist, William Keeling, who attempted to uncover the whereabouts of the 
proceeds of oil sales was rapidly deported. Nearly every year was marked by fuel, 
religious and ethnic/regional riots, most of them occurring in the north and recording 
large numbers of casualties, deaths and loss of property. The Zango Kataf crisis in 
Kaduna State is a case in point (Maier, 2000).  
To address development issues in the oil-rich regions of the Niger Delta, the Oil 
Minerals Producing and Development Commission (OMPADEC) was established in 
October 1992. Substantial financial resources were allocated to the oil producing areas 
to cater to the problems of environmental degradation and speed up developmental 
initiatives, while reducing conflict at the same time. The establishment in 2000 of 
another agency, NDDC to replace OMPADEC implies unmet objectives. The Niger 
Delta Development Commission took over the affairs of OMPADEC and its 
performance is as contestable as its predecessor’s. The persistence of the delta issues is 
now testimony to the idea that environmental problems and marginalization cannot be 
resolved in one fell swoop by the creation of an organisation; rather, assiduous and 
disinterested efforts by the government in collaboration with the affected group are 
necessary.  
Babangida continued strategically delaying the hand-over to civilian rule to the 
extent that in November of 1992, Obasanjo wrote him a letter in which he enjoined him 
to leave office honourably and, prevent a looming violent eruption within the polity. 
Chief Arthur Nzeribe who was to become the leader of the Association for a Better 
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Nigeria (ABN), asked Babangida to retire from military service and contest the 
forthcoming elections, but he refused. Instead, he postponed the hand-over date a fourth 
time amidst rising political and civil unrest within the country. Although Babangida 
finally stepped aside on August 26, 1993, and had put in place the machinery for the 
successful conduct of presidential elections, he still coveted the presidency. Under the 
SDP and NRC, Moshood Abiola and Bashir Tofa respectively contested the elections 
which held on June 12: a memorable date in Nigeria’s history. Abiola emerged the 
winner of the election, but to the utter surprise of Nigerians, Babangida annulled the 
election results on June 26, and in Abiola’s place, deliberately handed over power to 
Chief Ernest Shonekan, who is Abiola’s kinsman. Extremely violent riots erupted in 
several parts of Nigeria, notably Lagos, Ibadan and parts of the south-west region. The 
Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) went on sporadic strikes to protest the annulment. But 
the worst was yet to come. 
On November 17, 1993, Major Gen. Sani Abacha forced the resignation of Chief 
Ernest Shonekan, Head of the Interim Government and ascended to power. Abacha 
became not only the seventh military ruler of Nigeria, but also the most brutal dictator 
that the country has ever known. Nobel Prize Winner, Wole Soyinka, challenged the 
legality of Gen. Abacha’s government. He argued that if Ernest Shonekan’s interim 
government was illegal, as declared by the Nigerian law courts, therefore, Abacha’s so-
called succession was “a claim in legal and constitutional void, a patently illegal 
enterprise” (Soyinka, 1996: 11).   
Abacha abrogated and proscribed everything that smacked of democracy 
including the National Assembly, the state governments and political parties amongst 
others.  Abacha’s was the seventh military regime, a time during which rioters did not 
let up. A very unpopular regime, treason charges (including alleged coups) were 
brought against innocent citizens such as Wole Soyinka; Obasanjo, Shehu Yar’Adua, 
Dipo Diya, Abiola, who with several others were sent to prison. The National 
Democratic Coalition (NADECO), an opposition group led by Chief Anthony Enahoro 
had many of its members go into exile for accusing the Abacha administration of the 
murder of Kudirat Abiola, wife of the 1993 elections winner. The number of political 
murders grew in this period.  
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One of the most horrendous acts of this government occurred in 1995 when the 
Ogoni nine were hanged after being tried and found guilty of treason in a military 
tribunal which Abacha himself constituted. Soyinka quoting Chinua Achebe, another 
Nigerian literary figure in reference to the military execution of environmental activist, 
Saro-Wiwa, stated: “Ken Saro-Wiwa was not killed on the date announced by Sani 
Abacha’s regime, but on June 23, 1993, the day the nation’s democratic elections were 
annulled” (Soyinka 1996: 153).The nine men, led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, were pressing for 
accountability and the development of their native land where crude oil was being 
extracted. The oil operations by Royal Dutch Shell devastated their lands leaving them 
without compensation and basic amenities. The execution drew international fury and 
Nigeria was expelled from the Commonwealth of Nations as a result.  
In January 1998, a 5-million man march was staged in Abuja, asking Abacha to 
leave office. Two months later, a counter-rally urging Abacha to contest the presidential 
elections was held under the auspices of youth groups one of which was Youth 
Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA). Abacha was said to be dishonest in his personal life 
and official functions. He looted the national treasury through fictitious corporate 
entities. At moments of fuel crises, he ordered the supply of fuel to neighbouring 
countries while motorists spent hours on end queuing at petrol stations for fuel. On June 
8, 1998, 54-year old Gen. Abacha passed away, according to official records, due to a 
heart attack. This marked the end of forceful and authoritarian military governance in 
Nigeria, which was described by Ajayi (2007) as the military’s end of “political 
adventurism”  
 
2.6 Key Political Factors during the Period as Constructed in the Films 
The films Battle of Love (2001) and Across the Niger (2007) appear to evoke the period 
of the Nigerian Civil War. Without directly chronicling the events of the war, both films 
were set in the 1967-1970 time frames to underscore the ethnic tensions prevalent 
during the period and to relate it to current national instability.  
Oil Village (2001) seemingly constructs the period in 1995 when owing to the 
late Gen. Sani Abacha’s disquietude over the Ogoni protests, erroneously indicts, 
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convicts and hangs Ken Saro Wiwa and 8 other protesters against oil-induced 
environmental degradation.  
  Stubborn Grasshopper (2001) is Sam Onwuka’s version of Abacha’s ascent to 
and exit by death from the highest political office in Nigeria. Abacha’s predecessor, 
Gen. Ibrahim Babangida and Chief Ernest Sonekan are also featured in the film. One of 
the darkest episodes in Nigeria’s pursuit of democracy, the annulment of the 1993 
elections, and the key players of the period, were portrayed in that commentary.  
Anini (2005) arguably highlighted the 1986-87 robbery operations that not only 
ground Benin City to a halt, but that also unnerved the police force and the military 
Head of State, Babangida, at that time. Popular and state reactions to the events are also 
portrayed.  
Half of a Yellow Sun (2013), like Battle of Love and Across the Niger, also 
appears to reflect on the Civil War and its consequences on the Igbo people.  
To conclude this section, a very brief political history of Nigeria from 1967 to 
1998 has been traced to aid the flow of the whole narrative in this study and to help the 
reader situate the context and events depicted in the films being studied. Only included 
were those details required to locate the periods and people whose stories are woven 
together in the video-film narratives. This means that several social and economic 
factors not considered relevant for this section were omitted. I do not attempt an actual 
comparison of the events mentioned above with their depictions in the films since the 
filmmakers’ mode and motivations of telling the past are most assuredly different from 
those of historians (Hesling, 2001). Their narrative techniques as much as their 
ideological slant do not converge with those chroniclers of official versions of the past. 
Accuracy is, therefore, not the focus. Rather, it is an appreciation of the political 
consciousness of a filmmaker and what might be understood when he lends his filmic 
‘voice’ to the re-construction of a country’s political past, which undeniably have their 








3.1 Representing History and the Past in Film 
Since the beginnings of dramatic film, narrativization of past events has been one of the 
most productive areas of filmmaking (Hannu Salmi, 1995). 
In this research, the past comprises the time between 1967 and 1998. In 1998, the 
Nigerian military Head of State, General Sani Abacha died. His death was officially 
announced as being the result of a cardiac arrest.   An attempt is made to continue the 
discussions begun in the first chapter. It begins by situating the political period which 
are reflected in the films under study. Such an effort is useful in locating the contextual 
background and literature. The chapter also examines the literature on history and the 
past, African past on screen and segues into popular arts in Africa since the latter 
adequately describes Nollywood productions today (Haynes, 2000).  
The extended debates on Western history on screen, though recognised, have 
been unable to account for the specificities of African video production and 
consumption. This is simply because such an effort presupposes that a comparison 
between an American filmmaking model and that of Nigeria is legitimate. It is not. 
African cultural products have to be investigated on their own terms taking cognisance 
of their histories and the socio-political differences of the locations. In her review of 
African film literature, Nancy Schmidt notes Frank Ukadike’s emphasis on adopting 
critical methodologies for analyzing African cultural products (including films) as well 
as the importance of eschewing inadequate western theories and myths that, for a long 
time, have informed the interpretation of African history and cinema. Schmidt reiterates 
Ukadike’s call for new approaches to African film analysis, rather than appending 
African film analysis to dominant film discourse, and emphasizes the need for African-






3.2 History and the Past: Brief Distinctions 
As already noted, this research proposes to read and analyse Nigerian films dealing with 
past public events – which could either be official or unofficial history – occurring 
between 1967 and 1998, historic people (public figures within the same time frame) and 
periods. Taken together, these three categories refer to the past as deployed in this 
project. In the following paragraph, a distinction is made between the ‘past’ and 
‘history’. According to Keith Jenkins:  
History is arguably a verbal artefact, a narrative prose discourse which ... is as 
much invented as found, and which is constructed by present-minded, 
ideologically positioned workers (historians and those acting as if they were 
historians) operating at various levels of reflexivity ... looking simultaneously 
towards the once real events and situations of the past and towards the narrative 
type ‘mythoi’ common – albeit it on a dominant marginal spectrum – in any 
given social formation (1995: 178).   
 
Jenkins’ definition already draws a slight distinction between history and the past and 
the ideologically influenced position of the historian. The distinction notes that history 
is a selective and scientific account of the past. Scholars have identified the vastness of 
historical occurrences and the human incapability of accounting for or interpreting all. 
In particular, Scannell (2004) affirms, “History, as we all know full well, is always 
greater than, inevitably exceeds, our individual efforts because it is inexhaustible and 
keeps on going, projecting into a never ending future whereas mere mortal 
historiographers do not” (p. 138) 
The distinction between history and the past, between official and unofficial 
history is crucial for obvious reasons. It deserves reiteration that this research will cover 
both categories of knowledge. There seems to be a tacit agreement among scholars on 
the synonymous nature of history to the past or the past to history. But it is not every 
past that is history. The renowned Polish philosopher, Leszek Kolakowski, explained 
that the past is “an ocean of events that once happened” (2005: 35). Therefore, 
unofficial, unwritten history refers to those accounts of the past which are not accounted 
for by the official versions of history. Without words (and images), the past would be 
perennially silent. Confusion occurs sometimes when we use – without clarification – 
the word ‘history’ to mean not just historical writing but as a synonym for the entirety 
of past happenings. So, if history is fundamentally a construction of and from the past, 
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then the processes of its construction must be equally if not more significant than the 
result. In outlining historical methods, Tosh (2006) recognises the role of oral history 
and argues that the first-hand conversation with people who lived through the period 
under investigation and witnessed the events may possess more useful approaches to the 
study of history. The argument is sufficient support for my inclusion of the past as that 
which is also drawn from collective memory (unofficial history).  
Schudson (1992), quoted in Leavy (2005), defines collective memory as social 
memory, referring to the ways in which group, institutional and cultural recollections of 
the past shape people’s action in the present. This definition corresponds to Leavy’s 
who noted that “collective memory can be conceived as a repository of ‘shared’ cultural 
images, narratives and visions of the past.” And, “it is a space where culture fuses with 
social power resulting in a dominant, although contested, historical narrative” (Leavy, 
2005: 5). The notion of ‘shared’ does not denote uniformity in thought or interpretation, 
rather, it refers to the narratives as “permeating a given society and constituting a 
dominant discourse about the past” (p. 5). This demonstrates as Leavy further notes the 
social power, the conflict over meaning as well as the subjectivity that results in the 
process of writing or recalling historical events whether of journalistic (news media) or 
commercial (filmmakers) value.  
History follows the past in the ontological order because it takes from what 
constitutes ‘the past’ to formulate its own account of that past. The past is the object of 
enquiry. All history is a subjective mediation of the past, but the past is an objective 
phenomenon existing before the scientific efforts of history scholars. Tuchman (1982) 
as well as Carr notes that “all historical judgements involve persons and points of view, 
one is as good as the other and there is no objective historical truth” (Carr, 1961: 4).  
According to Tuchman (1982), there is nothing as a neutral or objective historian. The 
writing of history is a process of highly selective reconstruction of features of the past 
(Kolakowski, 2005). Further, it states that “the past doesn’t speak; it must be evoked, 
and that evocation is inescapably selective in the extreme.” Carr states that “history 
consists of a corpus of ascertained facts” where “a fact is a datum of experience as 
distinct from conclusions ... the facts are available to the historian in documents, 
inscriptions and so on, like fish on the fishmonger’s slab. Using his analogy, the 
historian collects them, takes them home, and cooks and serves them in whatever style 
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appeals to him” (1961: 6). That is why this research takes up the past therefore as: 1) 
history as written i.e. official history, and 2) unofficial history i.e. the entirety of past 
significant events, including the recent past some of which reside in collective memory. 
In both cases and arguably too, the filmmaker takes on the role of a ‘historian’ – 
professional or otherwise.  
Historiography, therefore, is imagined and invented as found by historians or 
those, in the words of Keith Jenkins, “acting as if they were historians” (1995: 16) based 
on their conceptions of the past in a given context. That past is no longer present, but 
the evidence, the traces of it are and that is what historians deploy in their fabrication or 
narrativisation of events of the past. In his polemic account and rejection of Carr’s 
(1961) understanding of history, Jenkins (1995) synthesises the works of several 
historians and philosophers including T. Bennet, F. R. Ankersmit, and H. White to note 
that:  
the past as constituted by its existing traces is always apprehended and 
appropriated textually through the sedimented layers of previous 
interpretations and through the reading habits and categories developed 
by previous/current methodological practices. Consequently, the status of 
historical knowledge is not based for its truth/accuracy on its 
correspondence with the past per se but on the various historicisations of 
it, so that historiography always stands in for the past, the only medium it 
has to affect a ‘historical’ presence (Jenkins, 1995: 18). 
 
Further, Scannell writing about news (2004: 130) distinguishes historiography from 
historicality. The first he refers to as the “narrative of the presence in the world of 
human beings who are historical because they make history.” These subjects of history 
as envisioned by Scannell are individuals, institutions and the world. Historiography is 
writing the events of the past hence its retrospective nature while historicality has to do 
with the future as understood or interpreted in the present. Scannell also explores the 
retrospective and prospective dimensions of historical writing, the latter residing in the 
pluralities of media events coverage. He observes:  
[B]ut with radio and television the time of the event and the time of its 
telling coincide. Both exist in the same phenomenal real time now... 
Broadcasting attends to the existential structure of days, thereby 
producing the phenomenal now in which past present and future 
encounter each other (Scannell, 2004: 132-133) 
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Scannell agrees with Schuarz (2004: 105) who notes that “the past itself can only be 
known in the present through its manifold representations – representations which in the 
contemporary world are profoundly, irretrievably, mediated.” It is worth emphasising 
that events make history and as Scannell put it, “no event, no history” (ibid.). If 
historiography is official written history, then unofficial history must be those events 
not accounted for by historians but which nevertheless occupy a position in the 
country’s lifespan – perhaps they could be referred to as histories in the collective 
memory, i.e. events whose historicity is undeniable.  
The debate over what constitutes history is vast and seems unending, with 
historians and anthropologists claiming a small or large part of the historical terrain 
(Carr, 1961), Tosh (2009). Indeed, there are different and competing versions of 
historical accounts. Whereas Scannell (2004) affirms that past events inform the writing 
of history, Eckert and Jones (2002) document a historiography that looks to the 
quotidian (not necessarily a distant past) as sources, objects and methods of doing 
history. The essays summarised by Eckert and Jones reflect the ramifications of colonial 
and post-colonial African realities viz. the production of iron, oral narratives of slavery, 
photography, African festivals, objects, and the interplay of colonisers, missionaries and 
indigenous people in the ordinary (and to some extent extraordinary) game of life. They 
conclude that the analyses made possible by everyday life history shape an 
understanding of modern Africa while revealing the utility in accommodating multiple 
social and cultural accounts inevitably arising from historical writings.    
If we follow Scannell’s (2004), and Eckert and Jones’ (2002) accounts in the 
essays, ‘Broadcasting historiography and historicality’ and ‘Historical writings about 
everyday life’ respectively, then the discovery of a niche in which filmic depictions of 
the past (as popular art expressions) find articulation is made possible. And that is a 
major concern of this project. The prevailing intelligence among Nigerian audiences – 
and indeed elsewhere – is that the daily events in the country provide a pool from which 
the filmmakers draw stories. For instance, soon after the inauguration of President 
Goodluck Jonathan in May 2007, a film titled Jonathan was released. During the 
eastern Okija crises, innumerable films were made to portray the disturbing events that 
amounted to the ‘fetishisation’ of politics in the south-eastern parts of Nigeria. The 
Niger Delta upshots have also found expressive outlets in films like Militants (2007), 
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Crude War (2011) and many others. So there is the reflection of the everyday, the 
quotidian character of the films which depict at a given moment, the socio-cultural 
realities of the people. There is also the historical property to the same films since their 
historicity is attested to by the ‘storyable’ events (Scannell) they portray, events which 
historians, journalists, sociologists or anthropologists narrate or investigate for the 
significance they bear. For indeed, we can all bear witness to historical truth. Such 
events are facts which, together with or like the historian, the filmmakers use as raw 
materials for the interpretation and representation of the society. This comparison 
recognises the significant differences in writing history and filmic storytelling.  
 
3.3 The Past on Screen: An Introduction 
Filmic representations of the past in the dominant filmmaking culture in the world, 
namely Hollywood, merit our attention. Arguably, filmic attempts at depicting a 
people’s history date back to the 1920s although Glancy (2005) argues that the 
phenomenon mushroomed between the 1930s and 1950s and was perfected in the 
American film industry (Hollywood). The literature on American and European 
historical films is extensive. Such films as those featuring official history on the world 
wars, slave trade and freedom, colonialism and politics, civil rights, immigration, 
racism, and past presidents of the United States have engaged historians’ attention for 
decades. Other events of the past – unofficial history – have also found their way to the 
audio-visual medium, but these are less interrogated by history scholars and more by 
film critics and academics in cultural studies. Leading historian and film scholar, 
Rosenstone (1995a, 2006), has contributed immensely to the debates over the 
acceptance of filmic-history as valid history. Hannu Salmi (1995) points out that film is 
not only a source for historical writing but also an end point i.e. an outlet for history.  
With every reference to the past on screen, the scholar is invariably looking at 
what is more commonly referred to by scholars before him as the historical film. In this 
sense, it appears that the past is equated with history. When Rosenstone (1995a, 2006), 
Hesling (2001) and Bickford-Smith & Mendelsohn (2007), to mention a few, write 
about representing the past on screen, they are addressing historical films in the light of 
Rosenstone’s (1995a) definition.  Rosenstone’s (2006: 47-48) understanding of the 
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depiction of the past, which is often a past that is unitary, closed and complete, “focuses 
on individuals, offers little room for doubt or provides the look of buildings, landscapes, 
costumes and artifacts.” Rosenstone asserts that, for a film to be labelled historical, it 
must submit to the prevailing historical narratives of the day. What about filmic 
constructions of past events that fail to fall under this rubric of historical films? 
Nollywood is inundated with such films. But what do scholars make of films that, 
without necessarily drawing from historical discourses, still construct a past that 
probably belongs to popular/collective memory as in the case of Anini (2005)? This 
question opens up the debate on how Nollywood constructs a national past. Without 
necessarily drawing from known historical text, but applying a mix of official and 
unofficial ‘history’, and in some cases popular wisdom and rumour, it develops 
narratives that Barber refers to as being inclusive, syncretic and hybrid. Nollywood, too, 
historicises political events.  
Hesling (2001) asserts that historians have lost their monopoly on the past. 
Indeed, every discipline mediates the past albeit to varying degrees. Just as journalists 
(Scannell, 2004), sociologists, anthropologists, geologists, archaeologists and historians 
probe existing peoples, materials and events to make sense of the human condition, 
filmmakers also delve into the ocean of the past to mine stories. Obviously, those 
filmmaking attempts will also be selective. It is only when the past has been accounted 
for systematically, chronologically and empirically that official history surfaces. Zelizer 
explains that journalists have a special stake in using events as markers of collective 
memory. “Central players in the creation of collective memory, journalists assert their 
authority over history by determining what is socially significant and then constructing 
themselves as the objective authorities over what they deem newsworthy” (Zelizer 
1992:191) in Leavy (2005). Historiography has developed owing to the numerous 
sources (including reportage) available to historians.  
Hesling (2001) also argues that filmmakers engaging the past approach it with a 
different set of questions and strategies from historians, and so will necessarily arrive at 
different explanations, interpretations and constructions from their scientific 
counterparts. He underscores the difference between written history and ‘narrativised’ 
or filmic constructions of the same event in the following words: 
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Swearing allegiance to the powers of artistic imagination, rather than to 
the laws of scientific logic, they (filmmakers) use narration purely for 
dramaturgical reasons, thereby transforming the historical past into a 
symbolic space where, often to the historical profession’s utter dismay, 
imaginary and factual events easily intermingle (2001: 3) 
 
He further states that historical films, like other works of art, borrow from existing 
materials to produce stereotypical, inter-textual and cinematically coded depictions of a 
selective past. Evident in Hesling’s work also is the incessant quibbles from historians 
“crying foul” (Rosenstone) about accurate and inaccurate constructions. His 
identification and espousal of the limitations of the audio-visual medium provide a valid 
argument and an invitation to historians, critics and viewers to re-consider their 
appreciation as well as interpretation of historical films.   
As already noted, Hollywood’s visions of history and politics gave rise to an 
avalanche of academic literature on history via the screen. Other film cultures too have 
been exhibiting comparable traits of projecting historical discourses on documentary 
and feature films. Notable examples emerge from Hollywood’s contender in 
filmmaking, namely Bollywood. A remarkable analysis of history and film as practiced 
in Bollywood is Bhaskar Sarkar’s book-length treatment of India’s Partition, and its 
aftermath on the people of India titled Mourning the Nation: Indian Cinema in the Wake 
of the Partition (2009). Sarkar’s invaluable contribution to the history and cinema 
discourse deploys documentaries, television serials and feature films, through textual 
and document analyses to interrogate complex questions of nationhood, civil war, 
identity, dislocation, loss and post-Partition trauma. He discusses, with the aid of 
interviews and archival materials, the dynamics, scope and limitations of media 
representation while locating the symbolic, visual and dialogic strands of “an Indian 
paradigm of cinematic mourning” (p. 26). In many ways, Sarkar’s account is similar to 
the Holocaust films and their attendant academic debates (p. 13). Bollywood’s treatment 
of the past also goes beyond the Partition narratives to awaken other aspects of British 
colonialism, albeit through a fictional account in Lagaan (2001), and more recently, a 
historical marital alliance between a Muslim Mughal emperor and a Rajput princess in 
Jodhaa Akbar (2008) among many others. Later additions to filming the past witnessed 




3.4 African Past on Film  
Much of what is required here to discuss the African past on screen has been laid out in 
the preceding chapter. The efforts by historians to interpret the past through filmic lens 
have been highlighted. Of primary importance though is not the historians’ validation of 
such attempts but an overview of some of the prominent films beginning from the 
1970s. Of course, the leading figure is Ousmane Sembene. Sembene did not only re-
create the past on screen but he also took African language to the screen, shooting films 
in his native Senegalese Wolof. As already noted, his films were tailored towards 
activism and the rejection of Western imagination of the African continent. His was a 
distinctly African mode of narrative representation in which he utilised the perspective 
of popular masses, especially in Ceddo, (Rosen 2005: 721) and wherein African oral 
tradition is interrogated and problematised.  
Below is a list of African films, made between 1970 and 2009, depicting various 
aspects of African history.  
1970 – Monangambee  is a parody on colonial ignorance shot in Algeria by Sarah 
Maldoror. It features the imprisonment of Angolan writer Luandino Vieria, by 
Portuguese colonial authorities in a labour camp in Cape Verde Islands  
1971 – Emitai by Ousmane Sembene portrays the revolt against French colonial 
authority by the people of Diola, Senegal, for being forced into the French colonial 
army and the requisition of agricultural products by the colonisers 
1972 – Sambizanga was shot in 1972 in Congo-Brazzaville and is a portrayal of the 
initial phase of Angola liberation struggle against Portuguese colonial administration 
1977 – Ceddo (Sembene’s 5th feature film) reveals Sembene’s historical vision as he 
recasts the history of Islam, Christianity and slavery in the Senegambia region  
1979 – West Indies by Med Hondo who translates complex political dialectics that deal 
with Africans and people of African descent, but which take place in Africa and West 
Indies 
1983 – Wend Kuuni by Gaston Kabore about pre-colonial Burkina Faso 
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1986 – Sarraounia by Med Hondo, battle between Queen Sarraounia and French 
Colonial Forces, and based on a novel by Nigerien author Abdoulaye Mamani 
1987/8 – Camp de Thiaroye, Sembene and Faty Sow re-tell the colonial story of how 
French-speaking West African soldiers who helped defend France during WWII are 
detained in a prison camp in Dakar before repatriation while those who protested half-
pay were massacred 
1988 – Testament by John Akomfrah chronicles the portrait of an African politician 
who is forced into exile following a coup d’etat. It is a journalist’s attempt to unravel 
the true story of Ghanaians’ political lives in a post-colonial period  
1988/9 – Heritage Africa by Ghanaian Kwah Ansah in which he explores the ravages of 
colonialism to African identity and engages a return-to-your-roots dialogue 
1988/9 – Mortu Nega (The one whom death refused) is Flora Gomes’ first feature that 
enacts Guinea-Bissau’s war of independence in a blend of contemporary history and 
mythology 
1993 – Sankofa (slave trade) by Haile Gerima is an Akan word that means “we must go 
back and reclaim our past so we can move forward” and is a film about Maafa, the 
African holocaust 
1997 – Buud Yam by Gaston Kabore is a Burkinabe historical drama about a young 
orphan accused of his sister’s death. His effort to regain his reputation leads him to his 
roots 
1999 – La Genese by Cheick Oumar Sissoko draws inspirations and lessons from the 
Bible in order to portray the conflict that ravage the African continent 
2000 – Adanggaman by Ivorian-born director Roger Gnoan M’Bala is a film on war 
between Africans and European slave trade practices wherein the roles played by 
Africans in the ‘human’ trade is mirrored 
2000 – Daresalam (Let there be peace) by Chadian Issa Serge Coelo on the ravages of 
the civil war and post-independence, in Chad between the 1960s and 1970s 
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2000 – Lumumba by Raoul Peck, a political thriller which follows the life of Patrice 
Lumumba of the DR Congo in the months before and after its independence from 
Belgium in 1960 
2001 – Little Senegal was made by Algerian Rachid Bouchareb wherein he explored an 
African’s search for his ancestors who he believed were sold to slavery 
2004 – The Hero (O Heroi) by Angolan Zeze Gamboa used the background of the 3-
decade war to weave a story of love and courage 
2005 – Sometimes in April by Raoul Peck examined the 1994 Rwandan genocide during 
which close to a million minority Tutsis were systematically murdered 
2009 – Moloch Tropical by Raoul Peck revisions political violence in Haiti. The film 
was partly inspired by Haitian revolutionary leader, Henri Christophe (1767 – 1820)  
The list is by no means exhaustive, but it provides a glimpse of African efforts at 
portraying their history on screen. The first four chapters in the collection of essays 
edited by Françoise Pfaff (2004), Focus on African Films, provide more comprehensive 
material on African films and history. I would admit that to repeat the above for first 
generation Nigerian films, and then for Nollywood (popular culture) video films has 
proved problematic. The early Nigerian films made on celluloid have gone into 
extinction, and there is no single text that holistically discusses such films as the one 
just mentioned. This suggests that Nigerian film and history/the past has not received 
sufficient scholarly attention. The researcher has to rely on existing literature and oral 
communication with filmmakers in order to sift through the titles and themes of films.   
In his introduction to Nigerian Video Films, Haynes (2000) observed in the following 
statements that African film criticism has been disconnected from the study of African 
popular arts:  
This academic disconnection encourages a startling perception of how 
fundamentally African film has not been a popular art...it is capital 
intensive, it requires a high degree of technical and aesthetic education, 
which normally entails the ideologies and mentalities of the modern-elite 
sector, it is enmeshed with official bodies of various kinds, and, as 
African cineastes have been complaining from the beginning, they are 
forced to depend on international circuits because distribution problems 
inhibit their relationship with African audiences (p. 14) 
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These factors have huge implications for filmmaking practice and consumption on the 
continent, implications which invariably flow into the intellectual engagement with the 
films and videos. Haynes extended his comparative analysis of Nigerian and African 
cinema in a 2011 article in which he explains the origins of African cinema practice and 
Nollywood recognising the deep differences in production values, funding, distribution 
and consumption while identifying the similarities evident in both film cultures. The 
early African filmmakers were not commercial in nature whereas the Nigerian and 
Ghanaian (put together because of their marked similarities) were avidly so. These 
analyses shed light on the distinct categories that each film culture privileges.  
Historians concern themselves with the historical film since it provides an 
alternative way of doing history. In this research, the focus is not so much on ‘another’ 
history, but on the analyses and interpretations of popular media’s engagement with the 
past. The difference between what historians do and what this research does is that 
while the former looks for facts – which Carr (1961) refers to as a duty, not a virtue – 
and (to borrow Rosenstone’s words) “true and false inventions” on the screen, my 
research examines the motivations, narrative techniques, ideologies and reception of 
films that mediate a known past. The focus of activity in this research is the African 
film. Whereas the film historian would not be concerned with ownership, the present 
study examines Nigerian films made by Nigerians in line with the African Film Charter 
and Pfaff (1986: 8) who noted that “what constitutes African cinema is not the fact that 
it is made with African actors or even directed by an African. African cinema has to 
contain imagery, symbols and values pertaining to African societies.” In the edited 
volume of Bickford-Smith and Mendelsohn (2007), the collection of films investigated 
constitutes those made by Africans and non-Africans alike. It was sufficient for the 
subject to be historical to merit the contributors’ attention.  
Bickford-Smith and Mendelsohn (2007) quoting Rosenstone noted:  
Accuracy (as in ‘facts alone’) was not the sole criterion, he argued, for 
good history, whether written or filmic. Instead, what we demand from 
history, in whatever medium, is to be told what to think about ‘the facts’. 
Historical filmic dramas, he insists, can, just as well as written histories, 
‘recount, explain, interpret and make meaning out of people and events 





Similarly, Toplin’s observation on the historical film’s ‘ability’ to communicate 
important ideas about the past is useful, “the two-hour (or more) movie can arouse 
emotions, stir curiosity, and prompt viewers to consider significant questions.” 
(Introduction Black & White in History, p. 3). If Nollywood tells us “what to think 
about the facts” of the past, i.e. if it re-enacts the past, can we deny it because, for 
reasons mentioned above, it fails to meet pre-conceived western ideas of the historical 
genre?  
The concern of Bickford-Smith and Mendelsohn as well as Toplin is noticeably 
history, and its advancement through various media in this case, film. This is indicated 
in their edited volume which combines works and films from Africans and non-Africans 
although the unifying element of the essays is the geographical character of the African 
continent. The contributors of the edited volume draw together films probing historical 
(pre-, colonial and post-colonial Africa, war, slave trade etc.) as well as contemporary 
subjects (war, genocide, ethnic and religious rivalry) of an African past. The editors are 
loyalists of the Rosenstone school, identifying the latter’s descriptive categories: 
mainstream vs. innovative films, true vs. false inventions and recognising Sembene, in 
Rosenstone’s words – as filmic historian (Introduction, Black and White in History). As 
historians, their quest is on complementary and alternative sources of historical studies. 
The utility of the films examined in Bickford-Smith and Mendelsohn’s volume consists 
in etching history or events of the past (which may or may not have been aggregated by 
historians) on the minds of viewers in differing social spaces. Often, these films are 
subjected to criticisms of (non-) accuracy and in many cases, classified according to 
Rosenstone’s (1995a) true and false invention(s) categories. Since then, history on film 
has taken on various dimensions and genres.  
The historical film is a sub-genre of the epic. And there exist epics that are not 
historical (Nollywood has many of this). Other sub-genres which relate to historical 
depictions are the ‘docudrama’, a tentative description of films focusing on actual 
subjects and personalities and the documentary film. These categories of films represent 
efforts at portraying past and present events or people of various climes by semi-
fictionalising characters, thus combining elements of the documentary film and drama.   
Early African cinema did engage historical subjects in ways similar to the 
Hollywood practice, albeit designed to subvert western notions of the continent. Of the 
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representational modes deployed by Nollywood practitioners, the dynamics through 
which the practitioners mediate the past is discussed in the fifth chapter. The idea of 
dramatizing a public past is not only fascinating to viewers, but also revealing – giving 
clues to past customs, traditions, behaviours and attitudes. It reveals yet another 
interpretation of periods long gone or of the immediate past, known events or famous 
people while upholding certain ideologies over others.  
Discussing South Africans’ and Mozambicans’ resistance to apartheid and 
Portuguese colonisation respectively, Cham (2002: 52) cited in Green (1997: 16) refers 
to films made within a short period of the actual events as “the present as history”. Such 
filmmakers, as Green notes, “charted the events of the day with an immediacy born of 
the almost instant recognition of their historical significance” (ibid.), a point which 
Scannell (2004) also made. Whether the filmic construction is ancient history, modern 
or contemporary, or a past belonging only to popular memory, and therefore not (yet) 
committed to historical texts, such constructions achieve similar objectives. They fuse 
the past with the present, aid public recollection and advance cultural and historical 
knowledge even if that knowledge is severely contested. For example, Yoruba history 
has several versions; Gen. Abacha’s death has at least two plausible causes and 
Lawrence Anini (The Law) was not the only armed robber in Benin City, Nigeria in 
1986. One can ask whether his notoriety was heightened by the involvement of royalty 
in his gang, by a state oppositional conspiracy or, as Marenin (1987) noted, by public 
opinion.   
Africans have variously conceived notions and glimpses of the past in their 
filmic narratives.  The first set of African films was characterised by decolonisation, and 
the reconstruction of an African past. They bore the historical film burden, and were not 
regarded as popular art. Such films were made by educated French-speaking West 
African men (and later women) on celluloid.  
 
3.5 Indigenous Filmmaking Prior to 1992: Nigerians Filming the Past 
Although the fourth chapter deals specifically with political filmmaking, this section is 
added here to contribute to the conversations on African filmmaking and specifically to 
show the differences between Nollywood and the filmmaking practice in the rest of the 
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continent. Filmmaking in Nigeria has undergone three significant stages. The first is the 
colonial or pre-independence stage; the second is the post-independence period while 
the third is the post-indigenization period (Ekwuazi 1991: 1). The first stage was 
characterised by propagandist films which were intended to educate the colonies as well 
as inform the world of the developments that resulted from British efforts. Britain 
established a Colonial Film Unit (CFU) through the Central Office of Information in 
London, The British Council and the Crown Film Unit to achieve its objectives. Church 
and missionary activities were also involved in deploying film to attain education and 
evangelisation. At the post-independence stage, the Federal Government had taken over 
at the helm of affairs through the Film Division in the Ministry of Information. There 
was also the State Government division which saw to the production and distribution of 
documentaries. With the Indigenization Decree of 1972 and Decree No. 61 of 1979, the 
Nigerian Film Corporation (NFC) was formed although it effectively became functional 
in 1982.  
Ekwuazi’s (1991) book Film in Nigeria, a substantial and an early contribution 
to the discourse of film specifically from a historical perspective, documents the 
political, economic and cultural environment in which film developed, policies that 
enabled indigenous productions, the influence of the Yoruba folkloric traditions on the 
industry. It also discusses societal influences on the films, censorship and reception of 
early Nigerian films. Undoubtedly, Ekwuazi’s work is a significant starting point which 
also documents the earliest titles of some documentaries and feature films from the 
1960s to the 1990s. What is missing in this work is the content or story lines of some of 
the key productions listed. The search for Nigerians’ first attempts at depicting the past 
which would have set the trend for discussions in this work was partially futile. Without 
asking for too much, it leaves the reader wondering, if only from the titles, what such 
films might have explored given that most of them are no longer existent.  
Another addition to Nigerian film scholarship is Françoise Balogun’s The 
Cinema in Nigeria (1987). The missing element in Ekwuazi’s book was to a reasonable 
extent delivered in Balogun’s. She credits Francis Oladele as the pioneer of Nigerian 
filmmaking (p. 55) with the shooting of Kongi’s Harvest in 1970. But Ekwuazi’s 
account produces a conflicting report. He lists Bound for Lagos as an indigenous feature 
length film produced in Nigeria in 1962. In spite of the discrepancy, Balogun’s work is 
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informative as it provides, not only brief biographical notes on filmmakers such as 
Francis Oladele, Sanya Dosunmu, Ola Balogun, Adamu Halilu, Jab Adu and Eddie 
Ugboma to mention a few, but also summaries of their films. While Kongi’s Harvest 
was inspired by Nigeria’s military coup d’états, Bullfrog in the Sun (based on Chinua 
Achebe’s Things Fall Apart and No Longer at Ease) examines aspects of the Biafran 
war in what Balogun refers to as “a film of high technical quality and great 
political/historical interest” (p. 56).  
In his Cry Freedom (1980/81), Ola Balogun depicts the conflicts arising from 
colonialism and liberation struggles. The film is mentioned here because of its treatment 
of colonialism and the nationalist tendencies that sought to overthrow it. Balogun 
(1987) notes that “intellectuals who enjoy abstractions in films praised it, but the 
popular audience who, above all, want a good story, rebuked it because spectators want 
a war film with battle scenes and blood and are indifferent to moral and political 
lessons” (p. 66). Apart from the numerous Yoruba films (Ekwuazi 1991: 16-18), Eddie 
Ugboma’s films are of interest for their exploration of historic-contemporary themes. 
These films are discussed again in the fourth chapter in order to locate them within the 
history and discourse of political filmmamking in Nigeria. 
The year 1992 is marked off as the period which brought about commercially 
successful video filmmaking. It was a boom period in the sense that, before then, film 
production and consumption had plunged in the late 1970s-1980s following a national 
economic downturn wherein the film enterprise was an incredibly expensive one.  
 
3.6 Nollywood 1992- 
The name Nollywood was coined in 2002, ten years after the release of the film, Living 
in Bondage (1992), that opened the floodgate to would-be producers and directors (See 
Haynes’ What’s in a name? (2007e). There is a growing number of scholarly texts that 
attempt to explore and theorise the video revolution as seen in Nigeria in the last twenty 
years. From the edited volume by Foluke Ogunleye African Video Film Today, Jonathan 
Haynes’ Nigerian Video Films, Pierre Barrots’s Nollywood: The Video Film 
Phenomenon, Viewing African Films in the 21st Century to the newest additions by 
Matthias Krings and Onookome Okome (Global Nollywood). Critical academic 
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attention and interdisciplinary studies evident in the fairly large number of journal 
articles investigating various forms of Nollywood’s cultural articulation in global 
contexts attest to the growth and significance of the Nigerian film industry. The texts 
mentioned above contain substantial details of Nollywood’s origins; hence the film 
industry’s genealogy will be omitted from this section. 
Nigerian cinema, especially from 1992, did not engage directly in resistance or 
the reconstruction of Western versions of the African story. It simply keyed into the 
demands and aspirations of popular minds. Nollywood therefore provided an outlet for 
the identification, problematization and assuagement of Nigerian anxieties. This led to a 
vast collection of genres which question, satirize, glorify and allegorize the Nigerian 
socio-political terrain (see Haynes 2006 and Adesokan 2009b: 601 for titles). 
In the 1980s, the Nigerian government made investments to develop the national 
television infrastructure from which several would-be Nollywood practitioners would 
emerge. There were also national media policies that required indigenous content which 
undeniably paved the way for Nollywood. On 6 November 2010, the Nigerian 
government under the leadership of President Goodluck Jonathan announced an 
entertainment fund intervention from which video film practitioners and other artists 
could access financial aid for their productions. The single-digit-interest-rate-loan is 
formally referred to as the Nigerian Creative and Entertainment Industry Stimulation 
Loan Scheme. President Jonathan announced:  
Nollywood is getting set to take over the world. I recognise the role of 
entertainment in the Nigerian economy and this government will support 
an industry that makes Nigerians happy. I have given them direct order 
to make sure entertainers have $200 million worth of loan to work with. 
Make more movies, write and produce more hit songs, provide jobs and 
give hope to our people... (The Guardian, July 19, 2012, p.22) 
 
Since the inception of Nollywood in 1992, this is the first national support provided for 
the industry. There have been state collaboration in the financing of films, but never has 
there been a large one on a federal scale. The Nigerian Export-Import Bank (NEXIM) 
and Bank of Industry (BOI) are custodians and administrators of the entertainment fund. 
Both institutions require feasible business proposals and collaterals from film 
practitioners. This government intervention has received enormous press attention and 
analyses from filmmakers and media critics. Presently, only US-based Tony Abulu has 
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obtained a loan for his film Dr. Bello. A first generation filmmaker, Ola Balogun, Yinka 
Ogundaisi, former consultant to the National Film and Video Censors Board (NFVCB), 
and Kenny Ogungbe have expressed misgivings on the effective management and 
allocation of the fund. Colleagues in the industry have also interrogated the rationale 
behind awarding financial support to a Nigerian emigrant when numerous filmmakers 
resident in the country are without aid. The reactions from Robert Orya, NEXIM bank 
chief, is that the “approved loan shall be disbursed in line with modalities structured 
during appraisal process... that the NEXIM Bank will soon be reaching an agreement 
with not just filmmakers but other segments of the creative industry like music, visual 
arts and others” (Osae-Brown, 2012). It can be gleaned from these comments that only 
those who meet specific lending criteria can access the loan.  
Regarding the question on what scholars make of films that, without necessarily 
drawing from historical discourses, still construct a political past that with considerable 
certainty belongs to popular memory, the filmmakers’ engagement with such narratives 
has found expression among several scholars under titles different from the historical. In 
works like “political critiques” (Haynes, 2006), “practicing democracy” (Adesokan, 
2009b), “socio-political commentator”, “juju and justice in the movies” (McCall, 2004) 
to mention a few, traces of Nigerian history in video films are evident, but the authors 
refrain from using the concept of ‘history’. Elsewhere, such films are labelled 
sociological documents reflecting the mood of a particular period, or ideological 
constructs, advancing particular political or moral values or myths, indigenous history, 
the way that colonized peoples conceptualize their own historical experience, popular 
memory, the repertoire of cultural scripts constructed by film, television. The 
prevalence of films dealing with Nigerian history and the past on screen is both denied 
and under-researched.  
 
3.7 Nollywood and History? 
Prior to the start of this study, preliminary interviews conducted with Nigerian film 
scholars revealed that history in Nollywood was impossible to research, was a 
problematic category and an elusive topic. Some scholars averred that as popular 
culture, Nollywood had no business with the past (O. Okome, personal communication, 
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August 2011). With the increasing number of Nigerian films dealing with traces of 
Nigerian history and past, why do scholars and filmmakers shy away from naming these 
films ‘historical’ and why have they refrained from treating them as such?  
Four reasons are suggested. 1) The dominance of the Hollywood historical film 
model seemingly makes the non-western historical videos incongruous with the 
dominant paradigm in terms of verisimilitude and freedom of speech. Scholars claim 
that in Nigerian films, anachronisms abound, and the filmmakers are not entirely free to 
represent controversial subjects. 2) The fear of censorship prevents filmmakers from 
directly engaging historical subjects especially (as is often the norm) when the intention 
is to condemn the violation of democratic principles. The result of this fear is a deluge 
of political satires which includes, before the opening credits, a caveat to the viewer 
against the semblance of real persons, living or dead. 3) Bureaucracy and costs of 
accessing public facilities. Nigerian filmmaker, Chico Ejiro, once narrated the ordeal he 
was put through upon request to shoot a scene at the international airport in Lagos 
(personal communication, 2010). 4) The amount of research that a historical 
reconstruction demands is not economically attractive to the filmmakers given the low 
budgets available to them.  
In an attempt to overcome these hitches, the filmmakers simply compromise the 
production experience while maintaining their historical leanings defiantly even if 
consciously anachronistic. Thus, accuracy is lost and what is left is referred to by elite 
Nigerians as a caricature of the past. Even the critically acclaimed Hollywood 
blockbuster, Titanic (1997) suffered its share of intolerance by historians (Saab, 2001). 
Regarding James Cameron’s anachronisms in the film, Saab makes interesting points 
when she notes that, “movies made in the present, regardless of their historical subject 
matter, are always about the present” and  “... historical periodization is not absolute, 
that cultural politics are always fluid, and that the relationship between history and 
popular culture is often uneasy and complicated” (p. 718) The assumption therefore, 
that Nollywood does not produce historical films merely because of anachronistic 
portrayals or that the themes are ahistorical requires validation. 
Another argument against the notion of Nigerian historical films is that most 
Nollywood films are set in contemporary times. When films are set in pre-colonial or 
colonial times (e.g. Sitanda), anachronisms are inevitable, thus negating or ill-deserving 
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the title ‘history’ or the past. Admittedly anachronisms occur in many films even among 
those made by the best Nollywood directors (Barrot, 2008; Iyanda, personal 
communication, 2013). Whether or not they are the result of under-researched pre-
production work, or intentional designs of the directors (who find themselves 
financially constrained, with little training and so have to compromise production 
values to make a film), film scholars and critics have come to learn to read the films 
under different labels from the ‘historical’. The argument here is that there are some 
Hollywood historical films widely acclaimed as such which were not set in the 
historical period. After all, historians recognise ancient, modern and contemporary 
periods in the narrativisation of the past (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Clint Eastwood’s 
2009 film about 1995 South African events – Invictus – is an example.  Eastwood 
portrayed the period in 1994 when, after release from prison, Nelson Mandela mobilised 
black and white South Africans to support the Springboks in the 1995 Rugby World 
Cup. Perhaps it would be stating the obvious to say that the history of South Africa is 
incomplete without the towering figure of Mandela. Hotel Rwanda (2004) is another 
illustration. The genocide from which the story was constructed occurred less than two 
decades ago. And a third representation is Heart and Stone, a 1995 documentary 
featuring Govan Mbeki, who played a major role in overthrowing apartheid in South 
Africa before his death in 2001. 
Josef Gugler (2004) calls for the critic’s responsibility in assessing films that 
provide narratives of African history and its people. He identified the important ways by 
which fictional representations depart from reality, noting that any worthwhile 
assessment of fictionalised portrayal of Africa must take cognizance of the knowledge 
of Africa that is already known through other means (p. 81). Cham (2004) and Gadjigo 
(2004) note the prominence of Sembene, who “became the first Soviet-trained African 
filmmaker and the first writer-director and producer to bring images of the African past 
to the screen” (p. 38). Gadjigo (2004) explicates the motion picture thus: “...the power 
of the moving image is not limited to the way it mirrors our present; we also receive our 
ideas about the past from motion pictures and television in feature films, docudramas, 
miniseries, and network documentaries” (p. 35)  
A notable feature of Gadjigo’s (2004) argument is the distinction he makes 
between Hollywood’s historical representation paradigm and that of Africans especially 
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in the figure of Sembene. According to Gadjigo, while American filmmakers portray 
the past as a “setting for action and romance” e.g. Titanic (1997), Gone with the wind 
(1939) without necessarily problematising that past (this position is arguable as 
Rosenstone (2006) has demonstrated the contrary), Sembene and other African 
cineastes used the audio-visual medium to subvert Western images of the African 
continent. Glancy (2005) keenly observes the politics of representation in The Patriot 
(2000) (self and other) evident in Hollywood films where careful selections and 
avoidances are made. Whereas Americans pander to public appeal and profit (p. 38), 
Africans re-tell their own stories which have long been misrepresented by and tilted to 
favour the Western world. Thus, the counter-hegemonic position of early African 
filmmakers drew the criticism, cynicism and politicization of the audio-visual medium. 
Sanctions were imposed; funding withdrawn and exhibition was delayed if not totally 
prohibited “...as the banning in France of Emitai and Camp de Thiaroye, the decade-
long argument between Sembene and Senghor over Ceddo, and the stifling of Samori 
also imply, the field of African history itself has become a site of competing and 
contentious imaginations” (Gadjigo 2004: 39). As will be discussed below, the response 
of those in power to political and historical representation shows that the films are seen 
as subversive.   
The intrinsic power of art to communicate is enormous, and Barber (1987) 
already attested to it in the following statement, “But popular arts are also much more 
than constellations of social, political, and economic relationships-they are expressive 
acts. Their most important attribute is their power to communicate.This power is 
eloquently testified to by the frequency with which they are repressed” (p. 3). 
Ekwuazi’s (2001) account of Francis Oladele’s 1970s experience with Things Fall 
Apart is telling: “while...shooting...was going on, security agents came and sealed up 
my location, bringing shooting to an abrupt end. On enquiry I was told that I should not 
make a film about Things Fall Apart because nothing was falling apart in Nigeria” (p. 
280). Eddie Ugboma had similar threats with his 1970s and 80s films.  
Directly relevant to this research is the article by Chukwuma Okoye (2007a) 
History and Nation Imagination: Igbo and the Videos of Nationalism in which he details 
– with examples from two Nigerian films – the ideological and discursive standpoints 
from which history is mediated. Using the background of the Nigerian civil war (1967 – 
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1970) which creates settings for Battle of Love and Laraba, he argues that the 
marginalised peoples of Nigeria especially the Igbos find refuge in “ethno-nationalism”. 
For him, ethnic subjectivities are the basis of the positioned rendering of the past 
evident in the two films discussed. Similarly, Francoise Ugochukwu (2014) examined in 
a book chapter, Nigerian Video-films on History: Love in Vendetta and the 1987 Kano 
riots, the problems of ethnicity and religious conflicts among Christians and Muslims, 
and how such tensions affect marriages and families. Like popular culture theorists, 
notably Barber (1987), Ugochukwu concludes that Nollywood has provided alternative 
spaces for freedom of speech to people who were previously denied. She posits that 
such spaces engender national dialogues where official forms of communication have 
failed.  
This segment has noted African’s efforts to make films about their past and 
some of the contexts under which these were done. It showed the themes explored by 
those cineastes among which (de)colonisation stood tall. Through these films, Africans 
wrested their past from colonial narrators. What these films achieved have not be 
sufficiently articulated by academics because of the gaps in audience studies in Africa, 
and also as Haynes (2011) argued, such films were rarely seen by African audiences. 
However, the banning the films faced in several European countries bears some 
testimony to their impact, not only in the decolonisation discourse, but also in the power 
of the audio-visual medium as an effective  tool for retelling the past.  
If the history of African and, in particular, Nigerian cinema shared any 
similarity, the next logical step would immediately examine how Nigerian filmmakers 
have undertaken the construction of their past. It has already been stated above that 
there are similarities and dissimilarities. The present day Nigerian filmmaking has deep 
roots in the Yoruba popular travelling theatre. The Yorubas are one of the major ethnic 
groups in Nigeria (with Igbos and Hausas as the other two). The literature on the 
practice and consumption of popular arts in Africa is extensive. Therefore, an 






3.8 On Popular Arts in Africa 
Africans have experienced various forms of popular arts ranging from paintings, music 
and concert parties to travelling theatres, literature and video films. Such art forms have 
narrated the daily cultural experiences of their creators and consumers. They have also 
mediated the past and opened up debates on historicising national and political events of 
the state. Scholars of African popular arts have recognised its interdisciplinary nature 
and Haynes (2000) in his thoughtful introductory essay to the edited volume, Nigerian 
Video Films, outlined social history, anthropology, literary theory and criticism as well 
as cultural studies of the Birmingham School as predecessors of popular art and culture 
(p. 13). As a starting point, the debates on popular arts and culture is approached in this 
research through the work of Karin Barber (1987) because it encompasses a wide range 
of art forms across the continent, including the Yoruba travelling theatre, which is a 
precursor to the video films. Barber’s work is not without limitations, as will be seen 
below, yet she more than any other scholar is mindful of those limitations. For as she 
admits the study of popular arts is akin to battling the hydra.   
There have been various debates and interpretations surrounding the notion of 
popular arts and culture. Among these are Obiechina (1973), Graburn (1976), Fabian 
(1978), Barber (1987), Hall (1998), Street (2001) to mention a few. These are by no 
means the first or last scholarly efforts on popular arts and culture, but they are, together 
with others, significant contributions to the theorisation of popular arts and culture in 
Africa. A definition of ‘popular’ or ‘culture’ is problematic, evasive and political. Street 
(2001:302-3) noted succinctly that “the very definition of popular culture is political, 
sanctioning some forms of culture and marginalising others”. 
For Hall (1998), an interpretation of popular culture begins with grasping the 
constituents of the ‘popular’, a term understood by Barber (1987) as the ‘people’ or the 
grassroots. Hall notes that, “the structuring principle of the popular...is the tensions and 
oppositions between what belongs to the central domain of elite or dominant culture, 
and the culture of the periphery. It is this opposition which constantly structures the 
domain of culture into popular and the non-popular” (1998: 448). So the idea of 
contestation is central to his idea of popular culture. Hall provides a common definition 
of popular culture as that which also gains popularity because masses of people listen to 
them, buy them, read them, consume them, and seem to enjoy them to the full. In 
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another sense, popular culture is loosely understood as the expression of art originating 
from the people and designed for the populace. The notion of what constitutes popular 
is indefinite, somewhat evasive, and a generally accepted definition is even less 
desirable among scholars. This is precisely because popular culture is broad and has 
multiple meanings which are dependent on one’s point of departure. It denotes various 
forms of artistic productions and expressions of the desires, aspirations, grievances, 
oppositions and general dispositions of the people, not so much their eating and 
drinking as differentiated by Englert (2008).  According to Hall, “... no whole, 
authentic, coherent and autonomous popular culture lies outside the field of force or the 
relations of cultural power and domination” (p. 447). He ties the study of popular 
culture or what the term is, properly speaking, to containment, resistance and 
acceptance which are typically exemplified in cultural relations, cultural power and 
cultural implantation. This is where he begins to build his argument on the nature and 
component of popular culture as well as his outline of what popular culture is not. “It is 
not a sphere where socialism, a socialist culture – already fully formed – might be 
simply ‘expressed’. But it is one of the places where socialism might be constituted. 
This is why popular culture matters” (Hall, 1998: 453). Arguing along these lines, 
Barber notes that popular culture is unofficial, i.e. if ‘unofficial’ is understood as 
circumventing state mechanisms. She states: “popular art is modern and urban-oriented, 
and represents a culture that can be recognised by its unofficial character and 
novelty...they combine elements from the traditional and the metropolitan cultures in 
unprecedented conjunctures, with the effect of radical departure from both” (1987: 13).  
Or as Fabian (1978) asserted when highlighting the connotations that popular 
culture might have, “it signifies, potentially at least, processes occurring behind the 
back of established powers and accepted interpretations...” (p. 315). Fabian compared 
three popular forms of Zairean culture existing between 1950s and 1970s: song, religion 
and painting along the lines of male-female relationship. Taking context, forms and 
function as well as narrative structure as frames of reference, he underlined the notion 
that these expressive media are constantly engaged in processes of identity formation. 
He concludes: 
...it is equally clear that popular culture does not consist of a play of pure 
forms and structural relations. Substantial issues are being formulated; 
political-ideological choices are made, and distinctive expressions are 
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being created. In other words, the observable processes are such that we 
cannot dispense with notions of intention and intellectual content. Nor 
can we neglect relations of power and domination (Fabian, 1978: 328). 
 
Here again, the subject of power arises, but Fabian does not show how, within each 
popular cultural mode, the relations of “power and domination” occur. With his single 
and brilliant examples of each form: love songs, mythologised Adam/Eve narrative and 
mermaid paintings, Fabian leaves the reader without a clue of other genres within 
popular songs, religious teachings and paintings, and how one differs from another. 
As one of the leading scholars of African popular arts, Barber gave the 
following definition: popular art is a category that seems to be characterised above all 
by its inclusiveness and its apparently infinite elasticity (1987: 6). This is similar to the 
position adopted by John Collins, whose definition of popular art was cited in Barber 
(1987: 10) as a popular syncretic form “which has continuity with traditional life and 
which has assimilated ideas creatively from the West, resulting in a qualitatively novel 
phenomenon”. This new form is often accepted based on its creative uniqueness or 
rejected as something inferior to the ‘authentic’. In his study of three expressions of 
popular culture in Zaire, Fabian (1978) also argues that “this form of popular art owes 
its existence to highly creative and original processes” (p. 315). 
Further, Hall (1998) highlights the cultural flux which is found in different 
historical periods; indicating that the tensions evident in popular art forms will take on 
varying manifestations. He rejected every form of static culture. Cultural struggle takes 
on many forms: incorporation, distortion, resistance, negotiation and recuperation. He 
refers to tradition as a tricky term in popular culture, a vital element which has little to 
do with the persistence of old forms. For Hall, “popular culture is one of the sites where 
this struggle for and against the culture of the powerful is engaged: it is also the stake to 
be won or lost in that struggle. It is the arena of consent and resistance. It is partly 
where hegemony arises, and where it is secured (p. 239).  
There is a Euro-triadic art paradigm, traditional-popular-elite, which has been 
espoused by scholars over the years. But even this has been problematised by Karin 
Barber. Popular art addresses all forms of living, all classes of people, but is generated 
by the common, ordinary folk as distinct from the privileged ruling class (characterised 
by wealth, position and power).The traditional is the authentic communal, participatory, 
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non-profit oriented and official construction of art. Barber cites Mamadou Diawara 
(1985) to contest the ‘official’ and at the same time, subversive character attributed to 
traditional arts. Traditional art dates back to the pre-colonial and colonial era. Implicitly, 
there is an assumption that this traditional mode of expression is uneducated and lacks 
sophistication, especially when contrasted with the elite art. The traditional art forms 
were found among the pre-colonial/ancient communities of African societies. Barber, 
quoting Ulli Beier (1962a), provides a valid and contrary opinion to this position about 
illiterate and uneducated producers of traditional art.  
Traditional art... is...produced according to rigid codes by highly trained, 
skilled craftsmen. It has a tendency to be austere and serious. Individual 
art (which others would call high or elite) is produced as Beier's choice 
of term suggests by named, self-conscious, educated artists, searching for 
a personal and original style and executing intellectually-conceived 
projects (Barber 1987: 9) 
 
Elite art is the individualised production of a highly privileged few, the culturally and 
intellectually well-placed in the society. This triadic model then alludes to the popular 
as the mass of expressions or productions between the traditional and the elitist. A 
polarised conceptualization of the popular reiterates the evasive nature of what actually 
constitutes popular arts, as an art form which is neither here nor there.  Fabian (1978) 
admits to the open, never-ending process of how perceptions, experiences and problems 
are mediated by popular culture (p. 329). For Barber (1987), the triadic model simply 
yields two because what is in the middle is indefinite and as such, defies a finite 
definition. She maintains, however, that the popular is recognisable, its distinguishing 
properties being syncretism, novelty and change in a critical combination of forms (p. 
10) 
Music is said to be one of the early forms of popular cultural expression on the 
continent (Barber, 1987: 1-2). Other forms include painting, literature, concert parties, 
religious movements, and various forms of drama troupes. Englert (2008) argues that in 
South Africa and Kenya, popular music helped shape the direction of political 
governance to good and evil ends. Citing Olwage (2008), he points out that scholarly 
attention is brought to the fact that popular music “helped constitute apartheid just as it 
helped take apartheid apart” (Englert 2008: 8). It is both warmly received and 
appropriated by the people and the government who turn such popular songs to election 
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campaign slogans. Barber (1987: 4) refers to Wole Soyinka and Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, 
two Nigerian public figures who write and sing respectively about Nigerian politics. Her 
reference to Soyinka addressed the jest he made of politicians with the song ‘etike revo 
wetin’ after the 1983 elections. And to Fela Anikulapo-Kuti’s Who kill Dele Giwa? – a 
song which the social activist cum musician used to alert the Nigerian public to the 
ruthless operations of the military regime in the 1980s. Englert records similar 
experiences in Tanzania, Senegal and other parts of Africa where music is deployed to 
entertain, educate and resist repressive leadership.  
Similarly, Mano (2011) writes about the nexus between music and journalism in 
postcolonial Zimbabwe. He argues that like other forms of popular arts, popular music 
adopts a counter-hegemonic tempo, similar to what journalistic practices in repressive 
regimes would do. And, that musicians positioned themselves as intermediaries, 
broadcasters and discourse-originators between the supressed populace and the political 
regime of the day. In other words, popular music functions as alternative journalism, not 
necessarily as political endorsement as Englert (2008) showed. This positioning of 
popular artsis contested in chapter five below, which sees video films and their 
producers as consciously endorsing political power.  
Another interesting dimension of popular art’s interactions with the people and 
the state was presented by Dolby (2006). In South Africa, Dolby (2006) investigated the 
highly controversial Big Brother Africa’s rise, social impact and moral standing, not 
only in that country, but also in other African countries, which demonstrate varied 
receptions by the ruling class and the ruled. Her analysis of contemporary scholarship of 
popular culture reveals that the economic nature of popular culture makes its 
consumption heavily accessible to the youth. It speaks of their lifestyle, aspirations, 
anxieties, and even indifferences. It is also a site of public discourse, arresting personal 
and public attention in leadership, governance, religion, ethnicity and a host of issues 
that provide an outlet to identify with and relieve tensions. According to Dolby, Big 
Brother Africa was welcomed by the youth in twelve African countries, condemned by 
citizens and church leaders for its voyeuristic quality, and acclaimed by the Zambian 
government for placing the country in the limelight with the success of Cherise 
Makubale. The reality TV show is a center of identity formation and public discourse 
whose impact is not articulated beyond the concerns of unifying citizens of diverse 
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African cultures and countries. Similarly, Dodds’s (2010) study of popular cartoons of 
political figures, notably President Jacob Zuma, is yet another example of the extent of 
mediation that popular art forms can and do engage. The production and circulation of 
the cartoons via the internet has reached phenomenal proportions resulting in a steady 
barrage of tension among supporters and critics of the Zuma administration, including 
death threats to Jonathan Shapiro, the cartoonist. Clearly, art forms have been used to 
interrogate old and new forms of culture and politics across the continent.  
The understanding of what constitutes popular culture has undergone numerous 
revisions – the most outstanding of which is Barber’s (2014) and Newell and Okome’s 
(2014) – to accommodate an ever-shifting and flexible notion of what is meant by the 
‘unofficial popular’, but it has retained a lot of the definitional ‘problems’ raised in the 
1987 article. Rather than focus on definitions, Barber posits that it is more beneficial to 
“think of this emergent field precisely as a terrain – open, stretching out in all 
directions, with no marked boundaries, but with centres of activity, hot spots, sites of 
generativity” (2014: xvi). The freedom of popular arts from the constraints of the 
official traditions and their position in the unofficial sphere as cultural brokers between 
the foreign and the indigenous, mean that the popular arts are liable. These conventions 
are opposed to the accepted standards of popular expressions obtainable in European 
culture. Barber collapses her earlier position that these culture forms are “dynamic,” 
“ever-changing,” “playful,” with “undefined forms,” as opposed to official art which is 
“finished, completed, didactic, utilitarian.” The conventions according to which “they 
construct their meanings and communicate with their audiences are not publicly 
legitimized” (1987: 37). Evident from the revisions is that these later positions are 
changing. The communication between the producers of popular arts and their 
audiences now seems secure although it is not entirely so as chapter eight reveals; the 
problematic traditional-popular-elite paradigm has equally been revised to 
accommodate overlaps rather than focusing on distinct and untenable traditional, 
popular and elite categories. Attention is now turned to the popular in Nigeria, the 





3.9 Popular Arts in Nigeria 
The first form of popular art in Nigeria was music (Waterman, 1982; Barber 1987). 
Popular music forms notably juju and afro-beat have drawn the attention of scholars 
notably anthropologists and sociologists. Christopher Waterman’s Juju (1990) is the 
first extensive study of musical performance as a cultural phenomenon among the 
Yorubas. It provides an excellent historical and ethnographic account of this form of 
African music in which the dynamics of power relations, identity and socio-cultural 
practices are enacted. Thematic leanings privilege financial, domestic, religious, 
philosophical and political concerns.  
Associated with the West African coast, and the Caribbean, its aesthetic form is 
increased by the use of poetic rhetoric combined with harmonious sounds from 
instruments made of ceramic and wood. Performance sites include beer parlours, elite 
gatherings and outdoor parties, weddings and other festivities. The rendition of juju 
music favours praise-singing of power-brokers during which crisp naira notes are 
ostentatiously ‘sprayed’ at the performers, and on occasions subversive tropes are 
targeted at politicians. Waterman demonstrates convincingly how the praise and 
criticism of political powers relate to the nexus in juju music between tradition and 
modernity. However, Erlmann (1991) questions the growing attribution to juju and 
other popular art forms of the power to realise social change by revealing questionable 
practices of political powers (p. 151). Quoting Fabian’s (1990) observation that “not 
everything that is crucial to culture and to knowledge about culture is performance” (p. 
13), Erlmann argues “might we not have to argue that some performance traditions 
(such as juju?) do not articulate the kind of alternative vision that Yoruba speaking 
Nigerians may well create in other realms of social and political action?” (p. 151). Apart 
from the juju music widely popularised by King Sunny Ade (KSA) and Chief 
Commander Ebeneezer Obey, the other dominant style is fuji which Waterman (1990) 
described as a secularised outgrowth of ajisaari, a religious chant that calls Muslims for 
prayers.  These debates reveal the changing and contentious perceptions of popular arts, 
even among scholars, which is later articulated by Haynes (2000).  
A later manifestation of popular arts in Nigeria was the Onitsha market literature 
which was extensively researched and documented by Emmanuel Obiechina (1973). He 
addresses, among other concerns, the dislocations of modernity and the effects that such 
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might have on the masses in their day to day operations (Okome, 2008: 148).  Its 
syncretic nature was affirmed by Barber, who observed that the Onitsha market 
literature “raids European art forms” (1987:36). Lindfors (1968) quoted in Barber 
(1987) comments on the writers of such literature “who approach a foreign language 
with so much zest and audacity, who do not bother to learn all the niceties of grammar, 
spelling and punctuation, who simply rip into English and let the splinters fly” (Barber 
1987:36). This syncretic nature is evident in Nollywood films as well where American 
filmmaking and acting styles are transposed to the Nigerian setting (Haynes and 
Okome, 2000). Typical examples are Zeb Ejiro’s film The President Must Not Die 
(2004) and Teco Benson’s action thrillers. In the first, scantily-clad female detectives 
fight crime in martial displays to the chagrin of a kidnapped president. Those ladies, 
together with police officers, deploy comical CIA techniques (not commonly found in 
Nigerian law enforcement practice) to rescue the president. The localisation of 
American and Asian procedures further attests to the characteristic syncretism found in 
popular arts.  
Another popular art form in Nigeria is the Yoruba travelling theatre. Biodun 
Jeyifo, in his brilliant book on the Yoruba Popular Travelling Theatre of Nigeria 
(1984), at one point uses popular in the sense of all the people: the whole population, 
the nation. The Yoruba popular theatre, he says, is widely popular, attracting large 
audiences of various socio-economic backgrounds. There is a link between the 
travelling theatre and the video film culture as constituted in Nigeria today. On the 
origins of the Nigerian film industry, scholars have identified the role of the Yoruba 
travelling theatres of the 1960s and 1970s. Particularly, Adesanya (2000) notes that:  
Involvement of the Yoruba travelling theatre practitioners in motion 
picture production was perhaps the most auspicious single factor in the 
evolution of an indigenous cinema in Nigeria. This happened in the mid-
seventies when, in spite of positive reviews, English-language feature 
films by Nigerian filmmakers were not making the desired impact to 
stimulate the constant market demand both at home and abroad. Ola 
Balogun’s box office hit Ajani Ogun (1976) which opened the 
floodgates, gave the much-needed impetus to local film production and 
led to a new career for travelling theatre troupes (p. 38)  
 
Similarly, Ogundele (2000) also provides a stimulating historical account of the 
antecedents of Nollywood as the site of cultural production and contestation. In fact his 
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account makes most plausible the nexus between the Yoruba travelling troupes and 
what is known today as Nollywood. From its beginnings in the 1930s to the 1970s, 
when its popularity increased significantly, there were well over 100 troupes spread 
across the western areas of Nigeria, and “the big cities of the West African coast, all the 
way to Freetown” (p.92). The founders of this movement were Hubert Ogunde (1916-
1990) also known as the father of the popular theatre troupes. He founded the Ogunde 
Concert Party in 1945. Others include Duro Ladipo (1931-1978), widely acclaimed for 
his play, Oba Koso (The king did not hang) in which he also acted, and Kola Ogunmola 
(1925-1973) who founded the Ogunmola Travelling Theatre in 1947.   It appears that 
Ogunde’s theatre contemporaries before Ladipo and Ogunmola were A. B. David, P. A. 
Dawodu, Layeni and G.T. Onimole. Apparently, Ogunde and Ladipo developed their 
interest in theatre under the auspices of churches based in the western region. Other 
dramatists, notably Oyin Adejobi, were to follow. His theatre company formed the 
protagonist of Karin Barber’s book The Generation of Plays (2000) 
Ekwuazi (2000) notes that the “Yoruba travelling theatre created a guaranteed 
audience for the Yoruba film, for when the practitioners of this theatre took to film, they 
merely adapted their stage repertoire to the screen: they produced the same kind of work 
for the same kind of audience” (p. 132). The themes of the plays were varied. At the 
onset, and while still under colonial rule, there were church plays and harvest concerts. 
Later, Ogunde re-designed it to accommodate indigenous masquerade performances and 
traditional elements. There was also the inclusion of borrowed cultural flavour from 
neighbouring countries, e.g. Ghanaian highlife music. Duro Ladipo is said to have 
incarnated the Yoruba god of thunder in his performance in the internationally 
acclaimed Oba Koso, and indeed elevated the entertainment business with other 
productions to his credit including Moremi and Oba Waja. These were classics largely 
composed from Yoruba history and mythology. Ogundele asserts that: 
theatre has of course always been an instrument for forging group social, 
political and cultural identity, for interrogating such an identity, 
mirroring its state of being, and recuperating its past, especially when 
that past is in danger of being forgotten in the face of present crises 
(2000: 93).  
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Before Ogundele, Duro-Ladipo and Kolawole (1997) addressed the mix of traditional 
and westernised (in this sense additions informed by Christianity and Islam) forms and 
the latter’s begrudging impact on the former:  
The history of West African theatre in the colonial period reveals itself 
therefore as largely a history of cultural resistance and survival. 
Confronted by the hostility of both Islamic and Christian values in 
addition to the destructive imperatives of colonialism, it has continued 
until today to vitalise contemporary theatrical form, both in the 
traditional folk opera and in the works of those playwrights and directors 
commonly regarded as Westernized (Duro-Ladipo and Kolawole, 1997: 
103). 
 
Interestingly, Ogunde is recorded as the first to produce plays with brief film insertions 
at the end (Ogundele, 2000: 95). Such insertions were depictions of super-human 
powers and effects on humans that could not be performed by the actors. This was well 
received by audiences and would-be producers who latched onto the new opportunity. 
As the commercial benefits of the new medium were being reaped, Ogunde proceeded 
to make more feature films using the same technique.   
The Yoruba popular theatre was not without its share of criticisms. With the 
introduction of traditional drums to church plays, a whole congregation before whom 
Ladipo performed was scandalised. In fact, Duro-Ladipo and Kolawole (1997: 103) and 
Ogundele (2000) affirm that Ladipo was expelled from the church and the 1960 Easter 
cantata to which he was invited discontinued. By the travelling theatre standards, such 
hybridization, a feature of popular arts and the very element on which they thrive 
(Barber 1987) was unacceptable in a religious setting.  
When Barber’s article, Popular Arts in Africa, was published in 1987, 
Nollywood, the popular film culture in Nigeria was in the offing, although the first 
generation filmmakers from the 1970s were already in practice. Other popular art forms 
in Africa – and specifically, Nigeria – the first of which was music and later literature, 
pervaded the Nigerian space at that time. Interestingly, the characteristics of popular arts 
outlined in that essay can aid the reading and interpretation of Nigerian video films 
today. Nollywood scholars, among who are Jonathan Haynes, Onookome Okome, John 
McCall and Moradewun Adejunmobi, have drawn from that seminal essay in debating 
the nature of Nollywood productions as popular art.  
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If popular culture is the non-elite, non-governmental (or unofficial), people-
oriented representation of the knowledge systems of a society, how does it differ from 
the traditional or elite? Jules-Rosette (1987) refers to Graburn’s (1976:7) assertion that 
popular arts are those produced by an artistic elite “whose arts often take the forms of 
European traditions, but in content express feelings totally different, feelings 
appropriate to the new cultures that are emerging among the leaders of the Third 
World.” In contrast, Barber criticizes both the view that popular arts are produced by an 
artistic elite and the approach that reduces such art forms to a “residual cultural 
category”. Instead, she argues that this new art form is a distinct, syncretic form with its 
own new or distinct character. And this is where Nollywood belongs.  
Graburn’s assertion will be found problematic if weighed against Nollywood 
films primarily because a large number of the video films is not produced by elitist 
individuals. They are produced, directed and marketed by partially and informally 
trained cinematographers and Igbo merchants. In fact, some of the Nigerian elite, e.g. 
Dora Akunyili cited in Onyekakeyah (2009), Reuben Abati (2009), Femi Osofisan 
(2007) unreservedly dissociate themselves from and criticise Nollywood. However, the 
latter part of Graburn’s postulation sits comfortably within Barber’s and later 
theorisations of popular arts. Barber rejects the ‘residual cultural category’, and refers to 
it as a mix peculiar to the culture from where it originates rather than the ‘remainder’ of 
something else, probably an elite cultural form. Commercial art “produced and 
consumed by the people” is the most fully popular of all art forms and, according to 
Barber, encompasses “the vast majority of all arts usually described as popular, e .g., 
dance music, urban theater, and popular painting and fiction.”  Jules-Rosette (1978) 
challenges Barber’s classifications of popular arts, “Although this ‘provisional 
framework’ is first introduced in a section of Barber's paper entitled Popular Art and 
Social Change, the model is static and accounts for neither social change nor artistic 
production and communication” (p. 92).  
Barber (1987) further states, “one of the most valuable insights to have emerged 
from the triadic model is, precisely, the indefiniteness of the area labelled popular, its 
fluidity and lack of boundaries. What we are looking at, then, is not a bounded category 
but a field whose edges are indeterminate but whose centre is clearly recognizable” (p. 
20). Chris Waterman (1986) identified the absence of observable rigid boundaries 
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between ‘popular’ and ‘traditional’ music in Ibadan, but notes that the popular borrows 
freely from the traditional. Fabian (1978) notes the common traits of popular arts as 1. 
urban traits, 2. contexts of colonisation and decolonisation, 3. local audiences, 4. 
opposition to established powers and accepted interpretations. Over the years, this 
categorisation has undergone modifications especially when applied to Nollywood 
productions. Certainly the video films have urban traits. They depict contemporary 
cultural life. Most of them are shot in posh houses in Lagos and other Nigerian cities; 
actors use expensive automobiles, and in some instances, a class struggle is evident 
(Haynes 2007). The stories explicate life in Lagos (the commercial nerve-centre of 
Nigeria) and are unapologetically steeped in domestic themes of marriage, infertility, 
love and betrayal, and wealth acquisition. This makes them widely acceptable to local 
audiences who see their personal circumstances played out in the films. 
To further pursue Fabian’s ‘common traits’, Nigerian video films have indirectly 
grown out of colonial and missionary encounters.  Its audiences span the entire globe 
including non-Africans (Ugochukwu, 2014; Krings and Okome, 2013; Okome, 2011), 
and in instances are vehemently opposed to irresponsible governance. Hence, Fabian’s 
categorisations, while useful as a starting point of discourse, do not provide absolute 
indicators of the nature of popular African arts.  It serves to highlight the variations in 
expressions that exist among African countries, even though certain similarities still 
exist. Regarding the opposition to established powers, Fabian fails to account 
completely for all forms of popular arts as there are those that endorse, rather than 
contest political or established powers.   
Alternative conceptions of popular arts were promoted by Kinsey Katchka. 
Katchka (2000) argues for a non-resisting, non-hegemonic conceptualization of popular 
art as opposed to Barber’s and Fabian’s response-to-oppression paradigm. Katchka 
observes that while some see popular arts as a deviation, which is a regrettable 
corruption of the authentic culture, others welcome it. In her article on Exhibiting the 
Popular..., she cites Waterman’s (1990) position of complementarity of popular and 
elite art, thus questioning the positions of the former scholars. In parts of Dakar where 
Katchka carried out her 4-year ethnographic work, popular arts were institutionalised 
and exhibited in public places. The institutionalisation and exhibition of popular works 
of African arts also serves a pedagogical purpose. Katchka notes that developmental 
74 
 
community programmes were held in the museums for children, where they exhibited 
their artworks and were further integrated into cultural life. So while Dolby (2004) and 
Stack and Kelly (2006) examined people’s negative perception of popular arts and 
culture, referring to its negative influence on youth, children and the entire populace, 
Katchka (2000), McCall (2004), Dolby (2004), Haynes (2000, 2007e), and Okome 
(2007) celebrate it for its ability to communicate intentionally the deep-seated 
differences among people and places. The debate over the utility and futility of popular 
arts and culture is world-wide, yielding an array of scholarly and journalistic material, 
but for my purposes, I limit the discussions to the African continent.  
To West Africans in the Diaspora, it appears that Nollywood is their cultural 
ambassador, indicating the traditional and modern complexities of African life in ways 
yet unexplored in classrooms, textbooks and the news media. They are avid spectators 
of Nigerian films, taking advantage of every trip home to re-stock their collection of the 
video films. Sitting beside a Nigerian MBA student at a UK university on a Lagos-
London trip, I was apprised of her last-minute travel plans, which included purchasing 
over a dozen videos (with the multiple instalments of each title) because they make her 
laugh and remember Lag (Lagos), not because she likes them very much (personal 
communication, 2011).   
Scholars have not sufficiently explored the alternative conceptions of popular 
arts, as the emerging productions, however few, seem to exhibit. Some of the video 
productions outrightly support official powers, which suggest the need for additional 
theoretical work on the changing nature of popular arts and what might be responsible 
for such changes. To illustrate this point, films like Zeb Ejiro’s The President must not 
die (2004), Andy Amenechi’s The Last Vote (2001) and musical videos such as Tony 
Tetuila’s You don hit my car (2001) are arguably political statements in favour of the 
official powers of the day.  
There have been various reactions to Nollywood as popular art. Nollywood’s 
most vocal defender, Onookome Okome, has published impressive literature on the 
origins, nature and popular criticisms of the film industry. The latest and most complete 
of this is Nollywood and its critics (2010) in which he marshals stakeholders’ arguments 
for and against the industry. He argued that “the social significance and political value 
of Nollywood must be located in the practice of popular arts in much the same way 
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as...the Onitsha market pamphlets or the concert parties of Ghana of the 1950s” (p. 37).  
It is precisely a misunderstanding of Nollywood as an arena of popular culture that 
leads critics to view its productions with foreign parameters. Okome’s contribution is 
telling, detailing a vast collection of private and public exchanges and documents that 
chronicle a continent-wide reading and analyses of Nollywood films. He concludes: 
“...Nollywood and the cultural products it sells constitute one social document, a 
tableau vivant, if you like, of contemporary Nigerian social and cultural history from 
the bottom up” (p. 39). Elsewhere, Haynes (2005) refers to Okome’s denunciation of 
“Europeans for seeing Nigerian videos as a mere ‘curiosity,’ detecting an underlying 
lack of respect”. That parochial mentality is most certainly another variant of Euro-
centrism.   
Luke Onyekakeyah’s (2009) article queries the former Minister of Information 
and Communication, Dora Akunyili, for her intervention on Nollywood’s effort at 
degrading the country. The scathing comments levelled against authors of popular arts 
are as old as the study of popular culture itself. He argued against perceptions of 
Nollywood’s moral and cultural bankruptcy stating, “[A]s a matter of fact, a critical 
analysis of what has contributed in tarnishing the nation's image would certainly not 
place Nollywood in the list. On the other hand, the same analysis, if unbiased, would 
place Nollywood high on the list of agents of good image for Nigeria” (The Guardian, 
Dec. 15, p.67). It is indeed ironical that the same minister launched a ‘Rebrand Nigeria’ 
project in 2009 and appointed a key Nollywood figure, Pete Edochie, to head the project 
committee. Rebrand Nigeria was designed to restore the negative image that the country 
and her people attract in international circles. The Minister of Information and Culture, 
Prof. Dora Akunyili launched the rebranding project for a national and international re-
orientation on African and specifically Nigerian values. It was not a project for 
Nollywood filmmakers as such, but given the power wielded by the filmmakers through 
the reach of their films, the minister co-opted some of them as stakeholders.  
Nigeria’s literary giant, Femi Osofisan, is not the first of his kind to openly 
rebuke the popular products of Nollywood. He states: 
This is where the films present us with a great dilemma, and where, in 
spite of our pleasure, we must take a stand in the interest of our 
collective survival. For we cannot but remark that, however popular the 
films may be, and however much in demand, the picture that the majority 
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of them present of our world is one that we must not only interrogate, but 
indeed reject very strongly, if what we seek is the transformation of our 
society into a modern, progressive state (2007: 2). 
 
McCall (2004) in his analysis of vigilante films (Issakaba 1-4) argues that those films 
represent the people’s call for justice and the restoration of popular confidence in the 
government and para-military agencies – a laudable popular initiative. The 2000/1 
Issakaba films are replete with rituals/human sacrifices, the occult and recourse to the 
supernatural as an alternative means of eliminating villainy.  Whereas McCall, 
anthropologist, examines the films in the light of their significance in a troubled and 
troubling society, Osofisan excoriates such depictions in a standoffish manner: 
...why this unceasing preoccupation with juju, this relentless celebration 
of dark rituals and diabolical cults? Practically every Nollywood director 
seems to have been caught in the spell-mix a diet of grotesque murders 
and cacophonous chants and bizarre incantations...instead of ...empirical 
extrapolations and direct physical participation in social struggle (2007: 
2-3).  
 
But the more pressing issue here is how the film director, Lancelot Imasuen, re-cast past 
and on-going state security issues, government and popular responses to crime and 
punishment in southeastern Nigeria. Furthermore, there are Haynes’s (2010) and 
McCall’s (2012) reviews of Pierre Barrot’s (2008) book on Nollywood where the latter 
recounts with dissociated interest and poignant disdain, the ‘personality/character’ of 
the video industry. As one of the first edited volumes on Nollywood, the book has its 
merits. While serving as an introductory journalistic material to the industry, Barrot’s 
book also lambastes directors of the popular video film culture and their modes of 
representations. Clearly, the author’s criticism of the Nigerian popular art originated 
from his limited and probably Euro-centric view of cultures.  
Celebrated journalist-now-turned presidential spokesman, Reuben Abati (in 
newsdiaryonline.com) has the following to say of Nollywood:  
There is a crying need for professionalism in Nollywood. The industry, 
despite its popularity and impact is gradually being overtaken by home-
grown mediocrity. Every actor and actress is a potential producer, movie 
director and screenplay writer. This “jack-of-all-trades” mentality 
reduces the quality of the output. When this is not the case, a typical 
Nigerian film is a family-affair. I have seen quite a number of these films 
in which the cast and crew are made up of husband, wife, brothers and 
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children. Casting is not determined by ability but filial relations. The 
dialogue is poor. (2009: para 9) 
 
These criticisms which reveal the semi-literate background of the film producers and the 
possible constraints they face have made the filmmakers more attuned to the needs of 
their audience. It has led to better productions (A. Amenechi and F. Amata, personal 
communication). But it has also revealed the initial reluctance of the elite to accept 
Nollywood as anything good or for its achievements as a home grown filmmaking 
practice – even if the processes are crude.  
Katchka (2000) questioning the presentation of popular arts as a site of 
contention notes that Waterman (1982, 1990) in his ethnography of Nigerian highlife 
music, makes no reference to the polarised descriptions of the popular but reiterates its 
parallel existence alongside traditional and elite art. This, he argues, is made possible by 
the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of urban settings – the space where popular arts 
dominate. Nollywood films are set in rural and urban locations, and in fact, majority of 
the films project a nexus between rural and urban lives. This is derived from Nigerian 
realities, which bear at once harmony and tension between the rural and urban lifestyles. 
In Nigeria, as well as in other parts of the world, indigenes live in cities from where 
they did not originate. At specific times of the year and however elitist they may be, 
they return to their roots to visit families.  
In spite of the criticisms of popular against Nollywood and its producers, the 
industry continues to thrive because the people for whom the productions are made see 
in the videos a powerful space for negotiating their own identities. But popular arts are 
also much more than constellations of social, political, and economic relationships – 
they are expressive acts (Barber, 1987). Their most important attribute is their power to 
communicate. Referring to Nollywood productions, this power is inadvertently asserted 
by Femi Osofisan in favour of the video films: 
The films have been proven to exercise a tremendous impact on our 
people's minds, on their ways of thinking and their habits of perception, 
on their attitude to the world, to work, to family, to their neighbours. The 
films also have significant influence on the way that others see us, and 
hence on the way they relate to us. We cannot but be concerned therefore 
about what they are saying, what attitudes they are promoting, what 




And it is eloquently testified to by “the frequency with which they are repressed” 
(Barber 1987: 3). Street (2001) also notes that “the fact that regimes bother to censor 
popular cultural products is the best proof that it is nothing trivial. It is worthy of 
systematic societal and scholarly attention to understand clearly its manifest forms of 
production, circulation and consumption as well as whose interests are represented or 
undermined” (p. 303).  
This chapter has outlined the dynamics of representing the past on screen 
beginning with the contestations on what constitutes history. It examined the 
distinctions between early African efforts at historical films, which had a decolonization 
agenda and the video film practices with a less revisionist approach. Since the video 
films were not concerned with rewriting colonial history, they tended to what scholars 
have identified as popular arts. The defining traits and debates of popular arts in Africa 
and particularly Nigeria were examined paying close attention to how those informed 
the growth of Nigerian video films that depict history. The contestations on 
Nollywood’s attempt at representing the past were also highlighted and it was argued 
that if the films tell us what to think about the past, then they do certainly re-enact 
history in spite of the less technically sophisticated ways in which the filmmakers may 














HISTORY OF POLITICAL FILMMAKING IN NIGERIA 
4.1 Introduction 
The history of film in Nigeria has already been well documented by Nigerian and non-
Nigerian scholars alike (Opubor & Nwuneli, 1979; Balogun, 1987; Mgbejume, 1989; 
Ekwuazi, 1991; Haynes 1995, 2000; Larkin, 2008), and aspects of it were examined in 
the preceding chapter. In this chapter, I examine the early Nigerian films that deal with 
politics as earlier defined in the light of their motivation, narrative techniques, ideology 
and reception. The paucity of political filmmaking in Nollywood has been identified by 
Alamu (2010) for reasons that will be examined throughout the following chapters. It 
suffices to set up here the divergent opinions on political filmmaking.  
While Haynes (2006) suggests that political filmmaking is gaining ascendancy 
in the collection of Nollywood films, Alamu (2010), writing later argues “that 
contemporary films in Nigeria do not have any interest in shaping current political 
discourse and situations, given that little or no effort has been devoted to these issues by 
the producers” (p. 168). On the one hand, Haynes devotes his attention to the nature and 
forms of political critiques while teasing out the environmental factors that impinge on 
such productions. On the other hand, Alamu foregrounds his article on the stylistic 
elements of narratives in Nollywood by identifying the topical issues addressed in the 
films. Although both authors approach Nollywood from different perspectives, there is 
arguably a lack of awareness by later scholars on the subtle developments within the 
film industry, and the reasons thereof. This oversight is glaring when considered in the 
light of Adesokan’s (2009b) article in which he aims “to discuss the emergence of films 
concerned with democratic governance” (p. 2). Alamu is neither aware of Haynes nor 
Adesokan, but rightly observes that “the industry does not possess a vibrant tradition of 
political filmmaking” (2010: 168). But it is also necessary to examine cultural 
production in Nigeria/Africa as well as the kinds of political issues such productions 





4.2 Cultural Production in Nigeria  
The most simplistic definition of a concept as broad and as shifty as ‘culture’ is that, it 
is a people’s way of life. But that definition, now seriously overused and also severely 
inadequate is now obsolete. Barber (2014) defines culture (popular) “as a site in which 
people understand themselves as part of a global order which nonetheless, in significant 
ways, operates to marginalise them and their local experience” (p. xx). The benefit of 
this chapter, it is supposed, is to take a close look at the political and cultural situation in 
which independent cultural, and specifically, film production thrived in Nigeria before 
and after colonisation, because as a cultural tool, cinema shapes the people who make 
and consume it just as the culture of the people is deeply reflected in their cinema.  
In spite of the negative and critical sentiments associated with colonialism, there 
is the undeniable truth that film in Nigeria, and indeed in many former colonies, is one 
major legacy of the colonial enterprise. Film policy and regulation also drew heavily 
from the British, which as McCall (2004) argued, prepared the scene for contemporary 
filmmaking. During the colonial era, film was produced to the extent that it served as a 
tool of propaganda, to show to the colonised what the British had done for them and for 
which they were expected to be grateful and subservient. It was also deployed as an 
educational tool and as the means for inspiring self-help projects among the viewers and 
under the auspices of the colonised (e.g. Daybreak in Udi). In his book, Film in Nigeria 
(1989), Mgbejume also writes about the early “films shown to the communities which 
were on education, health, community development and modern farming techniques” 
(Mgbejume, 1989: 11). The films were either purchased from European filmmakers or 
were produced by the British. Depending on the audience – Hausa or Yoruba, an 
interpreter adopted various nuances in his explanations to cater for the existing cultural 
differences. By and large, the ‘message’ of the films served the purposes of the British. 
In the 19th Century, together with the colonization agenda, the Colonial Film 
Unit (CFU) was set up. Ekwuazi (1991) records the CFU’s formation at the beginning 
of World War II – although Mgbejume (1989) states it was established in October 1946 
– primarily to use the film medium to promote British agenda in the colonies and to 
mobilise support against the Germans. Under the British government’s central offices of 
information, the British Council, the CFU and the Crown Film Unit (CFU) in Britain 
operated. The CFU through the colonial and regional governments funded film 
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productions that were shown to indigenes of the colonies. The films, funded through the 
Colonial Development Welfare Act, were intended to deepen British superiority, 
indoctrinate, acculturate, assimilate and foster more civilised social behaviour on the 
part of the colonised. The films were distributed through strategic outlets such as 
government agencies, churches, cinema vans, community exhibitors, schools and clubs 
(Opubor & Nwuneli, 1979; Mgbejume, 1989; Ekwuazi 1991). This period, 1946 
onwards, is significant because it saw the growth of mobile cinema shows to which over 
two million Nigerians regularly thronged (Larkin 2008). Larkin’s observation was that 
the organisation of the shows did not remain within the CFU, but rather shifted to the 
Federal Film Unit and regional units as more Africans got involved in the processes of 
production and exhibition (Larkin 2008: 86).  
Films made by the CFU, documentaries and newsreel, are not considered 
political in the sense adopted in this thesis although they were made by a political 
power, Britain, and were motivated by political objectives. They were of a top-down 
approach targeted primarily at “breaking through mass ignorance and illiteracy” 
(Mgbejume 1989: 39) and were not reconstructions of the past as understood in this 
study. It is in the same vein that films made by the independent Nigerian government 
are also not considered political. Rather, the colonial films sought to “train these people 
to play a larger part in the life of their own territories” (ibid) and to facilitate Britain’s 
discharge of its duties.  The Federal Film Unit was established in 1947, a year after the 
CFU.  Similar to the functions of the CFU, the Federal Film Unit made and imported 
propagandist films with all the support from Britain, films that were aimed at educating 
an illiterate people on the functions of government, and by exhibiting colonial films. In 
addition to these, Mgbejume (1989) observed that the Federal Film Unit was charged 
with other responsibilities: that of portraying the achievements of the Nigerian culture, 
both locally and internationally as well as informing the public of news events in and 
outside Nigeria. Mobile cinema units were the conduit by which these objectives were 
met.   
At Nigeria’s Independence in 1960, much of the infrastructure and policies of 
the colonial government were bequeathed to the newly formed national government. 
Frank Aig-Imoukhuede’s (1979) observation that in Nigeria, distribution, exhibition 
(including advertisement films) and productions (except the products of government 
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film units) were largely in the hands of expatriates” (p. 40) is in sync with previous 
narratives on the growth of the film industry. Nigerians were exposed to documentaries 
made by the post-colonial government, and feature films largely from India, America, 
China and Britain. Ekwuazi (1991) rightly observes that “too heavy a dependence on 
these films has conditioned the Nigerian industry by influencing both the audience and 
the filmmakers and has consequently conditioned the definition of the production 
context of the Nigerian film” (p. 12).  
The 1979 seminar organised by the Nigerian National Council for Arts and 
Culture (NCAC) saw an increased and more academic interest in film production 
training, in film production and distribution itself, “in the fact that the film has become 
the focus of a more concerted government legislation, and in the foetal stirrings of a 
vibrant industry” (Ekwuazi 1991: x). The event also led to one of the first edited volume 
by Alfred Opubor and Onuora Nwuneli on Nigerian film and its precursors. The edited 
book turned out to be a landmark publication which formed the basis for subsequent 
studies and references to the burgeoning film industry in the then 19 year old post-
colonial state.  
Writing about Third World Cinema, the film practice by which Third World 
Countries are known, Sholat and Stam (1994) define this film practice as the “vast 
cinematic productions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and of the minoritarian 
cinema in the First World” (p. 27). Russell (1989) argues that Third Cinema counters 
the First (US, Europe, Australia and Japan) and Second World Cinemas, is 
revolutionary, and emerges from “poor, non-white nations who are emerging from 
colonial domination” (p. 3). This category is contentious as Sholat & Stam (1994: 25) 
have revealed since Third World countries like Venezuela, Iraq and Nigeria are rich in 
oil, and Argentina and Ireland are predominantly White. Among the trends of Third 
Cinema are its dependence on First and Second World countries as funding sources for 
films production because “severe IMF-provoked austerity crises and the collapse of the 
developmentalist models...led to the dollarization of film production and consequently 
to the rise of international co-productions or to a search for alternative forms such as 
video” (Sholat & Stam, 1994:29). This line of argument has been repeatedly rehearsed 
in the literature of Nigerian film. Apart from the economic constraints that led to the 
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video boom, there was also the ingenuity of Igbo (Nigerian) businessmen who, rather 
than selling off empty VHS cassettes, recorded filmed drama on them.  
Political filmmaking has risen through the years of the celluloid films of the 
1970s, the Yoruba travelling theatre, the television soap opera genre (Adejunmobi, 
2003), and the video technology all of which practiced mild democracy (Adesokan, 
2009b) or questioned unprincipled conduct by government officials (Haynes, 2006). 
The sections below provide particular examples of political films from the celluloid 
filmmaking period. Of the filmmakers discussed, one of them Eddie Ugbomah, stands 
out for the number of films devoted to political issues. For this reason, his filmmaking 
career is explored at some length below before drawing in other relevant examples. 
As former Chairman of the Nigeria Film Corporation, Eddie Ugbomah was born 
in 1941 and now has up to 13 celluloid films to his credit although none of them is in 
circulation today, and five have been lost to humidity. Trained in American and UK 
universities, Eddie Ugboma became one of the first indigenous and prestigious 
filmmakers in Nigeria. Very few people in contemporary Nigeria got to see any of 
Ugboma’s films, yet he is one of the most important filmmakers in the first generation 
of Nigerian filmmaking practice who devoted his cinematic prowess to political issues. 
Ugboma claims that up to 8 of his films, shot on 35mm, are intact although they need to 
be transferred to DVD for preservation. Shaka (2004) discussing funding avenues of 
early Anglophone cinema notes that Ugboma ventured into video filmmaking when 
celluloid became unattainable due to high costs. His first film, The Rise and Fall of Dr. 
Oyenusi (1977) similar to Anini was inspired by a personal experience of armed 
robbery, which subtly revealed the aftermath of the Nigerian Civil War. In post-war 
Nigeria, guns were available and were indiscriminately handled. The Nigerian society 
after the Civil War left unemployed youths with a lot of guns or at least made the 
purchase affordable. This led to the spate of armed robbery during the period. 
According to Ugboma, the film was a big hit, with its proceeds funding his next two 
films.  
He describes his own genre of films as the historic-contemporary genre i.e. 
casting a glance backwards at significant events of the past while drawing out the 
story’s relevance to the present realities. Affirming this, Ugboma states, “look at a film 
like Death of a Black President, anyone born then that you tell about the film will 
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mention Murtala Mohammed” (The Guardian, April 19, 2013). Mohammed was a 
former military Head of State (1975-1976). 
Ugboma was motivated to make films by a combination of factors. His personal 
experiences, as well as the social and political events of his period were also key 
factors, but in all, there was an element of personal interest forming part of his frame of 
reference. Oil Doom (1979) was produced because of the recklessness of government 
spending of oil revenue. This filmmaker is from one of the oil producing regions, Delta 
State, therefore he felt personally obliged to caution the government of the impending 
disaster that awaited the nation if fiscal regulation was not practiced. The film, Death of 
a Black President, saw the light of day because Murtala Mohammed, whose 
assassination was portrayed in the film, was a personal friend of his. Ugbomah revealed 
in an interview that Ekwuazi accused him of being too sentimental about the death of 
Mohammed. (E. Ugbomah, personal communication, August 2014).  
The major problem with discussing Ugboma’s films (and indeed others of the 
same period) is that there are neither substantial plot synopsis nor analyses documented 
anywhere except Françoise Balogun’s brief accounts in The Cinema of Nigeria (1987). 
Elsewhere, the only available information is film titles and themes that do not allow for 
a thorough engagement with or even analysis of the films. The films have long been out 
of circulation because of poor preservative mechanics and the very humid atmosphere 
of the country which destroyed the celluloid films.  
Like his contemporaries, Ugboma is critical of the majority of Nollywood 
practitioners for their lack of technical ability, and poor story telling abilities in spite of 
his openness to the video technology. Part of the disaffection for Nollywood by this 
older generation of filmmakers originated from the perceived snub by the newer and 
more video-oriented practitioners. Most of the video filmmakers do not consult with the 
older ones and thus, draw the latter’s wrath as Ugbomah himself revealed throughout 
the 82-minute interview he granted me.  
Ugboma laments the past and present lack of requisite funding that independent 
Nigerian filmmakers have to grapple with, noting particularly, that political films are on 
the decrease because of Nollywood’s pecuniary interests in associating with the 
government. He believes that the filmmaker must resist governmental pressures or 
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interference in terms of themes and subject matter. But this position is not entirely 
reflected in his conduct since his utterances revealed his financial expectations from the 
Delta State government (personal communication, 24 August 2014). He argues 
inconsistently that the filmmaker must be prepared to battle the Censors’ Board in 
upholding the social and political values espoused in his films. In the interview 
conducted with him, he stated that one has to be mindful of the social and political 
implications of representing the past in his film. This was said in reference to Half of a 
Yellow Sun’s depiction of violence on the basis of ethnic differences (E. Ugboma, 
personal communication, August 2014).   
 
4.3 The Early Political Films  
This study also sought to unpack the motivation of early political films. Mgbejume 
(1989) mentions a number of films produced in the 1950s and 1960s by Nigerians in 
collaboration with foreign technical crew. By presenting 22 films and then listing 11 
more as “recent films”, the author makes no distinction between Nigerian and non-
Nigerian films. The 1958 and 1963 productions he highlighted were arguably made by 
foreigners. Mgbejume states that the first Nigerian feature film was titled Fincho 
(1958), directed by Sam Zebba, whereas other scholars make no similar claim. Rather, 
Kongi’s Harvest, discussed below, is celebrated as the first indigenous political film in 
Nigeria. It is difficult to ascertain the veracity of Mgbejume’s (1989) claim; however, 
from his account of the film, it is not a political genre. He states that “it is a careful 
examination of an individual’s inner conflict” (p. 65), the individual being a foreign 
business man.   
To begin an examination of early filmmaking in Nigeria, reference is made to 
the catalogue of indigenous feature films with 109 entries provided by Ekwuazi (1991: 
16-18). Ekwuazi’s entries include film titles, producer/director/production company, 
year of production, language and rating. There are 68 Yoruba, 35 English, 5 Hausa and 
1 Igbo films. From the list, it is impossible to tell which are politically-informed and 
which are not, but the list is useful since it provides a starting point for further work and 
analysis to be done. The author does not analyse all the films. Although no selection 
criterion is provided, he selects a few of them to comment on. The selection for this 
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section is done from the 35 English Language films documented, which have very slim 
commentaries in academic texts on the subject. There are lots of scholarly thoughts on 
one or two films but very little or nothing on most other films of that period.  
Kongi’s Harvest (1970) is said to be the first political feature film produced in 
independent Nigeria by private filmmakers through the collaborative efforts of Francis 
Oladele, Ossie Davis and Wole Soyinka (playwright) to mention a few minds behind 
the production. Before then, the Nigerian government had made feature films such as 
Moral Disarmament (1957) and Bound for Lagos (1962). Shell-BP in Nigeria had also 
released a feature film Culture in Transition (1963). Ola Balogun is credited to have 
made a documentary titled One Nigeria (1969) which addressed the Nigerian Civil War. 
He was motivated to make the film upon his return to Nigeria from his training abroad 
and the witness of the vestiges of war (Russell, 1998:30).  Kongi’s Harvest is an 
adaptation of Soyinka’s 1967 play by the same title. According to Opubor & Nwuneli 
(1979), “Kongi’s Harvest is a satirical commentary of the First Republic of independent 
Nigeria. It is about power politics, preventive detention and image-making” (p. 6). 
Similarly, Josef Gugler, African film critic, writes of the historical production: 
Kongi's Harvest is, as the playwright put it, a play “about Power, Pomp 
and Ecstasy”: the power of autocratic president Kongi, the pomp of 
detained king Danlola, the ecstasy of Segi and Daodu who oppose the 
dictator. It is one of Soyinka's finest plays. The film, unfortunately, must 
be considered a failure. It follows the play closely in most respects but 
falls far short of its accomplishments and betrays it in the end. Still, it 
conveys Soyinka’s bitter satire of the recurrent features of 
dictatorships—the sycophants surrounding the dictator, the dictator's 
megalomania, the ideological isms invoked to justify absolute-ism, the 
propaganda blared at the population, the repression of dissent, and the 
economic concomitants of such political features: mismanagement and 
corruption (Gugler, n.d.) 
 
This commentary on the film, though informative but unverifiable since the film is out 
of circulation, is typical of most present day adaptations which are often read as being 
far off the mark. Ekwuazi’s (1991) review of the film is more robust moving from the 
dissimilitude between play and script, to the film structure, production budget and 
contexts to its favourable reception in the US and UK. For Ekwuazi, “the point is that 
Ossie Davies’ Kongi’s Harvest is a film that fosters the West’s stereotype about the rest 
of us” apart of course from its raising “a number of questions bearing on the problems 
87 
 
of an epistemology for the Nigerian film” (pp. 24-25). By these, Ekwuazi notes the 
foreign influences, which rip the film of its ‘Nigerianness’ and which perhaps 
contributes to Soyinka’s denial of the film. However, as the first treatment of 
dictatorship in Africa, it occupies a useful space in the historical records of political 
filmmaking in a West African State.   
Following Kongi’s Harvest is Bullfrog in the Sun (1971) which was directed by 
Francis Oladele and produced by his company Calpenny Films – the same company that 
produced Kongi’s Harvest. Bullfrog in the Sun was an adaptation of Chinua Achebe’s 
novels Things Fall Apart and No Longer at Ease. No substantial information regarding 
the film’s plot or narrative techniques exists except for the stringent censorship ordeal it 
went through (Chapter 5).  
Another Nigerian film, Dinner with the Devil (1975) is also believed to be a 
political film and was directed by Sanya Dosunmu. Opubor & Nwuneli’s slim account 
of the film reveals it to be one that “deals with political corruption and the quest for its 
eradication” (1979: 8). Aig-Imoukhuede referred to it as a formula film. Initiated by 
Balogun’s Ajani-Ogun, a formula film according to Aig-Imoukhuede is one which 
“exploits well-established and popular theatrical conventions” (1979: 42) well known to 
the actors and acceptable to the audience. The formula guaranteed success because it 
drew the patronage of the audience, and enabled the filmmaker to sustain the production 
process. Balogun and Eddie Ugbomah tried making films unsuccessfully outside this 
known framework (Russell, 1989; Ukadike 2014). Russell notes that the failure of 
Balogun’s experimental film, Alpha (1972) and Musik-Man (1976) both steering away 
from the Yoruba actors and narrative styles led him back to the travelling theatre of the 
Yorubas where success was guaranteed.   
Ola Balogun is also credited to have made Black Goddess (1975), a film which 
deals with the subject of slavery in a familial dislocation and reunion narrative. During 
the period of slave trade, members of a family are separated, one left behind in Nigeria. 
However, they are kept ‘united’ by the twin carvings which each party carried upon 
separation. Their reunion is wrought when the older folk travels to Brazil armed with 
the carving. Although not explicitly political since the film does not dwell on slave 
trade, it reflects on the consequences of slavery to show how the events of the past 
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retain its shadows in the present. Mbye Cham (2004) wrote that the film was set in 
contemporary times (then 1975).  
Blues for a prodigal (1984), which in Haynes’ terms is the original underground 
political film (2003:85) was a Wole Soyinka film. It was after this production that the 
acclaimed writer declared his intention to discontinue with the audio-visual medium, 
thus restricting himself to the literary genres for which he was well-known. Apparently, 
Soyinka was displeased with the film claiming that it failed to mirror his intentions. 
Filmmaking is so collaborative that the final product cannot be attributed to any one 
individual. This is such that in spite of brilliant stories and themes, executing the 
technical requirements to an acceptable aesthetical level may leave a producer (or 
director) dissatisfied.  
While the English and Yoruba language films thrived, that of Igbo was non-
existent. However, Ola Balogun’s Amadi (1975) was the first Igbo contribution to the 
collection of films in the celluloid filmmaking period. Haynes (1995) wrote that, there 
was heavy sponsorship for Hausa language films, a factor attributed to the Hausa 
politicians and elite who were in government. The economic situation was not viable, 
and Balogun (1987) was of the opinion that governmental aid should enable 
independent producers to make films. The call went unheeded for several years owing 
to the government’s interest in non-commercial films.    
 
4.4 Motivation of Early Filmmakers  
It is not entirely clear what the motivation of the early filmmakers were as little or 
nothing was written about their sources of inspiration, but there is reason to suggest that 
their sense of filmmaking was less of a commercially oriented enterprise than the 
filmmaking realities from 1992 to the present. The cultural exposure associated with 
training in western universities increased their awareness of the technical and aesthetic 
values of film. Francis Oladele, for instance, recognising the power of cinema saw 
himself as a missionary (Ekwuazi 2001: 276). Eddie Ugbomah also appreciates the 
power of film and uses it to “make statements about societal issues” (Ukadike 2014: 
251).  This is not to insinuate that these early filmmakers had no commercial interests at 
all. They did. However, existing literature does not emphasize commercial motivations 
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among the early filmmakers as it does for Nollywood practitioners. Ekwuazi states that 
the Nigerian English-language filmmaker was more educated than their indigenous 
language films counterpart, and so they recognised and placed the merit of art above 
pecuniary concerns. This reflected in their treatment of stories and themes. This, 
Ekwuazi continues, “did not isolate them from the commercial imperatives of the 
cinema, but they do not work merely with a view to commercial returns” (2001: 276).  
Animated by the success of Yoruba films, Balogun’s film project, Ija 
Ominira/Fight for Freedom (1977), addressed the features of “a tyrannical king deposed 
by his people” (Russell 1989: 31). The film was regarded as successful probably due to 
the appearance in a lead role of Ade Afolayan, a well-known actor and the adaptation of 
Adebayo Faleti’s novel of the same title. Haynes and Okome (2000) writing about 
contemporary Yoruba films referred to the model of using Yoruba actors to re-enact 
novels by the literati as a workable one because the audience of the theatre productions 
naturally turned to the screen without much ado. Balogun’s film touches broadly on 
politics and can be contrasted with Gbenga Adewusi’s film Maradona/Babangida must 
go (1993), which in spite of coming much later was presented as the first Yoruba film 
on Nigerian politics (Haynes 2003). It was largely a protest film set in Lagos against the 
backdrop of General Babangida’s annulment of the 1993 presidential elections. The film 
was made to reveal the general’s political machinations in the Nigerian society as well 
as to call for his exit, attributing to him the dribbling tactics of the Argentinean football 
player, Diego Maradona.  Tunde Kelani, one of Nigeria’s best cinematographers, now 
producer and director made Koseegbe (1996) to decry corruption in the civil service.  
There were social and economic factors that directly affected the production of 
celluloid filmmaking, factors which have been established in Nigerian film literature. 
Notable among these are Ekwuazi (1991), Haynes (1995), Adesanya (2000) and 
Ogundele (2000). It was the result of monetary policy originated by the IMF and 
implemented by Babangida that made filmmaking on celluloid impossible because the 
naira was devalued. This meant that filmmakers could no longer purchase the raw stock 
for films nor could they afford the cost of travel for post-production work even if films 




4.5 Narrative Content of Early Political Films 
Although they were indigenous films, the early political and non-political films had 
traces of foreign influences in them and as Opubor & Nwuneli (1979) observed, they 
were like documentaries. Russell observes that “Balogun’s early features explore 
various cinematic techniques as he gradually discovers his own voice” (1998: 31) 
although further comments on those cinematic techniques were not provided.  
Two major factors that affected the quality of narratives of early (Yoruba) films, 
and subsequently south-western films in general were knowledge and money. Without 
the requisite formal knowledge in narrative techniques, plot development and 
characterisation, and with only a few trained hands amidst the plethora of filmmakers, 
the stories ‘suffered’ in structure and form. Much of the practice at the onset of 
Nollywood was directly handed down informally and through observation of the 
travelling theatre. Haynes and Okome state this quite clearly:  
the travelling theatre artists always proceeded on the basis of a minimal 
scenario rather than a fully written-out script; this arrangement for film 
production ensures that this method cannot change. It also tends to hold 
in place the typecasting of actors, who bear the same stage name and 
persona in every film. The actors on the set may well not know the title 
of the film they are acting in...The result is unrehearsed cameo 
appearances, shallow characterization, predictable turns, and lots of 
irrelevant business (2000: 57) 
 
A similar point was made by Gabriel Oyewo who wrote that “the idea of scripting a 
video film production, with dialogue and detailed description of the situations, scenes 
and sequences remained alien to the Yoruba video film producers until 1995 when 
Mainframe produced Akinwumi Ishola’s Koseegbe” (2003:146). To this, the Yoruba 
actors who were accustomed to improvisation and ad-lib dialogues complained, but it 
signalled the emergence of professional pre-production work in filmmaking. Closely 
linked to the problem of knowledge was the inability of most producers or directors to 
fund themselves through any kind of formal training. The system was – and to a large 
extent still is – an apprentice-led one. It is quite common to hear older filmmakers say 
“I trained so-and-so.” (A. Amenechi, personal communication, August 29, 2013; E. 
Ugboma, August 24, 2014). Actions were taken not because the rationale behind it was 
understood but on the basis of trust in the under-studied director.  
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Because of the now-proven link between the Yoruba theatre tradition and 
Nollywood, Oyewo (2003) draws on Barber’s insights in The Generation of Plays 
(2000) to describe the narratives of the filmmakers. In his estimation, the Yoruba film 
producers classified their genre according to cultural and modern narratives. Whereas 
cultural narratives referred to those that drew on the Yoruba philosophy, tradition, 
history, myth, legend and spirituality, the modern referred to contemporary issues. This 
classification, though helpful fails to define with clarity the features of the modern 
narratives. However, written and oral narratives from actors’ experiences were 
exploited, adapted and retold to develop stories, making each presentation a medley of 
Oyewo’s traditional and possibly modern constituents. Haynes (2003) refers to the 
hybrid nature of Yoruba films some of which combine – as in the specific case he wrote 
about – music video elements, diatribes, and acting similar to the theatrical 
performances. The films do not represent a pure style, but are widely known to 
incorporate elements of different styles, traditions and modes of narration, which is akin 
to Barber’s syncretism discussed earlier in chapter three of this study.  
In his description of an early political film, Haynes (2003) identifies as the 
narrative layering of popular voices against the political elite, the ewi (a Yoruba 
traditional poetic chant), traditional comedy, music videos, televised news akin to 
journalistic practice, texts and subtexts powerful enough to drive home the points (p. 
83). While this is illuminating, it is striking that early scholarly literature on Nigerian 
films speak less about camera movements, lighting, editing and other technical 
compositions of film and more about themes and formats i.e. video versus celluloid (16 
or 35mm). The ideological standpoints of the filmmakers are also sandwiched or 
hurdled up in texts that prefer to deal with the seemingly bigger issues of film policy 
production, distribution, censorship or exhibition.   
 
4.6 Cultural Ideology in the Early Films  
Although the first Nigerian films by independent producers were not solely preoccupied 
with explicit political ideology, some of them, notably Ugbomah’s as examined above, 
addressed political corruption, tyranny, authoritarianism and contestable power 
relations. All the literature on Nigerian cinema established that the medium was an 
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educational and propagandist tool, which was successfully deployed in a hegemonic 
sense to entrench the dominant ideology of the producers.  
Along the lines of the Yoruba narratives were politicians’ agenda structured to 
influence the electorate in their favour. Such politicians financed the productions of 
Yoruba films like Kareem Adepoju’s Ekun Oko Oke and Adebayo Salami’s Ejiogbe to 
highlight their positive and nationalist qualities. This genre thrived in the 1990s. 
Writing about these films, Oyewo (2003) remarks that “the tendentious nature of 
the...productions reveals the intentions of the sponsors to impinge on the emotions of 
the electorate through the power of the video film, which is capable of manipulating 
them without their noticing the manipulation” (p. 147).  
Some of the early films also address the populace, calling it to some sort of self-
reflexivity in a way that apportions blame equally to the politicians and the people at 
large. One of the earliest promises of the video technology boom was its trenchant 
ability to punish evil doers and reward integrity. This has pervaded the films and as 
Adejunmobi (2003) claims, “the universe of many Nigerian and Ghanaian video films is 
one of moral absolutes demonstrated through the final scenes of the serial narrative 
where the triumph of good over evil is always complete and without ambiguity” (p. 58). 
Religion or the place of the supernatural is also quite pervasive in the political or 
other representations in films. This led Adejunmobi (2003) to assert that, “but equally as 
important, these spiritual forms of justice and the liberal use of the deus ex machina 
have considerable appeal for those West Africans who believe that the crises they 
encounter have a spiritual causation” (p. 59). Many filmmakers have retained the 
element of the spiritual in the narratives either by equating the Christian God with the 
deities known and revered in traditional African religions or as an extension of the band 
wagon attitude of cultural producers whose assumptions of passionate reception endorse 
and sustain the narrative trend.  
 
4.7 Reception of the Films  
The distribution of Kongi’s Harvest failed partly because of the dominance by the 
Lebanese businessmen who imported pirated copies of Indian, American and Chinese 
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films into the country. By the time Nigerians started making films, the market had been 
saturated by the foreign ones and it took a long time before the Indigenization decree of 
1972 was fully implemented. This later led the Lebanese businessmen to gradually 
relinquish the monopolistic hold to include Nigerian operatives. That the foreign films 
were more popular at that time meant that after a first production, Nigerian filmmakers 
could not sustain the business because the funds were not there. Part of the problem 
included the reluctance of the Lebanese merchants to distribute Nigerian films. With the 
dominance of foreign films, first time indigenous producers abandoned the practice 
soon after their first production. This factor was well recognised by scholars at the time.  
Quoting Afolabi Adesanya, Ekwuazi (1991: 196) noted:  
Among Nigerian filmmakers, only Ola Balogun, Eddy Ugboma, 
Adeyemi Afolayan and Hubert Ogunde have been able, somehow, to go 
from one film to another. Francis Oladele was last heard of with Bullfrog 
in the Sun (1971); Jab Adu with Bisi Daughter of the River (1977); 
Ishola Ogunshola with Efunsetan Aniwura (1982); Bayo Aderohunmu 
with Ireke Onibudo (1983) and Ayo Razak with Anikura (1983).  
 
This is because the distribution and exhibition framework has proved to be intractably 
problematic (Opubor & Nwuneli 1979; Mgbejume 1989), not different in any way from 
what it is in recent times. Writing on the problems of the early cinema period in Nigeria, 
scholars have often referred to lack of funding and proper distribution outlets including 
robbery during film screenings, political bureaucracy, untrained practitioners and a 
general lack of interest in film from some important quarters especially the government. 
With such insecurity lurking around filmmakers, it was evident that some structural 
problems were yet to be tackled. Among the more ‘successful’ filmmakers like Balogun 
and Ugbomah, there also existed the incessant cries of depleting finances leading some 
of them to compromise their creative values. For instance Eddie Ugbomah’s adoption of 
the Yoruba film genre was due to its popular reception. In an interview with Frank 
Ukadike, Ugbomah made the following point:  
I myself have since changed course and adopted the Yoruba film 
tradition. Since this tradition is oriented towards cultural plays and 
dramas and remains largely apolitical, a filmmaker is spared the danger 
of making enemies. The Yoruba theatre/film genre does not satisfy my 
creative impulse, but I have been making money from it... It is very 
frustrating that the quest for survival has forced me to relinquish my 
original style of filmmaking (Ukadike 2014: 256).  
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As expected, not all filmmakers of Ugbomah’s period made Yoruba films for the 
masses, and so did not attract an equal measure of reception. Writing about Ladi 
Ladebo’s film, Vendor, Ekwuazi (2000) says that it (and other productions of his) are 
usually shown to a small group of elitist individuals, “opinion leaders who, through 
interpersonal channels pass on the socio-political message” (p. 279). Ladebo must have 
been compelled to adopt this approach because of the ‘newness’ of the cinema to 
Nigerians at that time or because of the pressures of regulatory bodies, to which he had 
been previously subjected. Ladebo’s films were financed by foreign aid, which explains 
his continued affinity to the elite.  
The film Maradona, preceded by an audio rendition of a backlash to the military 
power for its annulment of the elections was so popular that a political scientist of the 
period attributed Babangida’s decision to relinquish power to Gbenga Adewusi’s audio 
cassette and later video film (Haynes 2003). The musician was briefly arrested for the 
production, but connections to influential elites saw his release sooner than Soyinka 
who spent several months in jail for his oppositional voice to the government. But such 
cultural missiles aimed at political powers were not to last especially after the 
Babangida administration. By the time his successor, Abacha, assumed office, and in 
the wake of his repression of dissident voices, video producers turned away from 
overtly political subjects to ‘safer’ and more economically rewarding thematic concerns. 
By the mid-1990s, there arose a film genre which catered to traditional and pre-colonial 
politics.  
 
4.8 Alternative Constructions of the Political Past: Cultural Epics  
According to Haynes (2000), “many of the films have traditional village settings; some 
are set in the historical past; many are self-consciously traditional” (p. 2). In the 
Nigerian imagination, any mention of a historical film or a construction of the past, 
conjures up what is today referred to as cultural epics. During the course of the 
numerous interviews conducted, it was realised that such films described above by 
Haynes fitted neatly into people’s minds as the depiction of history in film. By history 
according to this imagination is the distant pre-colonial time. Such references 
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envisioned 18th and 19th Century cultural history of ethnic groups in which kingdoms 
existed, were conquered and regained by valiant men and women.  
Filmmakers like Charles Novia, Fred Amata, Lancelot Oduwa Imasuen and 
Bond Emeruwa have already commented on the modus operandi of the film industry 
regarding the development of the epic genre. The success of a particular genre of film 
meant that several more like it was to follow. In the 1990s, there was the growth of a 
particular genre which practitioners called epics.  Popular critical characterizations of 
the epic will invariably describe a lengthy, larger than life, heroic tale – a hyperbolic 
assessment which also traditionally applies to superhero characters – with a longer-than-
normal duration. Epics are stories or dramas about humans on a grand scale. They are 
said to involve a hero(s) – kings, princes, aristocrats. They often have a lead character 
who is presented with an arduous task that must be undertaken, (in some cases with 
reasonable success) and usually for the common good. The characteristics of epic 
heroes include such qualities as strength, authority, intelligence, courage and 
attractiveness. Epics may have gods or other supernatural beings.  
Although initiated by the Italian film industry, the US has been known to 
popularize the genre in a way that has not been paralleled by any other film culture. On 
the one hand, Western film cultures have been known to develop various genres, the 
most popular of which are action, gangster, horror, war films, science fiction and 
fantasy, but as explained in the first chapter, these labels fail to adequately account for 
those that exist in Nollywood. It seems that authors adopt them as a kind of reference 
for their readers, often without a proviso.   
 Nigerian film genres on the other hand are predominantly drama even though 
the lines separating one from another are often blurred. A further division would 
identify melodrama, comedy and epics. It is the latter that engages the focus of this 
section.  Shaka (2011) points out that Nollywood genres did not emerge in a vacuum. 
Their roots can be traced to the social anxieties, fears, dreams, aspirations and demands 
of members of the Nigerian society. With the success of the ‘pioneer’ film Living in 
Bondage, many other would-be filmmakers cashed in on the subject matter. The result 
was a proliferation of ritual and occult genres in the 1990s. When filmmakers were set 
on edge with the incessant cries from critics (Okome, 2010) who denounced their focus 
on witchcraft and human sacrifice, they turned to epics as Shaka (2011) claims which in 
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itself constituted a rise in the cultural epic genre. Ayakoroma (2007) described the Igbo 
language genre, English language genre, epics/historical, prostitution and ghetto life, 
traditional belief genre (similar to epics), family situation dramas, gender-related genre, 
Christian genre, comedy, love and romance genre, thrillers, war/action films, political 
video film genre and horror films. This shows how unstable genre classification is and 
in most cases, it defies categorisations and boundaries.  
In the Igbo/English language film genre, Battle of Musanga (1995) was an 
important film, dubbed, an authentic African epic by its producer, Gabriel Okoye. But it 
was not as popular as the film Igodo (1999) which was a watershed in the history of the 
class of films that would be later known as cultural epics. Charles Novia in his book 
Nollywood till November (2012) shares great insights on the film about the producer, 
director, budget, stars, theme and reception. Clearly, Igodo was different in its style and 
portrayal of pre-colonial Africans because it represented a different perspective of story-
telling “when the movies were over-flogging rituals and witchcraft themes which the 
public were getting weary of” (Novia 2012: 7).   
Co-directed by Don Pedro Obaseki and Andy Amenechi, Igodo explored the 
idea of collective sacrifice to appease a god for a crime committed by one but with the 
acquiescence of an entire community. The film is a excellent example of Nigerian 
filmmaking and the epic genre. Set in the eastern region of Nigeria, the story mirrors 
communal living and lifestyle while de-emphasizing the role of the individual. When an 
innocent Iheukwumere is unjustly killed, the villagers silently endorse his death without 
consulting the oracle to determine the veracity of the accusations leveled against the 
victim. But for the mysterious and multiple deaths of villagers, the oracle would not 
have been consulted. When eventually it is, the perpetrators of the hideous crime also 
die in inexplicable ways, one after another. Celebrated as one of the best epics (a 
Nigerian filmmaker referred to it as the best historical film from Nollywood), Igodo 
engages the supernatural, has a major theme of retributive justice, and underscores 
communal living. Seven men sent off on a rescue mission to a blood thirsty oracle must 
return with a special knife with which to bring down a tree allegedly causing the death 
of villagers.  
Novia’s belief that Igodo “was released to massive acceptance and a sales record 
breaking feat” (up to 1 million copies were sold) (2012: 7) is indicative of the kinds of 
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films that were released for the next two years, while the producer of Igodo, Ojiofor 
Ezeanyache, was basking in his success. Egg of Life (2003), a feminine version of Igodo 
soon followed, among a plethora of similarly constructed films.  
This chapter has briefly traced the history of political filmmaking in Nigeria, 
what might be called the precursors of the six English language films examined in this 
research. It examined the existing literature on the 1970s films made by independent 
producers in Nigeria in terms of their motivation, narrative and ideological slant as well 
as their reception within their contexts of production. The alternatives to historical 
films, which are called cultural epics were also examined, noting that although such 
films are largely fictional, their producers and the viewing audience tend to refer to 
them as history because they are set in rural areas in pre-colonial times. But in actual 
fact, these epics may not be markedly different from folk tales orally handed down 

















REPRESENTING THE PAST: MOTIVATORS AND DE-MOTIVATORS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter responds to the first research question raised in the first chapter, which 
addresses the motivation behind the construction of a political past.  It looks at the 
character of Nigerian filmmakers whose works are studied, all of whom are men. The 
number of women filmmakers is growing rapidly in recent times, but none, it can be 
argued has ventured into political representations of the past. Filmmakers’ background 
is reflected on to understand how that affects the choice of which political past is 
narrated and how. This chapter demonstrates that Nollywood is neither apolitical nor 
ahistorical, and if it perceived to be so, it is the result of a series of factors outside the 
filmmakers’ control.  
Recent studies on Nollywood project the industry as a commercially motivated 
one (Adesokan, 2011; Haynes, 2000). While that is true to a large extent, this chapter 
shows that a minority group of filmmakers are not primarily concerned about commerce 
as much as they are about voicing certain social and political issues. For instance, 
Kingsley Ogoro, who has made up to 8 films remarked, “I don’t make a living from 
films. I am a businessman first, which is where my money comes from. I make films to 
address issues and correct impressions” (K. Ogoro, personal communication, 29 Aug, 
2013).  
However, the filmmaker’s ‘voice’ in past political and national conversations is 
frequently suppressed by budgetary constraints, censorship, poor distribution outlets and 
piracy. The historic representation of events and people requires a bigger (than the usual 
melodrama or romantic comedy) budget, which admittedly is out of the reach of the 
majority of Nollywood practitioners. After making his first historical film, October 1 
(2014), Kunle Afolayan stated that it cost him $2M (£1.3M), which is 400 percent more 
than his last production, Phone Swap (2012). In addition to that, the filmmaker affirmed 
that October 1 was the most challenging of his productions, one which stretched him 
financially, physically and psychologically (K. Afolayan, personal communication, 
November 3, 2014). Budgetary requirements, coupled with the possibility of a ban by a 
pro-government Censor’s Board, uncertain distribution channels and the mechanism of 
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piracy combine to steer filmmakers away from representing a political past. This is 
especially so in an industry not populated by Kingsley Ogoros, who have alternative 
sources of income. These de-motivators are further discussed below.  
Writing on filmmakers’ political critiques, Haynes (2006) notes that “the effects 
of the video films on their audiences and the motivations of their makers are effectively 
unknowable...” (p. 534). I argue the contrary in this and in the seventh chapter since this 
research has precisely addressed filmmakers’ motivation in this chapter and the 
audience responses to some of the politically-charged films in the penultimate chapter.  
The film Half of a Yellow Sun was a later addition to the collection of films 
listed in the first chapter because it was released officially in Nigeria in 2014 (although 
premiered at the Toronto International Film Festival’s special presentation section in 
2013), by which time this research was near completion. Therefore, it was impossible to 
interview, at least as an inclusion to the present study, the producers or director of the 
film. Apart from the minor experimental reception study performed at the Nigerian 
premiere of the film (not reported in this thesis), this researcher relied on media sources 
and interviews with Censor’s Board officials for information on the film.  
The educational background and the totality of filmmakers’ experiences as well 
as the traditions from which they emerge will undoubtedly affect their artistic vision, 
and the kind of treatment given to past political subjects. Charles Novia, Theatre Arts 
Graduate, attests to this by recounting the experience that inspired one of his films, 
shortly after a visit to Holland:  
When I returned to Lagos, my whole world-view had suddenly changed 
because of that trip...I started asking myself questions about the political 
leadership in my country and why Nigeria had...the worst form of self-
serving leaders over the years, despite our potential to be a great force to 
reckon with in the world. I had witnessed successive draconian military 
governments and at the time I came back from Holland, Nigeria was just 
two years into a democratic government with President Olusegun 
Obasanjo as the democratically elected President. However, his first term 
was quite directionless and nothing appeared to be any different from the 
past military governments. Whilst agonising over the state of my 
country, the stirrings of an idea for a movie came to my mind. It would 
later form the backbone of a movie I produced two years later titled I will 




Whether they employ the past political scene as a background for narrating more 
contemporary stories or they produce an adaptation of a historical piece, a filmmaker’s 
artistic vision will be shaped by the level of formal, semi-formal or informal education 
he is exposed to as evidenced by Novia’s comments above. Similarly, Tunde Kelani, 
another filmmaker, makes elaborate reference to the influence of his childhood years 
and education on his commitment to Yoruba culture and identity in all his films 
(Haynes 2007). Furthermore, Kunle Afolayan, one of the most respected contemporary 
Nigerian filmmaker, grew up in the home of a famous theatre and film director, his 
father, Adeyemi Afolayan (also known as Ade Love). From an early age, he was 
exposed to the film business, which explains his preference for filmmaking over a 
Banking career. Even in difficult circumstances and challenging infrastructural 
environment such as the absence of cinemas and brazen piracy, Afolayan is not 
interested in pursuing alternative careers. Entirely motivated by a passion for films, he 
carries on at the risk of incurring losses from the piracy of his films, a point which 
Kelani also makes “I don’t see myself doing any other business; it’s my background and 
the passion. Even when I say enough because of those Igbo boys (piracy), I still go back 
to it”.  (T. Kelani, personal communication, February 12, 2013). 
Another prominent filmmaker, Eddie Ugbomah, confirms that for him, money 
making in film is secondary. “I was abroad making films, acting and making a lot of 
money, but the stupid love to go home and do the same things was still there” (E. 
Ugboma, personal communication, August 24, 2014). For these reasons, and because 
the filmmakers occupy a key position in this research, the paragraphs below provide 
background information of varying lengths on the filmmakers whose works are 
discussed in subsequent chapters. Several Nollywood scholars address film texts in 
complete ignorance of the backgrounds of the producers of such titles as if the character 
and personality of the filmmaker did not influence the narrative and technical choices 
that realised the film. I argue against such an approach because it does not differ 
intellectually from a lay person’s analytical reading of films. As a critical and 
intellectual exercise, it is far more fruitful to interrogate, not just film, but also all art 
forms with sufficient background information of the creators because that knowledge 




5.2 Background Information on Individual Filmmakers  
5.2.1 Tunde Kelani (aka TK) 
Born in 1948 and although none of his films is reviewed in this study, Tunde Kelani is 
included in this section for three reasons. The first is that his Yoruba-language film 
Saworoide (1999) bears a resemblance to the films under critical review. The film, 
which uses the talking drum to symbolise the people’s voice, is a camouflaged depiction 
of military intervention amidst heightened civilian corruption in Nigerian civil life. 
Second, his contributions to contemporary Nigerian film industry have earned him the 
enviable position of a, if not the, pacesetter in terms of cinematography. Jonathan 
Haynes’s 2007 interview with him attests to this. Third, his name got multiple mentions 
in all the interviews conducted with filmmakers and film journalists as the most highly 
regarded contemporary filmmaker in the country. Widely respected in and outside the 
country, he is regarded by his colleagues as the don of filmmaking. In the video boom 
filmmaking era, Kelani alone approximates Eddie Ugbomah of the celluloid 1970s and 
1980s in terms of output, social and political commentaries in and through films.  
Kelani received financial aid from the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) to 
study at the London Film School in the 1970s after an apprenticeship in still 
photography. After a 2-year programme, graduating with a Diploma in filmmaking from 
the London Film School, he returned to Nigeria and worked with NTA for another two 
years before going ahead to practice independently. In his own words, the economic, 
political, and social climate in which he and most other filmmakers worked was 
“inauspicious” (Esonwanne 2008: 27). He began a video renting facility with Wale 
Fanu called ‘Cinekraft’, but he owns a studio, Mainframe Productions from which all 
his productions emerge.  
TK makes films in his native language, Yoruba, in his attempt to project its rich 
cultural heritage to a paying audience although it eventually gets recorded and sold in 
the home video format. His films are influenced by the fact that he grew up with his 
grandfather in Abeokuta, southwest Nigeria, where he was exposed to Yoruba culture 
and tradition. His films are either self-financed or through sponsorships from corporate 
organizations and governments. Kelani is a passionate filmmaker, motivated by the 
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desire to project his culture which is evidenced by his continued filmmaking practice in 
spite of being severely affected by piracy.  
 
5.2.2 Kingsley Ogoro 
Kingsley Ogoro, producer of Battle of Love and Across the Niger, started his 
entertainment career as a dancer, and later music producer in his own recording studio 
in Surulere, Lagos with artistes like Blacky, Sunny Ade, Charles Oputa and Ese Agesse. 
He has two degrees in Banking and Finance and Accountancy, but describes himself 
first and foremost as a musician, film producer and business man. His quest for 
excellence drove him into filmmaking because as he attests himself, “I observed the 
motion picture industry and realised that more was needed to raise the ante” (K. Ogoro, 
personal communication, August 23, 2013). He believed himself to be the custodian of 
the talent and leadership the film industry needed at the time of his entry. Ogoro is 
change-driven. He is in a superior class of producers because he runs an equipment-
leasing outfit which places him on a pedestal that most other producers covet. As 
Charles Novia, film producer and director, aptly recorded:  
...over eighty percent of the movies shot from 1995 to 2005 were shot 
with camera equipment from Carvers Studios.  From U-matic camera to 
analogue Betacam and later on, the Digital Camera and its Digital-
Editing Suites, Carvers had them all. The company was a dependable, 
up-to-date outfit anchored on the vision of its Managing Director, 
Kingsley Ogoro (Novia 2012: 2).  
 
Owning a film equipment and rental facility turned out to be a huge advantage that 
Ogoro has over fellow filmmakers who have to rent film equipment and work round the 
clock in order to return them within the stipulated time to avoid incurring additional 
costs. Ogoro has several films to his production credit. Battle of Love and Across the 
Niger stand out for what he called their “federal character”. Both films are projections 
of the Nigerian Civil War and how the questions of ethnicity challenge and are 
challenged by contemporary romantic relationships.  
Initially titled Guns of Biafra, Across the Niger drew the ire of the Censor’s 
Board, and was denied approval until the title was changed. Ogoro hinted at what he 
perceived to be a bias among the classifiers at the National Film and Video Censor’s 
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Board (NFVCB). He pointed out that only the title of a film is sufficient to irritate them 
and make them label a film even before screening it. This prejudice is deepened by an 
allegiance to the government of the day, which the Board seeks to protect from public 
embarrassment by prohibiting at will those films which are likely to undermine national 
security in their opinions.  
The motivations behind past political constructions are as varied as the 
filmmakers themselves as Ogoro observed. From audience preferences, political 
endorsements and contestations to budgetary constraints (research, props) and 
censorship, the political consciousness of filmmakers takes on different representations. 
What is certain is that they are undeniably aware of the political landscape in which 
they operate but may be willing or unwilling to commit resources to its commentary 
through film for a wide range of reasons.  
 
5.2.3 Sam Onwuka 
Sam Onwuka, film producer, is a Nigerian emigrant to the United States. According to 
him, he has some 40 productions to his credit including Stubborn Grasshopper (2001) 
and Oil Village (2001) which are of interest to my study. His conversation revealed a 
measure of disfluency in his knowledge of English language, and consequently, his 
educational background, which he failed to disclose. Onwuka made films with the 
intention of acting as an emissary of sorts. He affirmed that behind every movie of his, 
was an important message which he wanted to transmit to the Nigerian people. He 
claims that Stubborn Grasshopper was made “to tell Nigerians the truth about 
government and the way they were being ruled by the military” (S. Onwuka, personal 
communication, October 2013). He, like other Nigerian filmmakers, took on the burden 
of ‘preaching’ or reminding the audience that evil is always paid for by the perpetrator 
here on earth. His messages, as he believed them to be, were invariably positive and 
served as a deterrent to evil doers. Stubborn Grasshopper was intended to uncover some 
of the widespread untruths that trailed the death of General Sani Abacha. The film’s 
protagonist is undeniably General Abacha (acted by Sam Obeakheme as General Alba) 
although Onwuka claims to have been concerned, at the time of production, more about 
the country as a whole, than Abacha himself. In defence of that position, he explained 
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that the film also reflected on Babangida, Chief Abiola and some other political 
characters of the period, apart from the military dictator.  
Like many other filmmakers and audiences in Nigeria, Onwuka’s understanding 
of the construction of the past, dwells largely on the fictional portrayal of rural 
communities in Nigeria (known as cultural epics, discussed in the previous chapter) and 
how communal living was much desired then than it is now. He draws on lessons from 
his ethnic group, Igbo, to develop his narratives. This was explained in an interview in 
October 2013 as his narrative strategy. Onwuka confirmed how being Igbo, one of the 
major Nigerian tribes, fuels his storytelling and even justified the title of Stubborn 
Grasshopper on the basis of an Igbo proverb that best illustrates the character of 
Abacha and Nigerian politicians of the 1980s and 1990s at large.  
Sam Onwuka is described by his collaborators as a shrewd, daring and 
passionate film producer who would stop at nothing to realise his artistic vision. His 
relentlessness brought him Owerri State Police support during the production of 
Stubborn Grasshopper, which he believes has sold up to 100,000 copies at the time of 
the interview (2013). Onwuka revealed that he was mindful of the Censors’ Board at the 
time of release of the film, which informed a caveat with which the film opens “...any 
resemblance to persons living or dead is not intended”. “Without that”, he admitted, 
“they (Censors’ Board) will not let the film pass” In spite of this, there is reason to 
suggest that the film may have boycotted the Board. On two occasions in my telephone 
conversations with Onwuka, he evaded the question on how the film was received or 
classified at the Board. Although he may not have heard the questions clearly, another 
film director interviewed hinted at Onwuka’s evasive and questionable practices. While 
pleading anonymity, the director referred to his resistance of Onwuka’s antics which 
included shooting two films with the cast of one film and paying same for only one film 
project.  So, with little if any formal education, his ethnic origin and a shrewd business 
outlook, Sam Onwuka sees the burden of representing the past as a duty, which he is 
obliged to perform. Interestingly, another filmmaker who worked with Onwuka on 
Stubborn Grasshopper revealed that the prospect of producing the film held financial 
promises for Onwuka at that time (N. Ossai, personal communication, March 23, 2013) 




5.2.4 Izu Ojukwu 
Izu Ojukwu, film director, is a graduate of the Nigerian Film Institute, Jos. His first film 
Ichabod (1993) was a church production he made for the Catholic Biblical Movement in 
Jos. He directed Kingsley Ogoro’s Across the Niger probably because of his love for 
what he termed ‘military movies’. He has gone on to make other films but he is famous 
for the Nigerian Breweries, Amstel Malta Box Office (AMBO) movies Sitanda (2006), 
a film that reflects on slavery and love. White Waters (2007), which explores how talent 
can be uncovered through sports and friendship. Cindy’s Notes (2008) is a film that 
examines the value of youthfulness as a stage of societal transformation. There is also 
The Child (2009/10). His most recent and forthcoming film, ’76 is definitely, a 
construction of a political past. He describes the celluloid production as a film set in 
1976 when General Murtala Mohammed was Head of State for a brief period, during 
which time he was assassinated. The film mirrors the lives of the wives of the soldiers. 
Much as the film crew would want to de-emphasise the violent character of the period, 
the year 1976 is almost synonymous with coup d’état. This filmmaker’s vision for ’76 
“is to go beyond ethnic and religious boundaries in the film and preach a message of 
tolerance”. Ojukwu, who has spent 20 years in the video film industry, believes that 
those years were preparatory and leading up to the peak of his career when he would 
make a real movie, a film with historical dimensions. In an interview with Obatala 
(2012), the filmmaker said: 
…I wanted to take historical material and explore. It’s an opportunity 
that I cannot blow: doing what I’ve always fantasized about, and then 
getting a story...that can tell us where we’re coming from and where we 
begin [sic] to get it wrong...where the future of this country was 
determined (Obatala 2012: 26-27)   
  
Undoubtedly, the forthcoming film is the high point of Ojukwu’s career, but then, it has 
come with a good dose of difficulties since it was shot on celluloid, a format which 
many filmmakers including in Hollywood are turning away from. After reading the 
comments above and discovering I had a kindred spirit in him, I contacted him for the 
umpteenth time in the last four years for an interview. Even the intervention of Shaibu 
Husseini, the respected film journalist, failed. Izu Ojukwu subtly declined interviews 
and preferred a mediated conversation through WhatsApp. When I reluctantly agreed to 
chat on the mobile device app, he sent me the following statement: “I didn’t have any 
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proper formal education, my environment was my classroom, events around me were 
my resource materials” (I. Ojukwu, personal communication, June 15, 2014). 
Subsequent efforts to extract further information from him failed.  
 
5.2.5 Henry Legemah 
The interview with Henry Legemah was conducted on WhatsApp, a mobile phone chat 
device that uses 3G data or wireless internet connection to send and receive messages in 
real time. Attempts to secure a face-to-face interview over a period of four months were 
futile because the filmmaker shuttled between Benin and Lagos. Since I was based in 
Lagos, I requested a Lagos meeting, but then, Legemah’s ill health made that 
impossible. When he suggested conducting the interview over WhatsApp, I was hesitant 
because as Sarah Tracy explained, mediated interviews are known to prevent some 
information such as non-verbal cues from getting through to the interviewer, and certain 
questions would go answered (Tracy 2013: 165). Probing would be difficult and his 
responses would depend on how quickly he was able to type. Some responses were sent 
the day after, allowing him to think through them before typing and sending. As 
expected, some questions were not answered, even after a reminder and most of his 
responses were one-liners. But the basic information about him and his 2005 production 
Anini were obtained.  
Legemah is presently the Chairman of the Association of Movie Producers 
(AMP), Edo State Chapter. With two degrees and two diplomas in Electrical and 
Electronics Engineering, and a profile of working in different capacities as actor, 
scriptwriter, director and producer, the figure of Henry Legemah is versatile. The 
producer of Anini, Legemah, has spent close to 30 years as a filmmaker. The film, 
Anini, according to him was his fourth film, which earned him the attention of the 
viewing public. The film also brought with it the recognition he sought as an African 
filmmaker, with nine nominations and a special mention from the African Movie 
Academy Awards (AMAA) 2006 event. The Edo State born producer’s parents are 
royalty and he belongs to the Legemah and Obaseki dynasty.   
Having grown up in Benin City, he had familiarised himself with the intrigues of 
the Lawrence Anini saga in the late 1980s when it raged. He was particularly motivated 
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to make the film in order to disabuse the minds of the Nigerian audience who thought 
that Anini was a super-hero. To Legemah, Anini was a common thief, and in his own 
words, “I was a top dog in town when Anini saga came on and killed social night life in 
Benin. When I became a film maker, I decided to correct and de-mystify the myth and 
giant Nigerians thought Lawrence Anini was. He was just a common thief” (H. 
Legemah, personal communication, May 30, 2014). Besides, when the Anini crises 
abated, Otwin Marenin produced a brilliant and incisive article in 1987 on the robbery 
phenomenon which stated that, “the Military Governor ...called on the public to help 
find Anini; [because] the once ebullient nightlife of Benin City came to a standstill as 
people kept off the main roads after dark; for months, traffic was disrupted and 
motorists were harassed...” (Marenin, 1987: 260). The heightened insecurity in the city 
was a major source of concern which seemed to defy solutions at the time primarily 
because of the complicity and complexity of police operations.  
Legemah recalls the “extensive research” performed on the screenplay while 
talking about the pre-production, budget, production and release. Several filmmakers 
proudly refer to the research carried out on their scripts before shooting begins. Zeb 
Ejiro said it of Domitilla, Bond Emeruwa of Mortal Inheritance, Funke Akindele of 
Jenifa, Sam Onwuka of Stubborn Grasshopper, Franklin Okoro of Militants, Kalu Anya 
of Oil Village, and Lancelot Imasuen of Invasion 1897 to mention recent examples. 
These references to pre-production research reveal a professionalism that was largely 
absent from the film industry in the late 1990s and early 2000s. But the scale of research 
is sometimes incongruous with the final product which seems to suggest a lop-sided 
approach to pre-production research in Nollywood. For instance, Bond Emeruwa 
remarked that before cast and crew went on location to shoot Mortal Inheritance, which 
was on sickle cell anaemia, he alone did an extensive research (B. Emeruwa, personal 
communication, September 13, 2013). This means that the cast and crew had to rely on 
Emeruwa’s understanding of the health condition to interpret their various roles. This 
might also suggest the need for a vertical and horizontal broadening of the scale of pre-
production research.  
With Legemah’s Anini, there was evidence of research, up to a point that the 
second part of the film began somewhat like a documentary, with real names and 
biographical details of Anini’s new gang appearing as anchorage on screen. There was a 
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semblance to the real actors among the film cast. Legemah commented that to show 
how thoroughly they worked, he was himself auditioned for the role of Iyamu, the 
notorious police officer who aided Anini in his escapades. He pegged the film budget at 
N6.5m in 2003, when work began on the film. About N4m was provided by a business 
partner of his, Victor Ogiemwonyi. Anini was not released till 2005, and even then, he 
complained of being swindled by the marketer whose name was undisclosed during the 
interview.  
 
5.2.6 Fred Amata 
The interview with Fred Amata was engaging. It took place in his living room in 
Surulere Lagos, where three of us – the interviewee, an acquaintance of mine and huge 
fan of the Amata family and I – sat together for two hours to talk about Fred’s career, 
his involvement in the production of Anini and his vision of Nollywood. Amata is an 
energetic and eloquent speaker of Nigerian Pidgin. Although the interview was 
conducted in English Language, he switched frequently and with ease to Pidgin. He 
laughed a lot and defended some of the deficiencies well-documented in the film 
industry, one in which he has become a vital part of. Said Amata, “there is a reason for 
all that and I can explain it all to you. You know, we can justify a lot of things...argue 
positions and assertions. It is not a question of Nollywood settling for mediocrity; it is a 
question of mediocrity coming out of mediocrity” (F. Amata, personal communication, 
February 16, 2012).  
Fred Amata, a celebrated filmmaker, belongs to the Amata dynasty. His family 
is versatile in the creative arts (his father, Zack Amata his brother, Jeta Amata his 
nephew and Ruke Amata are actors and filmmakers). A graduate of Theatre Arts, 
Amata began his career at the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) Headquarters 
library where he met and dubbed cassettes for Zeb Ejiro, who had just completed the 
pilot of Ripples, a television soap opera.  Amata has been in the creative industry since 
he was six. After graduation, he started acting and before long, directing for television 
too. 
He had gone on to make films of his own before being approached by Henry 
Legemah. His motivation for directing Anini is the great story behind the character of 
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Lawrence Anini. “Who did not know about the story”, he quipped? “When Legemah 
brought it to me, I jumped at it.” At the time when the film was made, Nollywood was 
transiting, discovering itself and exploring genres as they (filmmakers) thought 
appropriate. In Amata’s perspective, there was a tacit agreement on what themes or 
story types were explored.  Then, there was the band-wagon issue that saw a 
proliferation of every kind of film that succeeded financially.  
Amata revealed interesting aspects of the journey in the production of Anini. At 
a time in the industry when script conferences were alien, they held one for Anini. The 
pre-production lasted a whole year before the actual shooting began. The cast and crew 
travelled to Benin to shoot the film because they wanted it to be as real as possible. 
Lawrence Anini lived and worked in Benin even though he was originally from Orogho, 
a village about 50km from Benin City, in the then Bendel State of Nigeria. Even at that, 
he spoke very fondly of the film adding that it was challenging and fun to work on what 
the crew interpreted as an “action movie”. Legemah refers to Fred and Jeta Amata, 
filmmakers in their own rights, who both acted in the film as two of the “best hands in 
the industry at that time” (H. Legemah, personal communication, May 30, 2014) 
Two other details of interest are the crowd-directing and the soundtrack, which 
Amata raised in the interview. At some point during the shoot, the exact location of a 
character’s (Dis-is-me) death could not be decided. Scores of on-lookers assembled to 
dictate where Dis-is-me was actually shot. The crowd grew to frenzy and had to be 
quietened to prevent civil unrest. The soundtrack popular with the audience, was 
markedly different from the kind of lyrics that obtain today, the sort that complete the 
narration in each scene in a semi-didactic manner.  
The release of the film was uncertain. Legemah released it two years after 
shooting, while Amata claimed not to have known when the film went public. An 
acquaintance of Amata’s called him up to talk about the film, which was how he came 
to know his “library film” had hit the shelves. Furthermore, Amata claimed the film was 
“shot as one movie but through the marketer, we got parts 1 and 2”. Legemah also 
painfully reflected on the dubious practice of the marketer when I interrogated the 
source of the N6.5m used to produce the film. He said, “No. The main funding of almost 
N4m came from Mr Victor Ogiemwonyi, a friend. A rare Bini man whom the good Lord 
will continue to bless; unfortunately the man did not get a dime back on his investment 
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because we were ripped off by the Onitsha marketer” (H. Legemah, personal 
communication, May 30, 2014) 
 
5.2.7 Kalu Anya 
Kalu Anya, is a man who describes himself in his film career as a very old hand in the 
industry, first as an apprentice and later as a film director. He claims to have been 
present from inception of Nollywood since he worked on Living in Bondage as director 
of photography. For Anya, “filmmaking is my passion, a profession that brings me 
fulfilment and which I find myself doing all the time. I can’t do anything else” (K. Anya, 
personal communication, February 12, 2012). A diploma graduate of International Film 
and Global Academy in Lagos, Anya is another filmmaker who has also trained for the 
most part on the job (personal communication). Apart from his passion, filmmaking for 
Anya was occupational in the sense that he sought it in order to make a living. When he 
directed Oil Village, he was approached by Sam Onwuka, the producer. But as he 
claims, he had to go in search of producers who needed his services and who could pay 
a good deal. He also attests to the role of censorship as a deterrent to constructing a 
political past, a factor which makes filmmakers carefully negotiate the images and 
codes of representation. The subject of censorship is discussed further below. 
From the background details of the film producers and directors, it is clear that 
there are several factors at play in the choices of which political past to portray. First, 
this set of filmmakers is motivated by a passionate desire to tell their own stories before 
the commercial benefits of filmmaking are considered as they claimed in the interviews. 
None of them stated explicitly that financial gains were their prime motivators, contrary 
to the conventional wisdom that the filmmakers are generally motivated by pecuniary 
compensations, set out by scholars including Haynes and Okome (2000). It is pertinent 
to note that non-commercial motivation is not a generalisation that accounts for 
filmmakers depicting a political past because of the small number of films examined. 
However, among those listed here and a good number of others, art and social 
commentary, they argued, trump monetary considerations. A salient observation is that 
the information reported thus far was self-reported by the producers of popular videos 
so that even if the filmmakers were commercially motivated, they did not present it as 
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being their prime concern. As will be shown below, there are several others who are 
motivated by financial returns.  
Second, personal and family backgrounds influenced choices and education 
played a key role in shaping the filmmakers’ cinematic view. The minimum level of 
education of the producers of the films discussed was a diploma, although some had 
first degrees as well, which, from the findings of this research did not necessarily 
emerge from Mass Communication faculties. Kingsley Ogoro has two degrees in 
Banking; Fred Amata has one in Theatre Arts; Henry Legemah has two in Engineering. 
Simi Opeoluwa now has one in Film Studies (but not at the time he directed Battle of 
Love). Tunde Kelani, Kalu Anya, Sam Onwuka and Izu Ojukwu have Diplomas in Film 
and allied studies.  
Third, nothing appears to be radically different from other kinds of 
representation in Nollywood videos. The same processes of story-telling, financing and 
distribution are deployed in spite of the bigger budgets that representing the past 
demands. Similar complaints of insufficient funding and censorship made by the early 
Nigerian and Bollywood filmmakers (Pendakur, 2003) arose. However, the filmmakers 
affirmed that a greater burden of representation fell on them since they sought to portray 
events, which the anticipated audience had as much information on (and perhaps more) 
as they did.  
Fourth, the films under consideration are shot on location like all other 
Nollywood films with popular (Segun Arinze, Kanayo O. Kanayo, Bimbo Akintola, 
Ramsey Noah, Sam Obeakheme, Iretiola Doyle, Fred Amata, to mention the top popular 
actors) and less popular  actors at work (Jeta Amata, Henry Legemah, Neville Ossai). 
There was a subtle yearning for audience acceptance by the filmmakers which the 
researcher perceived during the interviews, hence the casting of popular actors. The 
desire for acceptance also has in part to do with the third reason on the burden of 
representation such that it was both a burden and a guarantee. Because the events 
portrayed were already in the public domain, the filmmakers nursed the thought that the 
films would be well received by the audience. Fred Amata articulated this point 
carefully, “there is nobody that does not know Anini. Even children heard of him then. 
We knew we had a massive story that people will like, so I jumped at it”. Similarly, 
Kalu Anya said, “it was a Ken Saro Wiwa story, you know how popular it was”. And 
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Kingsley Ogoro added “people know about the war. I wanted them to come out from 
watching the film thinking that they have seen what they know...” 
In the following paragraphs, a broad categorisation of the motives of Nigerian 
filmmaking as understood from several interspersed months of interacting with 
filmmakers is provided.  
 
5.3 Filmmakers’ Motivation 
Several factors spur on a Nigerian filmmaker. Dominant among them is the quest for 
profit, which has been rehearsed ad infinitum in literature on the video films. This study 
supports the notion that majority of the filmmakers are indeed motivated by sheer 
commerce, but more importantly, it also identifies other motives which receive little or 
no attention in the ever-increasing literature on Nigerian films. The subsequent sections 
address economic and social factors seen to incite filmmakers into visual storytelling.   
 
5.3.1 Economic Factors 
Haynes (2010) in African Cinema and Nollywood, observes that, “Commercial cinemas 
became essential features of colonial cities, powerful instances of modernity, along with 
electric lighting, amplified popular music, factory wages, and motorized vehicles” (p. 
68). In post-colonial Nigeria, when economic fortunes plummeted due to fiscal policy 
(Haynes 2000), commercial cinema culture waned, to be revived through the video 
technology. Paul Obazele, filmmaker, in asserting that the commercial viability of films 
was placed before other options stated that political constructions are a task for the 
government (a task he referred to as propaganda and which was unlikely to be 
financially rewarding). “I’m not the one to propagate government affairs and events” he 
said.  The main factors are income and audience. The filmmaker always has to do what 
will pay him at the end of the day” (P. Obazele, personal communication, November 
2010). 
With the Nigerian video films, speedy financial gain was put before art because 
the film marketers were shrewd, largely uneducated businessmen. The videos were one 
113 
 
more commodity put up for sale. Commerce was known to replace technical knowhow, 
and Haynes (2006) rightly observed that “one of the most common charges against 
video producers and distributors is that they are motivated entirely by the desire for 
profit, with a consequent strong preference for sticking to known subjects and formulae, 
which does not include political matters” (p. 513). The reason for this was primarily 
because Kenneth Nnebue, and later producers cum marketers belonged among the Igbos 
whose business acumen, according to conventional wisdom, surpasses those of the 
Hausas and Yorubas or any other ethnic groups in the country for that matter. They 
were merchants who traded in everything and anything that could bring in profits. In 
Lagos, they dominated Idumota and Alaba markets, the same locations where films are 
sold; in Onitsha, the Igbos owned the film shops and other spaces in Iweka Road 
because it was their land.  
However, there are some exceptions. Novia (2012) wrote that although Ojiofor 
Ezeanyanche (OJ Productions), a popular film marketer, was uneducated, he “knew a 
lot about filmmaking and ... could create amazing story ideas. He also knew the 
requisite elements needed to make the scene or dialogue punchy” (pp. 21-22). So while 
it was profit for the majority, a few who ranked profit as secondary existed and 
practiced as well.  
All the filmmakers interviewed for this project did agree on one point: 
constructing the past is not an all-comers affair. Charles Novia, actor, writer, and a 
director of Project Nollywood is of the opinion that the greatest obstacle to the 
production of quality historical films is the lack of funds. This, he believes, will cater 
for all the other requirements including travel, research and props to mention a few. It is 
an uphill task for the intellectual filmmaker because it is much more capital and labour-
intensive than any other kind of audio-visual re-construction. With this, it becomes easy 
to see why depicting a political past could not be done quickly enough to guarantee the 
sales the merchants-turned-filmmakers were after. It is a reason that partly accounts for 
the small number of films that recast their vision of past events. Of course, other factors 
influencing telling a political past come into play but the level of education and the 
‘maximum profit’ orientation among producers and marketers did not make for a 
balanced equation.  
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Fred Amata’s take on the subject is that of collective social consciousness as 
well as environmental factors. His decision (or lack of) to make political and historical 
reconstructions of films will be determined by the popular and successful films of the 
period. To Amata, the success of a film is highly dependent on its timeliness. He 
attributed the success enjoyed by Ije (2010) to the period in which the film was made. 
Had it been done three or four years ago, it may not have been so popular. The 
unspoken motive of every filmmaker is to make profit, and so the income factor 
occasionally supersedes that of art. Furthermore, it is not every practitioner that is 
inclined to make history films, as Amata claims. “One of the qualities of successful 
people is the ability to follow their passion. I have to be passionate about something to 
do it” (personal communication, February 16, 2012) 
Among the commercially oriented filmmakers, two groups exist: the ones who 
make high quality productions and therefore have a right to derive profit from their 
labours, and the carefree practitioners who make compromises even before difficulties 
are encountered. To the first group belong veterans like Amaka Igwe who said at the 
Nigerian Entertainment Conference (NEC) 2013 in Lagos, “I make my own films to 
make money. I am unapologetic about it because I have bills to pay” (NEC, April 26, 
2013). But behind that desire for money is the passion for quality and socially relevant 
stories that Nigerians have enjoyed to the credit of this doyenne of Nigerian 
filmmaking. Indeed, every filmmaker gives attention to the commercial value of his 
production otherwise the passion will remain unfed and unexpressed. Further, before 
shooting began on Izu Ojukwu’s latest film project, ’76, the screenplay was sent to 
screenwriters in the United States because they were looking for “acceptability and a 
wider market” (The Guardian). Another passionate filmmaker, Kunle Afolayan, left a 
banking career in pursuit of film. Driven first by sheer pleasure in the art of filmmaking, 
the Igwes and Afolayans remain motivated even when the profits are thin, delayed or 
non-existent.  
To the second group belong the majority of Nigerian filmmakers who Bond 
Emeruwa and Andy Amenechi describe as ‘Asaba filmmakers’. The term referred to the 
hasty productions done solely with the intention of making quick money and moving on 
to other similar “Asaba movies.” This group shows little concern for training or 
production of high quality video films. Among this group of seemingly pompous 
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filmmakers, the following comments have been heard, “if our films are not good, why is 
Nollywood so popular? Why are people watching it all over the world?” (L. Imasuen, 
personal communication, August 20, 2014). There is a kind of imaginary status that has 
been conferred on Nollywood by fans, the media and film awards promoters that makes 
its practitioners complacent. Awards to first-time directors and producers, inordinate 
media hype and tabloid gossip on film stars’ lifestyles usually confer a larger-than-life 
status on actors/actresses, and film practitioners in general (F. Amata, personal 
communication, February 16, 2012). Dapo Adelegan’s comments to filmmakers at a 
film summit, reported by Florence Utor, speak to this fact:  
[E]ven if you have talent...you need to go to school...to put some 
finishing touches to the talent to make it more solid… The vain flattery 
in town that Nollywood is the fastest growing movie industry in the 
world and only next to Bollywood is not helpful. Traders and 
businessmen in garbs of movie directors, producers, scriptwriters and 
actors must lean back and come up with better ideas” (Utor 2013: 40) 
 
If this group of filmmakers, the Asaba breed, produce films without much depth, with 
rehashed plotlines and therefore draw the criticisms of the observing public and 
stakeholders, then the question of politics and history in film or “better ideas” becomes 
impossible. Perhaps, it is not entirely their fault because accolades have been quick and 
widespread, awards are given at one’s debut production, and the media representation is 
often uncritical, to such an extent that the awardees not only rest on their laurels, but 
also abandon training, perfection and historical portrayals altogether The focus then 
rests solely on making money in order to live up to the contrived status.  
However, the quest for quick commercial gain did not spur on any of the 
filmmakers whose films are studied in this project except Sam Onwuka and his 
Stubborn Grasshopper. Neville Ossai, actor and co-producer of the film, disclosed that 
in spite of feeling personally uneasy with the prospect of being arrested by General 
Abacha’s men, he went ahead with the production for the monetary gains, the measure 
of which remained undisclosed (personal communication, March 23, 2013). Another 
film maker, Chico Ejiro, also known as Mr. Prolific in the industry, acknowledged the 
high cost, rigorous research, frequent travels, permissions and approvals required to 
make such films. He mentioned the time constraints and interest rates they have to 
grapple with if loans are taken from the banks. To illustrate his point, he stated, “If I 
116 
 
want to shoot a film at the airport, and I take N10million from the bank, and I’m 
waiting for the approvals to come, interest will kill me. I have to pay the bank back and 
get my own money” (C. Ejiro, personal communication, November 2010). There is also 
the problem of distribution and dysfunctional exhibition spaces – which audiences 
cannot access – to ensure that creative ideas are not stifled by bureaucratic processes. 
 
5.3.2 Social Factors – Audience Preferences  
Filmmakers are keen to feel the pulse of their audiences before and after the release of 
their films. This is even more so in 2014 when reliance on cinema releases (few in 
comparison to the annual output of films) seems to guarantee higher returns on 
investment given the ‘pirate-infested’ film markets. Nigeria’s cinema-going audience is 
the youth, but with the proliferation of films on terrestrial and satellite TV channels, the 
biggest audience is the women folk as Brian Larkin (2008) argued and as has been 
repeatedly emphasized at film conferences by scholars and practitioners alike. Film 
producer and director, Novia (2012), observes this gender imbalance “80% of the 
audience for Nollywood movies are women because the movies massively appeal to 
them” (p. 33).   
The audience component is critical to the success of films. The filmmakers do 
require a measure of audience loyalty for their films, which is why an informal and 
unwritten system of determining audience preferences exists. This is usually done by 
word-of-mouth, through telephone conversations, and lately on social media platforms. 
The audience component is further understood in terms of market sales of CD/DVD, 
although piracy has made this impossible to determine. Audiences feedback to other 
producers and directors on the kinds of films people want to see or are willing to pay 
for, hence the band-wagon effect. For Fred Amata, director, Anini, the audience could 
relate to the 1986 story of Lawrence Anini aka ‘The Law’. He was primarily motivated 
to work on the film because the armed robber’s story was reported in the daily 
newspapers on a grand scale. Anini’s notoriety went well beyond his city of operation.   
F. Amata: The Anini story is phenomenal, honestly, it’s phenomenal. We had a 
great subject matter for an engaging film. It was a film that everybody could 
relate to. 80% of the people in Benin claim a one-on-one experience with Anini, 
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so it was huge. Even the famous presidential quote then was ‘my friend, where is 
Anini?’ (February 16, 2012) 
H. Legemah: I grew up in Benin and was a top dog in town when Anini saga 
came on and killed social night life in Benin. When I became a film maker I 
decided to correct and demystify the myth and giant Nigerians thought 
Lawrence Anini was. He was just a common thief (June 2, 2014) 
The reference to the audience in Legemah’s comment suggests that the Anini story was 
popularly known. It did not come as a surprise then that the film was widely accepted 
and was endorsed by the NFVCB even though at the time of the interview with the 
producer, he could not provide a copy of the letter from the Board. Legemah’s comment 
also indicates a change in interpersonal and communal life in Benin City, which 
annoyed him, the indigenes of that geographical space and the populace who were able 
to relate to the story, and who were even partakers of his spoils. Anini was known to 
distribute the money he stole from rich individuals and corporate organisations to the 
poor. So, Anini was a ‘psychic’ miscreant who pleased and displeased the people at the 
same time. After all, his sobriquet ‘The Law’ originated from the people, the same 
whose ‘social night life’ he killed. My point is, there was massive reception of the film, 
Anini and the filmmakers were aware of this even before making the film. 
Just like some filmmakers (Tunde Kelani, Kingsley Ogoro, Tade Ogidan) are 
convinced that representations of the political past have the potential to draw in 
audiences, hence raise their social relevance and financial prospects, some others (Chico 
Ejiro, Chikezie Donatus) believe that the Nigerian audience is not interested in seeing a 
political past on screen. Yet some more (Bond Emeruwa, Lancelot Imasuen) agree that 
factors beyond politics endear an audience to a film, factors such as acting (star system), 
story treatment and publicity surrounding the film.   
C. Ejiro: I don’t think the Nigerian audience is ready for that. They are happy 
with the kind of entertainment we give them. Nigerians are not going to watch 
anything historical (November 2010)  
B. Emeruwa: Yes, Nigerians are not too interested in history. Nigerians are 
only interested in today and tomorrow and their stomach. They do not see how 
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history will put food on the table which is very unfortunate (Lagos, September 
13, 2013) 
Reacting to Chico Ejiro’s comments on the lack of historical interest among Nigerian 
audiences, Bond Emeruwa agreed in the following words:  
B. Emeruwa: Up to a point, yes...up to a point. When I said it, I just said it. The 
truth is that the audience is prepared for every good movie. Now, if you say 
because you are doing history, you do something that is didactic and boring, you 
won’t have an audience. Movies are supposed to entertain primarily. Like right 
now, Kunle is shooting Oct 1. That movie is going to be successful because he’s 
taking his time to do it. And it’s history (September 13, 2013). 
My conversation with Kingsley Ogoro revealed that while he was pleased with the 
reception which Across the Niger received within and outside the country, he was 
somewhat regretful of the approach the film had taken. From his point of view, the film 
would have been much more popular among women if it was not a war film. A quick 
glance at the film jacket showed guns and military uniforms, which was sure to 
disinterest the female viewers.  
K. Ogoro: ... doing it again, I would actually try to remove a lot of the uniforms. 
The women, people who watch films, as soon as they see it, they’ll think it’s a 
war movie. That was the only thing, problem I didn’t like about the movie... a 
woman looking at the film, they’ll [sic] think it’s a war movie… (August 29, 
2013) 
Arguably, one of the first attempts at constructing a political past in Nigerian feature 
films which came with Ola Balogun’s Cry Freedom (1981) was unpopular among the 
audience. Sharon Russell writing about Ola Balogun observed:  
He shot Cry Freedom (1981) in Ghana once again in the face of 
tremendous difficulties. He wanted to present a specifically African 
perspective of colonialism and those who fought it. The film deals with 
the activities of a guerrilla group and a colonial army both led by young 
men of the same age who have grown up together – one as master and 
the other as servant. While the film appealed to intellectuals who were 
impressed with its serious considerations of important issues, the general 
public, accustomed to Hollywood-style action adventure films, largely 
ignored it (1998: 32). 
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Perhaps this partly accounts for the reasons why filmmakers shun past or present 
political commentary. The audience factor is a key one. Venturing into constructions of 
the political past in recent productions given the operational shoe-string budgets with 
the uncertainty of audience approval and patronage can prove detrimental to a 
filmmaker’s career. It is fairly established that mainly women occupy themselves with 
viewing Nigerian films and that their tastes do not, of necessity, run in the directions of 
political narratives as some contemporary filmmakers have identified.  
On constructions of the past, Bond Emeruwa says that it belongs to a limited 
audience, which Russell’s comments above support. It cannot be for the general public 
consumption since audiences are so diverse, with equally divergent tastes. There will be 
people who appreciate the subject of the political past, the more educated, intellectual 
ones, but there will also be those who settle for entertainment and narratives which are 
not necessarily accounts of the past.  
B. Emeruwa: Nollywood tells stories – African stories that’s why it has caught 
and built the audience that it built...worldwide audience…not necessarily history 
but it told our stories (September 13, 2013). 
The reference to appreciation of historical depictions by the intellectual class supports 
the idea that the films are primarily seen by women, and that the films are so popular 
because of Nigeria’s huge uneducated or semi-educated citizens. Nollywood has 
achieved its status without heavily resorting to political commentaries, which suggest 
that such commentaries, even if they have much relevance in current political discourse, 
like the ones addressed in this study, did not drive Nigerian filmic narratives in the way 
that francophone African cinema did, and still does.  
The following sections deal with some of the revealed factors known generally 
to inspire the film directors and producers, as well as those that specifically inspired the 
production of the films studied here. One overarching theme of the conversations with 






5.3.3 Social Factors - Nollywood as Political Endorsers 
As infamous as some Federal and State Governments of Nigeria have been, the idea of 
being funded by any of them or having one’s film premiere graced by government 
executives is most desirable to Nollywood filmmakers. By political endorsement is 
meant the mutual exchange of ‘favourable’ attention between filmmakers and 
government officials. The government also seeks to be well-portrayed in the video-
films. This attention is manifest in commending governmental efforts, or drawing their 
attention to one’s film wherein political principles are upheld or other propaganda 
made, or where a negative critique is couched in positive codes. Nollywood is anxiously 
hobnobbing with the government at all levels in anticipation of financial and other 
favours (e.g. signing into law a film council such as the Motion Picture Practitioners 
Council, MOPICON) to aid the industry. In the production process of Battle of Love and 
Across the Niger, Ogoro was deeply motivated by a consciousness that seeks lasting 
solutions to national issues as well as an ambition for political endorsement. He deploys 
the past to speak to the prevailing circumstances in Nigeria’s political sphere in the 
hope that it will receive political applause. 
K. Ogoro: My main quests were that I’d be the first to premiere my movie at a 
major cinema and that the president of my country be present. It happened; 
‘Across the Niger’, which is about creating peace for the country was 
successfully premiered. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo through 
Information Minister, Chukwuemeka Chikelu, got interested and came for the 
premiere in Abuja. The only thing he felt was missing was the Nigerian flag. 
The president shook my hand after the screening and I was happy with that 
handshake.  
I shoot movies to give our country a positive image. Across the Niger was shot 
when there were so many problems in Nigeria...ethnicity everywhere...a Chinese 
adage prompted me to make the film... it is great to fight and win any battle but 
it is even greater to win those battles without fighting ... I wanted to highlight 
the reasons behind the problems of the past, and to address the solutions 
(August 29, 2013). 
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In line with Ogoro’s motive, Nollywood ‘Sheik’, Zeb Ejiro shares a similar although 
semi-political position.  
Z. Ejiro: Then if you look at ‘The president must not die’, it’s all about our 
democracy, our nascent democracy. The president at that time was the symbol of 
democracy. And we must guide and protect our democracy. That film was shot 
when Obasanjo was in power and I used Obasanjo as a character which Enebeli 
played. I used Obasanjo’s catch phrases like I dey kampe and all that. And I 
presented that movie to Obasanjo and I said Sir, this character here is you.  
Yes, he said we should bring more copies to put them in the library for him so 
that when other presidents come, he’ll be giving them and showing it to them. 
There’s a picture on Facebook where I bent down giving Baba (Obasanjo) the 
film (July 25, 2013).  
Ejiro’s strategic construction of a political past, he claims, is approached with caution, 
so as not to incur the wrath of the Censor’s Board and the consequent loss of money that 
may accrue. This corroborates Haynes’ (2006) point on censorship concerns informing 
the production (or not) of political critiques. It is important to note that Ejiro negotiates 
his portrayal of the past through common phrases or expressions used by the character 
portrayed. This ensures that the audience grasps the meaning of the image or the text. 
So that, even if physical resemblances do not sig-ni-fy (Hall, 2013), verbal habits or 
traits will. Such linguistic coding of a character and his idiosyncrasy in ways decodable 
by viewers familiar with the personality, guarantees that censorship does not thrive. Of 
crucial importance here is that the film appears to endorse the political order, but in 
actual fact also carries subversive messages, even if marginally represented. The initial 
title of the film was The president must die, by which the producer meant that corrupt 
leaders must be exterminated, but his irony serves to overcome political pressure and 
censorship. 
These are similar to other efforts and comments by filmmakers wherein the 
official support required to make a film is either achieved through direct funding from 
government officials and the subsequent acknowledgement of the funder in film credits 
such as Amazing Grace (2005), The Last Vote (2001).  
122 
 
Nollywood’s function as political endorsement seems to be a strategy by 
filmmakers to secure requisite funding for current and probably future film productions. 
Apart from making specific films to draw the attention of the government, practitioners 
also hobnob with the powers that be for political appointments and cash rewards. This 
endorsement has various other manifestations including invitations to State Governors 
to attend film premieres, one of which is Alex Eyengho’s invitation to the Delta State 
Governor for a film purporting to promote the people’s cultural heritage. The 
politicians’ awareness of the cultural power wielded by actors and actresses is often 
used by such politicians to endear themselves to the public. Popular screen faces like 
Richard Mofe-Damijo (RMD) and Paul Obazele conspicuously flanked Adams 
Oshiomole’s side during his gubernatorial campaign in 2007, and other campaigns – a 
fact confirmed by Andy Amenechi in the following words: 
A.Amenechi: Nollywood is going to be a key factor in 2015 elections. Adams 
Oshiomole was elected not just because of his policies but because of the total 
endorsement of artists. I was in Benin that period so I know what I’m talking 
about. The other group took them for granted but each campaign that he did and 
took along Nollywood stars was twice the size of the last one. So by the time he 
did the final one when ... actors, Aki and Paw Paw, were there, it was 
humongous (March 29, 2013) 
In 2007, Mofe-Damijo, an actor, was also actively involved in campaigning for 
Emmanuel Uduaghan’s in the gubernatorial elections in Delta State. The Special 
Adviser to the President on Research and Documentation, Oronto Douglas, in 2012, 
held a meeting with well-known Nollywood producers and actors/actresses to address 
some of the recurring problems in film production in the country. That was a period of 
decline in the industry with producers and directors bearing the brunt of piracy as much 
as the screen stars. The meeting was held because practitioners saw the government as 
the cause and solution to the problems that plagued the industry. In May 2013, a 
presidential dinner for the creative industries was held in Lagos. This attracted a large 
number of Nollywood producers, directors, actors, actresses and people working in the 
industry.  
Further, the 2013 President of the Association of Movie Producers (AMP), Zik 
Zulu Okafor, led a delegate to former President Obasanjo’s home in July 2013 to make 
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him the grand patron of the association by virtue of his contributions to the film industry 
in Nigeria. The gesture drew promises of ‘support’ from the elder statesman, support 
which included placing his presidential library at AMP’s disposal. Actress Ini Edo in an 
acknowledgement speech referred to the support given by Godswill Akpabio, the Cross 
Rivers State Governor at the premiere of her co-produced film I’ll take my chances 
(2011). These few examples go to show the extent of association Nollywood has or 
desires to have with past or incumbent government officials in order to guarantee the 
sustenance of their profession and livelihood.  
Of course every industry needs collaboration between practitioners and policy 
makers but the arts industries bear a unique burden that suggests keeping a good 
distance from the political power of the day. In the current scheme of things, 
Nollywood’s association with the government has direct implications for political 
representations in the films. Barber (1987) observes that popular arts producers have 
been known to contest official authority through their works because they have been 
denied official hearing. But this may be rapidly changing in the Nigerian filmmaking 
scene in which official authorities are not contested but are courted. The actress now-
turned-producer, Omoni Oboli’s latest Being Ms. Elliot (2014) was premiered at the 
presidential villa amidst multiple speculations on the appropriateness of screening a 
romantic comedy in such an official setting. But that also signals the latest effort on the 
sort of affinity that filmmakers anticipate with the government. Such associations, it is 
argued, are likely to make filmmakers less critical and objective in their portrayal of 
political leadership. 
While their film productions may not carry explicit endorsements of political 
actions, the filmmakers’ increasing socialisation with politicians suggests that deep 
political critiques such as those written by Nigerian novelists and dramatists will be late, 
if at all, in coming. This partly explains the absence of political critiques. Recent films 
(The Last Vote, 2001) with political undertones are careful to adopt neutral or 
patronising positions not only to evade the censorship of the regulatory board, but also 
to keep the doors of Aso Rock (Nigeria’s presidential villa) open to filmmakers.  
According to Egya (2011), Soyinka (1996) and Obi (1994), artists should bear a 
special responsibility to their audience and their trade. Similarly, in his last book, There 
was a Country, Chinua Achebe pointed out that “the role of the writer (and artist) 
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depends to some extent on the state of health of his or her society...if a society is ill, the 
writer has a responsibility to point it out. If the society is healthier, the writer’s job is 
different” (Achebe 2012: 57). Reacting to the idea also expressed in the just-mentioned 
book that a writer has no business in politics or social upheavals of his or her day, he 
states... “the African writer who steps aside can only write footnotes or a glossary when 
the event is over. He or she will become like the contemporary intellectual of futility in 
many other places...” (p. 55).  
In March 2014, Patience Ozokwor, a prominent Nigerian actress was given a 
Centenary award by the Nigerian government in its celebration of 100 years of Britain’s 
amalgamation (1914-2014) of Nigeria. The award left her elated. Wole Soyinka, who 
was also nominated for the same award in a different category, rejected his and stated 
his reasons for doing so. Soyinka’s most important reason amounted to scorn for a 
government that rewards General Abacha who “put the nation under siege during an 
unrelenting reign of terror that is barely different from the current rampage of Boko 
Haram” (Ejiogu, 2014: 5). This occurrence tied in significantly with Steve Ayorinde’s 
comment on Nollywood which he made a year before the centenary.  
S. Ayorinde: I think Nollywood is still a very hungry industry that will go cap in 
hand every now and then, every time the government beckons. Nollywood should 
rise above the commodification of its own very essence.... Again it comes to who 
is the Fela, Achebe, Soyinka that will refuse CON of the Fed. Govt.... and will 
state logical reasons why you cannot take that from the goverment, and it will be 
on the covers of all the newspapers the next day. Are you saying that Soyinka 
and Achebe are richer than these Nollywood people?  No, it’s just that they 
subscribe to values that are much more elevated than the merchants who are 
pretending to be filmmakers in my opinion (May 6, 2013).  
Ayorinde’s comments served to highlight a point made by other journalists regarding 
the notorious familiarisation of the filmmakers with governments at all levels.  Jeta 
Amata’s 2005 film Amazing Grace was heavily supported by the Cross River State 
Government in view of the film’s potential to promote the state’s cultural and historical 
heritage. Other producers like Tunde Kelani and Kunle Afolayan have queued up at 
government offices as well. These support the point that Nollywood functions as 
political endorsers first through their filmic narratives and second, through the sustained 
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familiarity with political office holders. This position counters the view that popular arts 
are sites of contestation and resistance (Englert, 2008; Barber 1987, 1997a; Fabian, 
1978), if contestation is meant popular opposition to power. Rather, it works as popular 
arts being pro-establishment and institutionalising the medium and the forces that shape 
its production and consumption (Katchka, 2000).  
To the question of filmmakers’ motivation, I argue that they are motivated to 
protest wrongdoing by the government as the next section will demonstrate, but also to 
endorse certain political actions, bringing Barber’s (1987) and other scholars’ 
contestation paradigm of popular arts to fruition as well as to question.  Battle of Love 
and Across the Niger were made to promote a social and political agenda – the One 
Nigeria campaign; Anini was to highlight environmental forces that bred crime and to 
protest paramilitary corruption; Oil Village was also a protest film on the Niger Delta 
problems, therefore political. Stubborn Grasshopper was a social crusade film intended 
to raise the consciousness of viewers on the cost of military governments whereas Half 
of a Yellow Sun was unapologetically pro-Biafran (and therefore, pro-secession) 
although it was also opposed to war.   
 
5.3.4 Social Factors – Contesting Dominant Power  
Apart from Nollywood’s direct rapport with the government in and through films, there 
is also a group of practitioners who contest the activities of the political elite. What is 
clear, however, is that seeking financial assistance from the government does not, in this 
case, preclude subtle criticisms in the video films. But it does diminish the propensity of 
such representations by filmmakers who are obliged to ‘thank’ funders in the closing 
credits and invite them to film premieres. That said, some filmmakers are conscious of 
the role Achebe (2012) mapped out for writers and artists in general. In the way Achebe 
poked fingers at British colonizers, writers after him do so to postcolonial governments, 
who in the thoughts of Mbembe (2002) inherited colonial sovereignity in quite similar, 
arbitrary and totalising ways.  
While musing over the different connotations that the word ‘popular’ might 
assume, and how popular art forms respond to and are viewed by the society, Barber 
(2014) remarks that they are “negative to some, positive to others: meretricious trash or 
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authentic expressions of resistance to oppression” (xvi). This section takes up the view 
that video films as popular arts resist political oppression or “get revenge” on repressive 
military government through their representations.  In the words of filmmaker, Charles 
Novia (2012), this is achieved by “paying a visual tribute to all the pro-democracy 
activitists of the military era” (p. 54) Accusatory fingers are pointed to the government 
officials who fail in the execution of their duties, thus affirming Mbembe’s (1997) use 
of figurative images as meaning making sites in confronting autocratic governments. 
Novia, writer, director and producer, made a point of this as the motivation for one of 
his films, I will die for you, to protest what he termed the “draconian military 
government” (p. 54) of General Sani Abacha. He wrote of a script which he “skilfully 
wrapped...round a romantic tale” (p. 55) in a subversive manner:  
The script was motivated by the senseless murder of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
other pro-democracy activists ...that November evening in 1995. A 
tyrant, bereft of literary intellect and appreciation, had murdered a 
kindred spirit! To me, he did not deserve to be hanged. Something in me 
rebelled that evening. I cannot quite put a finger to what it was but it 
gave vent to an anger which was only doused when I wrote the I will die 
for you script eight years later...the rebellion to poke fingers at the 
government of my country, both past and present, swelled up in me 
(Novia 2012: 53).   
   
Here, we see popular art not only as a site of resistance and opposition but also as one of 
‘restoration’ for the producers. Restoration here is not understood as a total change of 
the state of oppression, but rather a healing, an assuagement – however brief or lasting – 
that enables the producers deal with troubling political situations. Novia’s anger, he 
claims, subsided only after his fictionalised self-expression of political murder had been 
accomplished. The films speak to the emotional state of their producers and their 
audiences as well while contesting dominant power. Another filmmaker, Zeb Ejiro, 
shares a similar concern even though he does not directly claim relief from his sadness 
through his artistic expressions.  That was inferred by his statements:  
Z. Ejiro: What motivates me actually is my environment...  I am angry. I’m still 
angry with my society, with my government and so on. Whenever you see me 
carry my camera, it is because I am not happy with what is going on 
Any day you see me set out to make a movie, that means there’s something 
bothering me that I want to tell the world.  
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We are going to make movies that are going to change Nigeria. I don’t care 
whether we go to jail. That anger is still with me because they are not doing 
anything to change Nigeria (July 25, 2013). 
Similarly, some other filmmakers share the view that the corrupt government must be 
brought to account for its ineptitude by telling the world about their operations. The 
director or producer, criticised and marginalised in society as untrained commercially 
motivated peddlers of art, finds no other avenue for this self expression and he thus 
utilises the one most available to him – the video film.  This group of people who are 
“silenced and excluded from public debate...turn to popular genres as the only space in 
which to represent their views”. Thus affirming that “the marginanlised can also be the 
vanguard...who took the lead in calling for more responsive and responsible 
government” (Barber, 2014: xix). The responses below equally fit neatly into this 
category:   
F. Amata: we wanted to make a statement about the political situation in the 
country: the same police that gives you arms to rob are hounding you for 
robbery...yea yea yea that was clearly in the back of our minds (Februray 16, 
2012).  
H. Legemah: we wanted to portray the military government as they are: aloof 
and corrupt (June 2, 2014). 
S. Onwuka: when I made Stubborn Grasshopper, you know, it was just after 
Abacha died. And we were not getting the actual story of how Nigerian 
government was actually running that time...a lot of things were covered up. So I 
chose to make it [Stubborn Grasshopper] to enlighten people ... The main thing 
is exactly what people picked up, how Nigerians were operating in the dark and 
at the same time, the selfish way of ruling the country (October 16, 2013). 
K. Anya: we wanted to tell the Ken Saro-Wiwa story again (February 20, 2012) 
In all these examples, a measure of political consciousness is evident in the filmmakers. 
And, more importantly, it is a political consciousness that evokes the past in order to 
draw parallels between then and the present times. The filmmakers may not be radical 
activists as Onwuka affirmed (personal communication, October 16, 2013), or as 
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theorised by Chris Atton in 2002 while writing on alternative media, but they certainly 
bear the anxieties brought on by the prevailing socio-political complexities of their 
times. This is a position which popular arts scholars like Fabian (1978) and Barber 
(1987, 1997a, 2014) as well as postcolonial theorists like Mbembe (1997, 2002) have 
written extensively about.  
 
5.4 De-motivation 
The discussion on motivating factors would be incomplete without a consideration of 
the perceived or actual factors that steer video filmmakers away from re-enacting a 
political past. There is no consensus on what de-motivates in this regard since the 
NFVCB often denies censorship of political films, and some filmmakers are of the 
opinion that available funds would not necessarily lead them to producing historical 
films. To some extent, self-reporting rarely produces a complete picture, and denial or 
silence on what demotivates does not mean its absence. The following sub-sections deal 
with two key demotivating factors for most filmmakers practicing in Nigeria.    
 
5.4.1 Censorship 
In 1979, Opubor and Nwuneli wrote that the “Nigerian government does not directly 
control or effectively participate in distributing or exhibiting... [film]” for a number of 
reasons. One of such reasons is “the possible belief of the Nigerian Government that the 
production of feature films does not constitute a threat to its existence...” (Opubor & 
Nwuneli, 1979: 9). Almost a decade later, the government came to the full realisation of 
the impact of films – documentary or feature. The issues surrounding censorship are just 
as salient to the topic of filmmakers’ motivation as are those discussed above. In most if 
not all cases, censorship de-motivates the filmmakers intending to re-enact the political 
past, especially one as problematic and contested as that of Nigeria. In 2000, Haynes 
wrote that “African governments may do little to support filmmaking, but they have the 
power to censor it and would be likely to see any but the most anodyne handling of the 
issue [of ethnicity] as divisive” (p. 11). The thought of the restraints imposed by the 
Censor’s Board serves as deterrence to filmmakers, some of whom are intent on 
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exploring politics. Haynes (2006) observed that, “the end of military rule in 1999 has 
certainly not solved Nigeria’s political problems, but it has created a more open political 
environment in which previously undiscussable topics can be aired” (p. 526). While this 
is true to a certain extent, the opposite can most certainly be argued too. This is because 
it appears that the Censor’s Board has taken over the repressive baton from the military.  
According to Ekwuazi (2001), there have been three celebrated cases of 
censorship in the production of Nigerian films. These happened with Francis Oladele’s 
(producer) Things Fall Apart/Bullfrog in the Sun (1971), Wole Soyinka’s Blues for a 
Prodigal (1984) and The Great Attempt (1990). In these cases, censorship took various 
forms: sealing up the shooting location(s), shutting down exhibition centres, setting up a 
special censorship committee to follow the life of the film and if considered necessary, 
banning it altogether. Such was the level of control that early Nigerian filmmakers faced 
in postcolonial Nigeria, under military regimes. In an interview with the film producer, 
Kingsley Ogoro, he reminisced on his arrest by the State Security Service (SSS) 
because it was thought that he and the lead actor, Segun Arinze were Biafran spies. It 
was Ademola James, former head of the Board that wrote a petition for the film to be 
released because according to Ogoro, “Ademola saw the film, thought it was sound and 
agreed to stand by it” (personal communication, August 29, 2013). Without such an 
intervention, the film would have been banned because it evoked memories of the war 
that the government of Nigeria would prefer to see obliterated, and because the country 
is still highly polarised along ethnic and religious lines. Such visual images may incite 
fresh ethnic tensions, the Board claimed. Furthermore, filmmakers have been jailed 
(McCain, 2013), bribed (Haynes, 2006), threatened (Ekwuazi, 2000; Ugboma, personal 
communication, 2014) and had their equipment confiscated (Francis Oladele in 
Ekwuazi, 2000) whenever they ventured into political commentaries. This explains the 
paucity of explicit political critiques that characterised early Nigerian cinema, in 
addition, of course, to the attendance loss of income that such prohibitions would 
attract.  
Under the umbrella of preserving national security, factually or fictitiously, the 
Board bans films that smack of any direct reference to past or present politics. Ishaya 
Bako’s Fuelling Poverty (2012) and Biyi Bandele’s Half of a Yellow Sun (2013) are the 
most recent examples. The documentary Fuelling Poverty gave a tip of the iceberg of 
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the fuel subsidy crisis in Nigeria and received the sledge hammer from Effiong Inwang 
who was the head of legal services at the NFVCB in 2013. Not only was Bako 
prohibited from screening the film in Nigeria, he was also ‘threatened’ in the official 
letter from the Board which stated that the Inspector General of the Police had been 
informed of his film and the ban. In April 2014, the official distributor of Half of a 
Yellow Sun, Kene Mkparu, wrote to Patricia Bala, the Director General of the Board 
requesting a formal feedback on the film presented for classification over six weeks 
before to which there had been an uneasy silence. Mkparu wrote:  
The continued unexplained delay in getting a formal response from the 
Board suggests that the Film has been banned even though there has 
been no formal communication to this effect. The Producers have 
informed us that they are already exploring alternative measures towards 
the resolution of this quandary, as they believe the delayed classification 
of the Film is injurious to their investment in the short term and is 
damaging in the long term to investments in the Nigerian film industry 
(Mkparu, 2014: para 6, 11) 
 
The difference between the current actions of the NFVCB and the Abacha (and 
military) clamp down on the media, which Haynes (2006) referred to, is perhaps the 
absence of deaths and incarceration which the latter routinely and unabashedly 
performed. Everything else remains unchanged. In 2014, the Nigerian Broadcasting 
Corporation (NBC) served a notice to radio stations requesting the names of politicians 
invited to live talk shows be submitted to the agency in view of the activities of the 
terrorist group, Boko Haram.  
Eddie Ugboma has insistently remarked that the filmmaker has to be stubborn 
even if threatened with incarceration. Zeb Ejiro’s insistence with The President must die 
gave way to The President must not die after “the Censors’ Board kept the film for 6 
months, money was going, and I didn’t want to die of hunger” (Z. Ejiro, personal 
communication, July 25, 2013). Tunde Kelani is sometimes pointed, and at other times, 
ambivalent in his treatment of topics like the military take-over of power. He attested to 
the idea that censorship restricts the indigenous filmmaker from venturing directly into 
controversial political subjects. Haynes documented Kelani’s remarks:  
...because the Nigerian film industry is a private enterprise, all the 
producers would just produce very safe stories, family issues, comedies, 
and love stories, but nothing about politics for fear of jeopardizing their 
investment. So everybody played it safe. Saworoide was a tame attempt 
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to document the evil of military rule. You know the print media on the 
other hand did very well because they openly criticized dictatorship. Of 
course some journalists had to go into exile and all that. But none of the 
filmmakers would dare that, so everybody just seemingly turned a blind 
eye and just went for their businesses (Haynes 2007: 13-14) 
 
To strategically overcome restrictions imposed by the Censor’s Board, indirect 
references to politicians and political events (understood here as negotiated images) are 
deployed although explicit references (Adesokan, 2009b) are also made. Kelani also 
observes that religious and ethnic biases of staff of the Censor’s Board led to 
misinterpretation of cultural representations and so attracted wrong classifications 
(Haynes 2007). My interviews with Kingsley Ogoro and Kene Mkparu confirmed 
Kelani’s sentiments. For instance, Kelani accused former Director General of the Board, 
Rosemary Odeh of giving speedy approvals (and even awards) to Christian videos even 
if those videos had rituals in them, but refused approvals to non-Christian and other 
genres that may have similar rituals or native doctor scenes (Haynes 2007).  
Kingsley Ogoro is cautious. The original title of his film, Battle of Love, was 
Guns of Biafra. At the Censor’s Board, it was rejected and denied approval until the title 
was changed to Battle of Love. Charles Novia’s approach in the production of the Saro-
Wiwa inspired video-film sums up the attitude of most, if not all, the filmmakers: 
When the movie I will die for you, went to the NFVCB for classification, 
the panellists were a bit apprehensive at the overall tone of the movie, 
which was quite ambivalent towards the past military government, but I 
skilfully wrapped the story round a romantic tale and they could not 
really pin-point any parts they wanted removed or censored. I remember 
I got a call later from one of the panellists after the movie had been 
classified. He asked if I was not scared of what the military apologists 
would do when the movie finally hit the shelves. I replied that I wasn’t 
afraid in any way (Novia, 2012: 55).  
 
My interview with Kelani also revealed this intentional ambivalence which Novia refers 
to. Sam Onwuka, on the other hand, was fearless about the release of his film Stubborn 
Grasshopper. Neville Ossai, the production manager on the film project states that 
Onwuka was so passionate and fearless about making a film on Abacha that his passion 
diffused among cast and crew (personal communication, March 23, 2013). Worthy of 
note also is the fact that Abacha had passed away at the time of the release of the film. 
The fact of Abacha’s passing on was a relief to Kelani whose production of Saworoide, 
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with its references to the evil of military rule, had begun during the military dictator’s 
life time (Haynes 2007: 12).  
Kingsley Ogoro of Across the Niger notes that he too had to ‘battle’ with the 
Censor’s Board and the State Security Service (SSS) before his film was released. He 
and one of the actors, Segun Arinze, were arrested by the SSS and kept in custody for 
hours for fear that they were Biafran spies. Interestingly, Major Dubem in the film is 
wrongly accused of being a Biafran spy, and is consequently severely tortured. Ogoro 
chuckled as he narrated the episode, with several references to, “that was then when 
people didn’t know much about filmmaking” (August 29, 2013). Fortunately, Ogoro did 
not have to engage in a protracted battle with the Board because an influential man in 
the film censorship circle came to his defence:  
K. Ogoro: The first DG of the, Ademola James…He was the one that named the 
first movie, the Battle of Love because... he looked at the movie, the story was 
sound. He loved the story and decided that they can’t ban the film. He wrote an 
article that they should release the movie, and that he would stand by it. Segun 
(Arinze) and I were invited by the SSS. They thought we were Biafran spies. That 
was another obstacle we had.  (August 29, 2013) 
As mentioned above, the very recent case of film censorship came to light again with 
the big budget ($8m/£5.3m) production of Half of a Yellow Sun. The film was sent to 
the Censors’ Board and the producers had scheduled a Lagos premiere on the 25th of 
April, 2014. Two weeks before then, rumours on social media platforms indicated that 
the film had been banned. The Management of the Board released an ambivalent and 
counterintuitive statement on its commitment to fulfilling its mandate. The statement 
refuted the claim on the ban, but was silent on the reason for holding up the film, even 
to the producers and FilmOne, the film distribution company. It is possible that the 
Board chooses to tread with caution given the alarming rate of Boko Haram-related 
bombings and the April kidnap of over 200 school girls by the same terrorist sect in the 
northern parts of Nigeria.  
Unarguably, film censorship has come to be registered as a deterrent to video 
film practitioners who, first, moan a lack of funding for film production, and second, 
who berate the government through its film agencies for not ensuring that a sustainable 
133 
 
film development structure is actualised. Successive governments have deployed 
rhetorical devices in their claims to support the industry but lasting solutions to the 
teeming problems faced by the practitioners are yet to be seen. With the existing hurdles 
that confront the filmmaker, it becomes clear why ‘full’ political histories are avoided, 
even if only to minimise the challenges of artistic expressions in postcolonial societies.  
Censorship plays a key role regarding the possibilities of political representation 
as shown above and as other scholars including Ekwuazi (1991), Haynes (2007) and 
Ugor (2008) have demonstrated. It is absolutely true that freedom of expression is yet to 
be realised in the Nigerian public space. Equally true is the fact that filmmakers are 
guilty of artistic abuses of various kinds in the past, leading to licentiousness and the 
celebration of the infamous, the impious and crass obscenity. Walking through film 
markets, one’s sight is assaulted by film jackets with pornographic material. This is why 
the NFVCB in its bid to sanitise the environment must be seen to be free, fair and open 
to critical dialogue.  
A former DG of the Board, Emeka Mba, advised the filmmakers not to be 
dissuaded from putting history on film by rumours of censorship. “We don’t do pre-
censorship”, Mba remarked at Eko International Film Festival in Lagos, 2010. “We only 
request that reality be adequately represented.” Earlier in his office as Censor’s Board 
boss, he had attempted to specify the kind of content that Nigerian films should have, 
but that failed woefully. This is not surprising especially when the practitioners believe 
that the choice of stories to tell over all possible options is theirs to make, more so when 
government aid is lacking. Although Mba agreed that the resources required to enact 
history on film may be lacking, his comments hinted at the unwillingness of the 
stakeholders to explore cheaper alternatives and undertake the rigour of research.  He 
ended his statement with “Nigerians deserve to see more of such movies” (E. Mba, 
personal communication, November 2010). 
But majority of the filmmakers are dissatisfied with the film watch dog, not only 
on censorship and classification matters, but also when issues of piracy are raised. Film 
director, Andy Amenechi’s comments summed this up: The regulatory board ought 
also to confine its operations within the limits of the law without arbitrary or unilateral 
decisions. More importantly, the Board should rise with its full constitutional weight 
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against the most heinous act against filmmakers, which is that of piracy. (A.Amenechi, 
personal communication, March 29, 2013) 
 
5.4.2 Piracy  
The investment in any film project is often huge. Budgets for popular depictions of the 
past are even bigger, which again suggests its reserve for a few filmmakers who are able 
to muster the financial requirements of such productions. In an attempt to discuss the 
motivations of filmmakers who have attempted to reflect on a political past through the 
cinematic lens, it is believed that highlighting factors that might de-motivate filmmakers 
is also necessary. Of prime importance is the issue of funding. Closely related to piracy, 
but a de-motivator of its own right is the hefty budget required to re-enact the past.  The 
filmmakers interviewed for this study unanimously stated that producing the past is the 
most expensive of film budgets. Two recent attestations to that are Biyi Bandele’s Half 
of a Yellow Sun with a budget of $8m (£5m) and Kunle Afolayan’s October 1 at $2m 
(£1.2m). By Nollywood standards, these are exceptionally high budgets, which is a 
clear reason for the avoidance of the genre. An average film budget is N20m (£78,000) 
or much less (A. Amenechi, personal communication, March 29, 2013).   Several of us 
are eager to explore rich historical topics, even if only as a background to more modern 
narratives, but financial constraints prevent us from doing so (B. Emeruwa, personal 
communication, September 13, 2013). If funding is a problem, it is further compounded 
by the prospect of losing a significant portion, if not all, of it to piracy.  
In the list of film de-motivators, piracy follows funding, but that is not peculiar 
to the portrayals of a political past. Films of other genres are also pirated. Even the not-
so-good ones, the American, Indian and Chinese films formerly imported to Nigeria by 
the Lebanese businessmen were equally pirated. Piracy of Nigerian films is often 
carried out under the ‘poor distribution channels’ cover. Social commentators, film 
journalists and critics subscribe to the idea that films made in south western Lagos 
never reach the south eastern parts of the country where demand is huge. They 
unwittingly justify the criminal act by making such statements as “people want to get 
the films everywhere; Nollywood is so popular.” (S. Husseini, personal communication, 
May 26, 2013). This bootlegging thrives on the basis of corruption and impunity rather 
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than on the distribution factor. Granted that the question of distribution is a sore point 
for filmmakers because of the dearth of alternative distribution channels to beat piracy, 
it remains to be proven whether any marketer has ever approached a filmmaker for 
additional copies of films and was denied. The problem is simply one of unscrupulous 
marketers reaping the fruits of other people’s labour (personal communication) as 
Husseini, now speaking for the filmmakers, also added. 
 Tunde Kelani is a regular victim of piracy. In May 2014, he released his 2012 
film Maami on DVD and within 48 hours, he was alerted to the proliferation of pirated 
copies of his film in the Lagos film markets (personal communication, February 12, 
2013).  The same happened with the release of his 2009 film Arugba although the 
perpetrators waited much longer before swooping down on his intellectual property. 
Kelani still laments the 30,000 unsold copies of Arugba in his office. The 66-year-old 
filmmaker’s frustration over film production and distribution is well known in 
filmmaking circles and among his fans with whom he has been interacting on social 
media platforms. The film Half of a Yellow Sun had not completed its first week in the 
cinemas (at N1,000/£4) when it went on sale in the streets for N50/25p (L. Imasuen, 
personal communication, August 24, 2014). With such a big budget film not being able 
to recoup its investment in its main market, it is certainly clear that piracy severely 
threatens future portrayals of the past – films ‘notorious’ for their hefty budgets.  
At an interview with Bond Emeruwa (September 13, 2013), he stated that there 
is no aspect of the political or even social past that cannot be portrayed on video 
because filmmakers have various interests – political and non-political (B. Emeruwa, 
personal communication). An excerpt from the interview is presented below to reveal 
his musings on making a film about a historical figure Usman Dan Fodio. Emeruwa tied 
together in the last recorded statement some of the factors that influence past political 
re-constructions which we have been discussing above.  
AA: But why are you thinking of Usman dan Fodio?  
BE: I love him.  
AA: Ok, so interest...is a motivation, I’m thinking  
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BE: If I could, I’ll love to shoot it, but right now, the facilities you need to shoot 
some of these things really don’t exist and it’s not just shooting it, but shooting it 
well.  
AA: So when facilities become constraints, why don’t you look at more 
contemporary agenda for which you can readily access facilities, for instance, 
people have been clamouring for a film on Fela Anikulapo-Kuti?  
BE: At the end of the day, it will all happen when the moviemaking crowd 
becomes more educated and more enlightened. Have you heard about Izu 
Ojukwu’s new film, the one he just made in Ibadan? 
AA: ‘76? 
BE: Yes, you’ve heard the story, about the coup but from another point of view. 
As the old people with their rigid mindset begin to leave and the younger 
generation takes over, you’ll find one or two of these filmmakers who’ll want to 
tell some of these stories and it’ll happen naturally, and as resources begin to 
abound and the avenues to showcase these movies also open up. So there are 
lots of factors that will all come together and as they come together, naturally, 
there will be additions to the industry whether we like it or not. And we will not 
wait for anybody to dictate when it will happen. It will just happen. 
This chapter began with background information on key filmmakers known to have 
portrayed a political past for the reason that personal profiles and societal contexts have 
a bearing on one’s artistic output. It then moved on to examine the motivations behind 
such portrayals by filmmakers. It reveals popular art, not just as sites of political 
endorsements (akin to Katchka, 2000), but also as avenues for talking back or talking to 
the government (Barber 1987, 1997). It was considered appropriate to address major de-
motivators as well. The argument here is that even if filmmakers are intent on depicting 
political events and figures of the past, the factors that work against such intentions 
seem to outweigh those in its favour, factors which seem to threaten seriously a 






NARRATIVE TECHNIQUES IN CONSTRUCTING THE PAST 
6.1 Introduction 
We tell our own stories – Bond Emeruwa, Director  
I wouldn't want to put a limit on what themes I would explore. I would say whatever 
feels compelling, whatever feels true, and hopefully what feels like the Nigerian voice 
that isn't being heard yet, whether in terms of culture, gender or age – Tunde Aladese, 
Writer 
The previous chapter discussed the various factors that motivate and de-motivate 
filmmakers who portray the past, including the general motivations of non-political and 
non-historical cultural representations in video film. That chapter provided a range of 
reasons why history is attractive and sometimes problematic for filmmakers. This 
chapter proposes to address a ‘how’ question. What narrative techniques have Nigerian 
filmmakers used to reconstruct the events and people of Nigeria’s political past? To 
make the chapter more specific, it has been divided into sections that ask the same 
question of each film: what narrative techniques have Henry Legemah and Fred Amata 
used to reconstruct the Anini episode for instance? In responding to this question, the 
chapter attends to others that naturally emanate from it: what do the narrative and their 
modes of telling say about the past they represent and the present? Thus, this latter 
question forms the crux of the sixth chapter.  
Narrative theories abound, are broad and they cater to various mediums and 
formats. Owing their developments to the study of European fairy tales, myths, tribal 
cultures and legends, with leading proponents such as French/Bulgarian Tzvetan 
Todorov, Russian Vladimir Propp, French Claude Levi-Strauss, narrative theories 
provide the basis for approaching various art forms. They possess within them 
analytical tools for reading a ‘story’ in the broadest sense, tools which the authors claim 
are evident within every narrative. Todorov’s thought attributes a state of equilibrium to 
every narrative, which is disrupted and then re-instated through the agency of 
characters, which for Propp, perform one of seven different roles (villain, donor, helper, 
princess, dispatcher, hero and false hero). Strauss conceived narratives as being 
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constituted of binary opposites. Turner (2006) confirms Strauss’ theory by stating that 
“one of the ways in which humans understand the world is through dividing it into sets 
of mutually exclusive categories” (pp.103-104), such that an object or person is either 
good or bad. There are also Ferdinand de Saussure, Roland Barthes, (and Hall, 2013 
shows how both authors’ works are linked to theories of representation) whose works 
have left a deep imprint on later theorizations of narratives in the First World 
Hollywood, Bollywood and other Third World countries.     
Third Cinema, arising from Third World, narratives developed the technologies 
and certain codes of the dominant film model, Hollywood while infusing it with 
specific, culturally-defined aesthetics and mythologies (Russell, 1989). The Indian film 
industry, arguably the largest of third cinema cultures in terms of output and having 
been in existence for over a hundred years, is well known for its song sequences and 
emotionally-charged narratives. It has also deployed folk tales and epics re-making 
popular stories with little or no inventive reflections (Pendakur, 2008; Ganti, 2013). 
Writings on Third Cinema include the narratives of early African filmmaking as that 
which sought to reverse colonialist tendencies and representations (Russell, 1989; 
Sholat and Stam 1994). This is evident in the now-vast literature on the works of 
Ousmane Sembene and other filmmakers listed in the second and third chapters. 
Conversely, Ghanaian and Nigerian films were not explicit reactions against 
colonialism. Rather, they exhibited, at least until the year 2000, a preference for 
representing human rituals, witchcraft, questionable wealth and the intervention of the 
supernatural, a phenomenon which was criticized as pandering to the colonizers 
assertions of Third World backwardness. These narratives, apart from expressing the 
anxieties of the narrators and audiences (Barber, 1987; Okome 2000, 2003) also served 
to instruct the viewers in all forms of desirable social behavior.  
Video film narratives originating from a West African filmmaking practice, 
distinct from African cinema of the Francophone persuasion, are best understood as 
popular cultural productions (Haynes, 2000) within the dynamic and modern economic 
systems of post-coloniality (Haynes and Okome, 2000). The structuring elements of 
popular arts: non-elite, non-traditional, playful, carefree, syncretic, and modern (Barber 
1987, 1997a, 2014) provide useful insights to unpacking the narrative techniques of the 
films studied. Barber noted that reading popular arts is a complex activity because of the 
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multi-layered meanings they bear. But more importantly, she affirmed that, “the arts 
cannot be read without both comprehending their nature as aesthetic constructs with 
their own principles and conventions, and locating them in the specific social universe 
which is the grounds of their existence” (1987: 5). In this respect, the video film 
conventions are teased out in subsequent sections and paragraphs to reveal the form’s 
aesthetic modes of narration.  
Scholars have already identified the uniqueness of Nigerian filmmaking 
narratives (Haynes 2007, Alamu 2010). “In terms of personnel, production techniques, 
administrative structure, and narrative elements, Nollywood is not homologous with 
foreign traditions” (Alamu 2010: 166). However, it has drawn elements from 
Hollywood filmmaking in an imitative way as Haynes (2007) observed (and as Barber’s 
syncretism implies), but not the formulaic three-act structure that has become a staple in 
Hollywood. Narratives have certain specific constituents and techniques of reading 
those elements as well. Brummett’s (2010) idea in providing the techniques for close 
reading rests on uncovering, within the text, the core elements of narratives, genres and 
characters. He regards narratives as being constituted mainly by form (the essence of 
narratives) and content, and which must possess certain analytical tools: coherence and 
sequence, tension and resolution. Of the first group, Brummett says, “these principles 
underlie successful narratives in every form” (p. 55). To distinguish form from content, 
attention is turned to Prasad’s (2008) definition of form as “the narrative structure, the 
organization of elements within the structure, the means employed to carry the message 
forward from one stage to the next and those by which narrative closure is achieved” (p. 
46). And the content is the message, the ideas and themes littered throughout the film.  
Genre, inherited from literary studies, is an important element in thinking of and 
analysing films. It is “a system of codes, conventions and visual styles which enables an 
audience to determine rapidly and with some complexity the kind of narrative they are 
viewing” (Turner 2006: 119).  For Kolker (2006), “to better understand genre, we need 
to create categories that are not only inclusive but also more definitive...that flesh out 
and individualize the master narratives and tell us the stories we like, with the variations 
and invention that keep them interesting” (p. 216). The idea of individuality which 
Kolker writes of is rapidly blurring, for as will be shown below, genres in Nollywood, 
though largely melodramatic (Haynes, 2000) and serialised (Adejunmobi, 2003) are 
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blurring the lines between one form and another as they tend to assume the elements of 
two or more genres throughout the narrative. Sources of Nollywood stories are mainly 
personal and communal experiences, folktales, myths, topical and contemporary issues 
(Alamu, 2010), and lately, modern novels (Haynes, 2007).  
This is similar to the Indian popular cinema sources which Ganti (2013) as well 
as  Pendakur (2003) highlights as deriving from “two main great epics – the Ramayana 
and the Mahabharata, while puranas, folktales, Jakata tales and modern novels are other 
sources for cinematic works” (p. 103). However, unlike most American films that last 
90 minutes and employ the three-act structure and Indian popular films that usually 
stretch into two and half to three hours with dances, songs, fights and romance, Nigerian 
films are serialised, like television dramas, with multiple instalments (1.5 hours each), 
use the story-within-story paradigm (sometimes effected through the flashback) with 
varying degrees of digression.  
In the sub-sections below, I describe the narrative techniques and film form 
under sub-headings: character and genre, setting and plot, instead of dealing with each 
element individually to avoid repetitions. Form and content are the two sides of a coin, 
and so what follows in this chapter is mainly the film form although that inevitably also 
reveals the content of the films. However, more attention is paid to the thematic 
contents in the next chapter.  
 
6.2 Discussions of Individual Films 
In this research, it is considered a fruitful exercise to discuss the film individually rather 
than collectively as the latter is likely to ignore certain important elements. Each film is 
an example of how the past is constructed and has its own narratives aesthetics, 
limitations and excesses to deliver about that past as well as the present. Indeed, as texts 
carry multiple meanings and their decoding is dependent on a host of factors including 
cultural backgrounds and experiences, I do not claim any exhaustive discussions of the 





6.3 Anini: Character and Genre  
The portrayal of the character of Lawrence Nomanyagbo Anini, a native of Orogho 
(then Bendel State) in the 2005 Nollywood production, Anini exemplifies the 
filmmakers’ deliberate construction of a government agency’s ‘funding’ of crime in 
addition to providing a new direction in filmmaking. The film director, Fred Amata, 
confirmed this in a statement which reflected the moments of change and transition in 
the film industry:  
At that time, we really didn’t know what films to make, what the best stories 
were. Some themes were bandied about and everything was tried in Nollywood. 
We were looking at Anini from his different challenges, from home, from his 
girlfriend and his different attachments to his people and all that until he 
becomes a criminal (personal communication, February 16, 2012).  
In support of the statement, Legemah affirmed that the production of Anini was a 
turning point not just for him as a filmmaking but also for the industry since it marked a 
new direction which distinguished it from the lot of predictable storylines available. The 
commendatory letter from the Censor’s Board was also indicative of the institution’s 
eagerness for newer productions that steered away from the routine, coming at a time 
when criticisms for the videos were rife. A tri-lingual – Bini (an indigenous Nigerian 
language), Pidgin and English – production without subtitles at the appropriate scenes to 
enable comprehension of the dialogue, the film actually starts from the end.  
The involvement of the deputy superintendent of police, George Iyamu, locates 
the film within the portrayal of a political past as defined above. This is precisely 
because Iyamu headed the anti-robbery squad of the Bendel State Police Command in 
1986, and effectively worked for the government. And, no other armed robber in 
Nigerian crime history has attracted the scale of attention including and especially the 
presidential attention which Anini drew (Marenin, 1987). This is line with earlier 
definitions of the political past which entails actions by governments and establishments 
set up by acts of the government as well as responses to events by the government of the 
day.  
The press in October 1986 reported that Anini shared the governance of the 
geographical territory that was Nigeria with General Ibrahim Babangida, the military 
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Head of State at that time (Marenin 1987). The film director also pointed this out while 
recognising the limitations of portraying Dodan Barracks the residence of the Head of 
State: If you know the Anini story, it was a national story. The President then, 
Babangida had to call and … his popular question then was, “where is Anini?” Ok, 
logistics of it, we couldn’t put it in the film (personal communication, February 16, 
2012). Olurode (2008) argues that Anini was nicknamed ‘The Law’ because of his 
ability to circumvent the police (and by extension the Head of State) after every robbery 
operation, but conventional wisdom revealed that ‘The Law’ was a self-conferred alias, 
which came before Anini was shot into limelight.  
In his characterisation, Legemah admitted that casting was rigorous because they 
wanted look-alikes so as to leave no doubts about the events and people he wanted to 
depict. As producer of the film, even he was auditioned for the role (George Iyamu) he 
played partly because of his physical resemblance to Iyamu. He recounts: 
If you have watched the movie, you will notice that all the actors had a 
resemblance with the character they played as the script was well 
researched. To tell you how thorough we were, I was auditioned for the 
role of Iyamu (personal communication, May 30, 2014) 
Prince Kingsley Eweka (aka Baba K) had a characteristic look and expression “full final 
fullstop” which he repeated when he needed to assert his authority and end any 
disagreement within the group of robbers. With a toothpick, which always stuck out 
from the left side of his mouth and his face cap worn backwards, he looked like a 
hoodlum instead of the prince that he was.  
Kingsley and Anini had the same goal although the former’s was less clear; they 
were primarily motivated by the desire to make a living. Anini had a scarf twisted and 
tied round his head with a knot in front. On Kingsley’s death, Anini subtly adopted his 
mentor’s dress, wearing his face with the visor backwards. Indeed Anini’s point of 
reference and mentor was Baba K to whom he referred when he needed to stress good 
managerial skills in the armed robbery business. After a bank robbery, he commented 
gleefully, “Baba K eh, him na thief o, but him own thief get respeeect...everything wey 
him de do, very careful” (loosely translated as ‘Baba K is a superior thief; he’s very 
careful in all he does’).   
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Anini’s upright position on a hospital bed provides a hint at the film genre. He 
was poised like someone eager to tell his life history with the introductory words: My 
name na (is) Anini. A medium shot revealed his amputated left leg, and from then on, 
the idea of a biopic became evident. Bonner (2013) identifies a biopic as that “genre of 
biographical film following some part of the life of one or more real persons” (p. 76), 
thus positioning the biopic as one way of constructing the past. The character of Anini 
is represented in red pyjamas on his hospital bed, which also gives a clue to the nature 
of the violent biopic. Lacey (2009) points out that “film directors may not consciously 
wish to make an expressive point with colour,” (p. 41) yet viewers could read meanings 
to the interaction of colours within a frame. The film follows infamous Anini’s teenage 
years to his state execution (an 11-year period) by firing squad. Anini confesses that he 
never planned to steal, a point to which I will return in the next chapter and then, the 
film cuts to his native home in a flashback that starts his story as a young boy, 
presumably a teenager, about to leave his parents for Benin City in search of a living. 
Biopics, like Anini, have documentary-like codes, with generous use of anchorage to 
guide the viewer through the historic moments being represented in the film. And as 
Kolker (2006) argued, genres in general “can be quite supple...[helping] the viewer 
negotiate with the film, promising to provide certain narrative structures and character 
types that the viewer finds satisfying” (p. 216).  
The narrative provides a glimpse of the character traits of the two gangs through 
which Anini operated (and subverted political power), something akin to one’s family 
of orientation and that of procreation. In the first gang, the armed robber was adopted by 
Kingsley, the gang leader. He becomes subservient to Kingsley after his ‘rite of 
initiation’ in a prison cell. Kingsley, the son of the Benin royal family, Eweka, calls the 
shot. He also deals directly with George Iyamu, the police officer responsible for 
supplying the gang with arms. Anini becomes Kingsley’s protégé until the latter is 
captured by the police force. Anini raises with difficulty a sum of N50,000 (£200) as 
bribe money to Iyamu for Kingsley’s release. Unfortunately, Kingsley is killed in spite 
of the ‘ransom’ paid. This infuriates Anini. Among this group of miscreants, there 
existed brotherliness – shown in their camaraderie – that made Anini work for his 
master’s release. It is ironical that such emotions exist among criminals, a factor I tie to 
the melodramatic property of the narrative, something which they shared with no one 
else. This sort of characterisation, motivated by the gang’s quest for survival, thrusts the 
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narrative forward without revealing any internal conflict within each member, not even 
of the protagonist. 
Anini is the only character that is fully developed in comparison to his gang. The 
biopic provides glimpses of the round character’s place of birth, family and future plans 
thus fulfilling the expectations of viewers as Kolker (2006) and Lacey (2009) observed. 
Every member of Anini’s gang was accounted for through the anchorage. This was 
unnecessary with Kingsley’s gang since the focus of the story is really on Anini. After 
Kingsley’s death, Anini constitutes another gang and before they begin operations, each 
one is introduced to the audience with biographical details as text on the screen. Anini’s 
sidekick, Monday Osunbor, is another look-alike of the real person who, through the 
text on the screen (anchorage), we know is a stammerer. This documentary evidence 
suggests and corroborates the research capacity of the film crew while simultaneously 
convincing the viewer of the narrative properties inherent in the biopic.  
 
6.3.1 Setting and Plot 
“Only one thing dey my mind” (There is only one thing on my mind). Anini revealed in 
his remorseful narrative that at the moment when he left his native home, there was only 
“one thing” on his mind. This piqued the interest of the audience who is left to guess at 
the “one thing.” The story begins at the end, moves to the beginning, the middle and 
rushes back to the end. Anini’s one thing upon relocation was presumably to eke out a 
living as portrayed in the exposition. The establishing shot of young Anini’s 
background reveals poverty. Medium shots announce his tattered clothes and unkempt 
appearance. Just before departing his parents’ home, he promises to supplement the 
family income by raising enough money from the trade he hoped to learn. When he 
eventually gets engaged in robbery, he laments that the money he makes services the 
corruption of the police, which presumably threatened his “one thing”. Subsequently, he 
establishes a supermarket in another city in order to make good the promise made to his 
parents. So while the subject of Anini’s “one thing” is never raised again in the 
narrative, it can be surmised that, as an elder son, he was intent on improving the lot of 
his poor family.  
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Anini was shot on location in different parts of Edo State particularly in Benin 
City where Lawrence Anini lived and operated from. It was set between 1979 and 1986, 
the moment from which Anini left his native home and when he was apprehended by 
the police. The desire to re-enact the look and feel of the past led the director to Benin 
in order to ensure audience suspension of disbelief. The crew must have begun working 
on the project in 2003 since Legemah revealed that the production took two years (the 
film was released in 2005). Anini also lived in Ibadan where he owned a supermarket, 
but that location was omitted in the film for budgetary reasons. Reference was only 
made to it through dialogues.  With a budget of N6.5m (£26,000), the producer could 
not afford to convey and sustain cast and crew to Ibadan from Benin, a distance of 
281km.  
The flashback as a narrative device is characteristic of Nigerian films, frequently 
deployed to tell back stories with the intention of re-connecting to the current narrative. 
It is a tacit convention of storytelling, initiated by a close-up of the reminiscing 
character and a blurred screen that heralds the technique. More advanced productions 
like Anini use the technique but dissolves subtly to the back story. The entire narrative 
is held together through a series of flashbacks interspersed with the image of Anini on 
his bed and his off-screen voice-overs when the scene cuts to the action being narrated.  
A similar but different technique to the flashback is the dream sequence used in 
Nigerian films to depict an omen, usually a bad one, from which a straight cut is used to 
depict the dreaming figure who is usually awakened from sleep (and sweating) by the 
dream. The Nigerian value system attaches importance to dreams which are believed to 
be used by dead ancestors to warn family members of impending dangers. With the rise 
of Pentecostalism in Nigeria and Ghana in the 1980s and especially the 1990s, such 
dreams were presented to religious pastors who were believed to possess the gift of 
interpreting them and arming the dreamer with requisite prayers to ward off dangers. 
The dream sequence has also remained a dominant narrative technique in Nigerian 
films.  
Another narrative technique deployed in Anini is foreshadowing. When Anini’s 
father warned him prior to his departure against associating with band gangs, “no join 
bad gang”, the viewer can assume that a gangster story is ahead. Foreshadows reveal 
hints of expected events or actions, which leave bits of clues for the audience and 
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enhance narrative coherence and closure. Foreshadowing is also evident in the quarrel 
among the gang members and later by Anini’s parents when his father warns his wife of 
the imminent danger in their home due to Anini’s sudden flamboyant lifestyle. Later, 
both parents are arrested and taken to an unknown destination. Further, Dis-is-me’s 
(Segun Arinze) death was prefigured moments before he was shot by Iyamu.  
We also hear the non-diegetic sound of Anini’s voice as he continues his 
narrative in a voice over while the audience sees Marcus and Anini on the screen being 
accompanied by the latter’s parents. The voice over continues through other scenes: his 
expulsion for theft from the mechanic workshop where he began his training with cars, 
talking about Baba K’s grasp of the business of armed robbery which ends in ‘thief na 
work; Baba K na manager (translated as ‘robbery is a profession and Kingsley is the 
manager’) Anini recognised a ‘leader’ in Kingsley. It was the latter’s death that turned 
the narrative into a ‘search and maim’ of the police. Anini’s voice over is suspended at 
this point until he is apprehended and shot in the leg by the police. Back in the hospital 
room from where the narrative began, he repents and asks the government’s forgiveness 
pledging to join the police and eradicate robbery in Bendel State if he is forgiven.  
Popular commentary is deployed in the narrative to enable the audience feel the 
pulse of the inhabitants of the areas where the armed robbers terrorised. At restaurants, 
ordinary citizens sat around tables and debated over Anini’s escapades. They told of his 
robbery operations thereby informing the audience of narrative bits that the camera 
could not or did not reveal. One particular scene pictured a group of men criticising the 
bandits at about the same moment when the gang drove into the same bar for a drink. It 
is through the non-diegetic sound of their voices while Anini and company drove in that 
the information on Anini’s threat to Bendel State and the federation is made known. The 
robbers killed and wounded those men. This served to tell the audience that the police 
was not the sole target of the gang’s actions. Innocent people were also victims of the 
gruesome years as if to sanction commentary on the robbers’ operations. It was also 
through the medium of popular commentary that Anini’s use of fetish charms spread 
like wild fire. The popularised opinion was that the robber possessed the capability of 
disappearing from a location when he sensed the police was near. It is not clear if his 
gang members had the same power, especially as they did not accompany him to the 
native doctor who concocted the potion Anini drank.  
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Owing to the media broadcasts during Anini’s operations in 1986, which critics 
concluded were significant contributors to the hero status conferred on Anini (Marenin, 
1987; Olurode, 2008), it seemed appropriate to extend the narrative in the film through 
radio and TV broadcasts. This occurred twice when a sum of N10,000 (£40) was placed 
on Anini’s head, and when Baba K and Kele were executed shortly after being nabbed 
by the police. A Bendel Broadcasting Service TV news reads: 
Good evening 
This is a government special announcement. 
A daredevil group of robbers have been terrifying Benin.  
Investigations have revealed this man Lawrence Anini as the leader of the gang 
A sum of N10,000 has been promised to anyone with information that can lead to the 
arrest of these hoodlums.  
The medium was also used to update the audience on the progress of the on-going 
police investigation except that the viewers of the broadcast are not known or seen, thus 
making that narrative technique stick out like a sore thumb. In spite of that, the 
technique revealed Amata’s desire to approximate the real life events depicted in the 
film. Lai Olurode’s book, The Story of Anini, and Marenin Otwin’s journal article 
mentioned above drew heavily from such media reports. 
A quick way of supplying information to the audience, advancing the plot and 
saving screen time is one of the functions of dialogue in this film. Fred Amata, the 
writer and film director, maintained that “Nigerians have a special gift of gab, so I 
needed to include a lot of dialogue in the script” (personal communication, February 
16, 2012). But beyond that, Amata has worked with theatre practitioners and was 
trained in Theatre Arts which seems to be another plausible explanation for his lengthy 
dialogues. As a major talking point for Nollywood critics, the question of excessive 
dialogue in an audio-visual medium is often greeted with harsh criticisms. It is 
invariably defended by the filmmakers but scarcely do they mount any other argument 
beyond the perceived loquacity of Nigerians and the theatre background which 
Nollywood owes its origins in part to. Emem Isong, writer and producer remarked, “We 
are a dialogue-based society.  We like to talk and we like drama. We have our way of 
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making films that is different from the European or the American. So do the Indians 
(who by the way like to sing!) this might not work for an American film but it does a 
Nigerian one.  That is what makes us Nollywood.” (E. Isong, personal communication, 
February 25, 2013) 
Through Anini’s parents’ dialogue, the controversy around his questionable 
source of income was made known in greater details. The audience also finds out 
through the same source that he had set up a supermarket in Ibadan, a south-western city 
and that he no longer stayed with his friend and mentor who took him to Benin in the 
first place. Narrations of separation and reunion are mainly revealed in the film through 
the gang and Anini’s parents. The film plods on through talk like Indian films, which 
Nayar (2008) regards as cultural products that “employ specific devices and motifs that 
are traditionally part of orally based storytelling” (p. 159). After major robbery 
operations which are not shown, the gangs (Kingsley’s and later, Anini’s) convene in a 
hide out to ‘tell the audience’ what transpired during the robbery operation. Those 
moments of talk were of information gathered from newspaper reports which Amata 
and Legemah had collected for the purpose of researching the characters’ lives (F. 
Amata, personal communication). Effectively, it was a conversation held among the 
robbers which had a celebratory character, but it primarily filled in the gaps for the 
viewers, and thus gave a sense of coherence that would otherwise leave audiences with 
questions if not disappointment. And when a member of the gang was absent from those 
celebratory periods, his return was greeted by additional comments on a robbery 
operation he was a part of. Such moments were also used to reward the most efficient of 
the group by way of praises as in Kingsley’s gang or monetary reward as done by Anini.  
These layers of dialogue were at once flaws and strengths in that they needlessly 
prolonged the scenes, but were also the filmmaker’s attempts at staying ‘faithful’ to the 
actual events being portrayed. 
As the protagonist, it is from Anini’s POV that the first 30 minutes of the story 
is unfolded before the audience. However, it is unclear at what point Anini’s 
recollections merge with that of the filmmaker. The police investigation scenes could 
not have been known to Anini. Shots of Anini’s image on the hospital bed interfere with 
the narrative in a continuous fashion until 25 minutes into the film. There, Anini stops 
narrating at the peak of his admiration for Kingsley. Furthermore, he could not have 
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been privy to what transpired between his parents, the police officers who were in 
search of him or the private lives of his gang members. This fusion of points of view 
contributed to the overall aesthetic of the film.  
The choices related to the mise-en-scene, editing, camera movement, color 
patterns, sound, and music were largely influenced by budgetary constraints already 
mentioned. The lighting is often low key when interior scenes are shot, thus creating a 
sombre feel among the gangs. This is with the exception of the police station. With only 
one camera to shoot, the director noted that there were multiple challenges outside his 
control. Sometimes, there were scenes that had two sound tracks at the same time with 
both struggling to out-do each other and to stifle the dialogue. Amata made excuses for 
the technical problems of the film by appealing to a mediocre culture in Nigeria. He 
said: 
We are evolving; Nollywood is evolving ... You know we can justify a lot 
of things, argue positions and assertions, but truthfully, at that time in 
the life of Nollywood, we were like adventurers. Film is a reflection of 
the environment. Everything generally in the society is sub-standard: 
education, transportation. It’s not a matter of accepting mediocrity; it’s 
a matter of mediocrity coming from mediocrity (personal 
communication, February 16, 2012).  
Anini had a montage of sorts when the police killed Baba Kingsley. This was portrayed 
through Anini’s POV. Amata made a montage by editing several previously seen shots 
of Kingsley which seemed to celebrate the slain character. He boasted about 
popularising the technique after he used it in several other films of his.  
As a trained filmmaker, Amata said he was proud of his achievements with 
Anini. The narrative techniques in the film are indicative of the period in which the film 
was made, a period in which as revealed by Amata, “filmmakers were in transition and 
were looking for a filming voice” (personal communication, February 16, 2012). Apart 
from the ‘fetishization’ of story-telling earlier mentioned, Amata’s views are indicative 
of an experimental moment in Nollywood. That is, the fresh attempts by filmmakers to 
tell unique stories without references to the occult. Amata also revealed how his 
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favourite technique, a montage of previous shots, depicted not a compression of time, 
but the psychological state of a bereaved Anini. Two points are necessary here.  
The first is a foreshadowing of Anini’s point of reference in the second 
instalment of the film. Throughout the second part of the film, Anini makes reference to 
Kingsley’s leadership and administration of the robbery business in a tone that seems to 
suggest hero-conferral. There too, while dealing with the loss of his leader, he vows to 
avenge him, one who by societal mores was a threat to national security. The second is 
that by enumerating five other films in which the technique was used, Amata alluded to 
the supremacy of the technique over the story, a point which Ekwuazi (1991, 2000) 
repeatedly makes. It is not the story, it appears, that dictates the style of editing in 
Amata’s and mostly other Nollywood directors, but the ‘successful’ editing styles that 
are imposed.   
 
6.4 Battle of Love and Across the Niger: Character and Genre 
Okoye (2007a) referred to Battle of Love as a video of nationalism, while Akpuda 
(2009) reviewed it as an African war film. These labels adequately express the genre of 
Battle of Love and Across the Niger reveal how shifty generic labelling can be 
(depending on the spectator and his purposes) although the concepts of nationalism and 
war are not too far removed from discourse on African (Nigerian) politics.  Writing in 
another context in which he compares Battle of Love with another film Laraba, Okoye 
(2007a) claims that the films “provide one continuous narrative of Nigeria’s political 
and social history from the hostilities of the war era to the ethnic-related disturbances of 
the present.” (p. 5) This suggests that the film also has the features of a historical film 
even though, again, he notes “they neither directly chronicle the actual events of the war 
nor offer cold facts about its causes, players or highlights, they articulate a position 
towards social and historical reconstruction that is experiential and humanist on the one 
hand, and popular and ideological on the other (p. 6)”.   
Both Battle of Love and Across the Niger share war motifs and icons such as 
open fire exchanges, deaths, military parades, fighting and torture, sexual and verbal 
assault, images of high mobility, displacements and family separation. Similar to Love 
in Vendetta (1987), analysed by Ugochukwu (2014), the films use anchorage (and later 
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on dialogue, even soliloquy) to cue the reader into the historical setting of the film. This 
partly fills in a bit of contextual data without which the film will be lost on the viewer. 
But the anchorage also performs a disservice to the entire film because as Ugochukwu 
noted, “once this prologue is done with, the film will neither make any reference to it, 
nor explain the reason ...” (p. 129) behind the representation. Filmmakers agreed that 
the cost of staging a period piece with a full-fledged war apparatus is huge, often out of 
their reach, and so they are compelled to limit themselves to their economic possibilities 
(personal communication, Amata, Ogoro, Iregbu, Egborge), which often appear in the 
form of text: oral or written.  
If the icons listed above reveal the genre as war films, and genres are a paradigm 
that producers and audiences understand (Lacey, 2009), then the second half of Across 
the Niger sits within the melodrama category. Attention shifts to the domestic and the 
personal, and remains there till the last scene when the nationalist agenda is evoked like 
an epilogue. This latter part of the film presents four individuals, two of whom struggle 
to win lovers. The historical agenda is suspended to “knit the viewers’ gaze within the 
narrative space...emphasizing glances, faces, hands...to mold the vierwers’ response into 
a narrative flow of despair, loss, anxiety, hope and eventual triumph suffered or 
instigated mainly by women” (Kolker, 2006: 233) in a melodramatic gesture similar to 
Hotel Rwanda (2004). Amidst the violent representations of the Hutu killings of 
minority Tutsis, Paul’s relationship with his wife and a hotel worker’s escapades with 
women find narrative space in director, Terry George’s Rwanda.  
Characterisation in the two films lacks depth. The film opens with a wide shot of 
a Hausa traditional wedding, with half-dressed men gyrating to the sound of drums that 
takes over the opening credits’ music. The shot zooms to a richly-attired Igbo man and 
an equally well-dressed Hausa lady. In this first encounter with the protagonists, Dubem 
and Rekia, with its accompanying background information, the narrative is set in 
motion as an inter-ethnic love story set against a fragile moment in Nigerian history, 
15th January 1966, as the anchorage reads on the screen. Observing the importance of 
the domestic in Nollywood film, Alamu (2010) “states the family has been a major 
focus of Nollywood films” (p. 167).Worthy of note therefore in this important event in 
the life of an Igbo man, is the absence of his parents, who are later revealed as royalty, 
probably due to their disapproval of the union. It is only in the second instalment, 
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Across the Niger, that the viewer gets a glimpse of Dubem’s family background – his 
mother was killed in the war; a maiden is being groomed for him to marry upon his 
return. Surprisingly too, Rekia’s parents are absent at the wedding. It is only later in the 
film that we meet Rekia’s mother. There is no father. Dubem and Rekia supposedly 
round characters with expected emotional and psychological developments resulting in 
change are treated as mere flat characters.  
Nollywood’s penchant for naming characters along ethnic origins, and making 
such characters assume the language of the persona being portrayed, that is if the actor 
(Kanayo O. Kanayo) is not Igbo (Dubem) is well-known. In this case, he is. This 
discussion is extended below under Stubborn Grasshopper. The important point to note 
is that, until the war breaks out, Dubem has no motivation. Nothing else is known about 
the soldier until he is set to flee the north, leaving behind his newly-wed. His fleeing 
companions, though known actors such as Ramsey Nouah, remain anonymous Igbo 
soldiers. Only at Nouah’s death (43 minutes into the film) does the viewer learn his 
name is Chidi.   
 
6.4.1 Setting and Plot 
Nigerian filmmakers tend to use historical events to frame stories that are considered 
more acceptable to their audiences. This was the case in Love in Vendetta as argued by 
Ugochukwu (2014), which is similar to the story-within-a-story narrative paradigm. 
Such metanarratives tell two or more stories concurrently with one being acted out by 
the characters and the other(s) embedded in the dialogues. They adopt a similar setting 
to the historical narrative they envision, and weave a plot around that setting while 
hesitantly negotiating history in a gesture similar to a Spanish bullfighter’s antics. “In 
The Battle of Love, the sounds of actual warfare frame and underscore the actions of the 
film, but the war does not in itself constitute the main plot of the narrative” (Okoye 
2007a: 6). While Battle of Love was set in Middle Belt Jos (near the centre of Nigeria), 
Across the Niger was set in the southeast city of Enugu although it also has the 
geographical features of a road movie owing to the fleeing easterners from the north 
travelling several hundred kilometres southwards (which took up two-thirds of Across 
the Niger). This is curious as the ethnic conflicts that led to the war did not begin in Jos, 
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but in northern cities of Kaduna and Kano. Every stop-over by the travellers produced a 
unique sort of danger to the travellers, which they have to overcome before continuing. 
They are shot at by Nigerian soldiers represented in low angle shots thus signifying 
their power; attacked by snakes, harassed by vigilante groups, and made to wade 
through rivers. Igbo, Hausa and English are spoken by the characters, depending on 
their location to prevent being taken as spies. The story is narrated from a multi-person 
perspective: Dubem, Rekia, Bako and an omniscient POV.  
With a chronological structure (except for one major flashback), Battle of Love 
tells the story, set in 1967 ‘northern’ Nigeria, of a senior Igbo soldier, Dubem (Kanayo 
O. Kanayo aka KOK) who falls in love with and marries a Hausa lady, Rekia at an 
elaborate traditional party. Unknown to Dubem, Rekia was betrothed to Bako (Segun 
Arinze) who appears during the wedding ceremony to claim his love. Both men are 
soldiers, the senior being Dubem. Although Rekia rejects Bako, Dubem’s ego is 
wounded by Bako’s rivalry and advances to his bride. A fight ensues and the loser, 
Bako, promises revenge before being whisked away by his senior colleague’s aides. 
This scene foreshadows the conflict which later unfolds between the Hausa and Igbo 
protagonists. It also casts a glimpse at the two major ethnic groups at loggerheads in the 
civil war, which are embodied in Dubem (Igbo and representing Ojukwu) and Bako 
(Hausa and representing Gowon).  Ojukwu and Gowon were the Heads of Biafra and 
Nigeria respectively – the warring factions.  
There is a symbolic representation in the image of Rekia, the sought-after object 
of Dubem and Bako’s desire, who both men struggle for. Each contender has to conquer 
the bride, a symbolic depiction of Nigeria, the fatherland that the opponents ardently 
wish to own yet have to struggle for, flee from and return to. Rekia, the cause of the 
tension between Dubem and Bako goes through difficulties herself, but has to reconcile 
both men for personal and collective good. She is symbolically tormented, abandoned 
by the transporter taking her in search of her husband, raped by marauding hoodlums 
and wounded by a bullet aimed at her husband, Dubem. Rekia’s predicament is 
evocative of the ravaged Nigerian land. The destructions of the war left rivers polluted 
by corpses, houses and offices razed down, farmlands less arable. Indeed, Rekia has no 
moment of respite just as the country itself had none during the war years. Emerging 
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from the throes of childbirth, and bringing forth a son, which signifies hope for the war-
torn country, Rekia has to contend with more losses, notably the death of her husband.  
The patriarchal Nigerian society cherishes male children, over and above 
females. Thus, necessitating the announcement of the sex of the child, “ït’s a boy”. At 
this announcement, the film cuts to Rekia, on the floor, regaining her composure and 
groping for her husband, who lies lifeless on the ground. Her provision of an heir to the 
throne seemingly secures her place within the royal family, but so fragile and insecure 
are her hope and future that its realisation (and the simultaneous realisation of her 
husband’s death) elicits a yell. The scene is such a powerful one that reveals the 
intention of the filmmaker, to call for hope. After Rekia’s yelling, the silence and 
expectancy that follow leads to Ogoro’s ultimate point: you can win a battle without 
going to war if you dialogue and listen to one another (personal communication, 
August 29, 2013). This is akin to town criers in African traditional societies who bear 
important messages from a king’s palace. They use a metallic gong to ‘yell’ at the 
inhabitants of the village who run out of their homes to listen to an all-important 
message. When the gong falls silent, the message is delivered with warnings or 
sanctions in the event of non-conformity. This is in consonance with Nigerian 
storytelling which “reinforce the collective mentality of Nigerian society, educating 
large audiences along certain established lines: developing collective memories of the 
past, maintaining a distance from the threatening present, and projecting life in the 
future” (Alamu, 2010: 166). That yell then leads directly to the sermon delivered by the 
king on the importance of Nigeria’s unity. 
Another narrative technique is the use of a back story which manages to thrust 
the story forward, but it is not without loopholes. The bitterness harboured in those 
years of the civil war ran deep. Hausa nepotism was blatant, and had much to do with 
containing the perceived dominance of the Igbos in a manner similar to the Hutus’ 
attempts at clipping Tutsi wings in 1994 Rwanda. Hausas came to hate the Igbos and 
vice versa on the strength of the killings that their kinsmen had undergone in the 
respective locations (Gbulie, 1981). It was therefore unconvincing that a mere recalling 
of a childhood play between Rekia and Bako was sufficient to change Bako’s mind 
completely towards his sworn enemy, Dubem, and even motivate the former to 
orchestrate Dubem’s escape from prison and execution.  Rather than try to depict real 
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possibilities of the period, the filmmaker injected the reason why he made the film in 
the first place which dwells on the ideas of hope, reconciliation and unity. It was 
therefore congruent with his agenda, without necessarily being a realistic portrayal of 
the period, to present Bako, formerly a cruel and vindictive soldier, as the helper who 
risks his life and military career in order to assist a ‘Biafran spy’ escape the custody of 
the Nigerian army. Several other scenes in the films use memory sequences (when a 
character remembers a point/another character and acts on that memory) through the 
dissolve to justify causality thus admitting a measure of coherence, even if narrative 
flaws inadvertently occur.  The dissolve, a continuity editing technique, which 
according to Lacey (2009) “suggests the passage of time or expressively links two 
scenes” (p. 57) was repeatedly employed to reveal the interior state of fear of the 
protagonists. Such techniques in Battle of Love and Across the Niger linked two scenes 
in a remote cause and effect narrative flow. Dubem and Rekia remembered their 
precarious marital situation at different moments; the former sadly for their refugee 
status and the other fearfully.  
 
6.5 Oil Village: Character and Genre 
Oil Village is included in this chapter as a construction of a political and politicised 
year, 1995, for the reason that it addresses in a fictionalised way, a shadow of the Ken-
Saro Wiwa story. As Mbembe (1997) argues, “the power to represent reality...implied 
that one was having recourse to...imagination, even fabrication that consisted in clothing 
the signs with appearances of the thing of which they were precisely the metaphor” (p. 
153). The protest film is a thin representation of repression and injustice with images 
that evoked popular agitation, which fell on deaf elite ears. The subtlety with which 
director Kalu Anya and producer Sam Onwuka worked grew out of the insecurity of 
cultural producers operating in conditions of gross inequality between the state and the 
people. Were it not for the Censors Board and the repressive tendencies of the 
government, the filmmakers will have been more direct in their representation of the 
story (S. Onwuka, personal communication, October 16, 2013). Writing about the 
aesthetics of Nigerian film, Larkin (2008) argues that they “draw on the sides of African 
life that were downplayed in the colonial period, in the nationalist era of independence 
and in the discursive concept of African cinema” (p. 171). Oil Village is a trope of long-
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suppressed underdogs framed in the image of a popular social crusader to interrogate 
the inadequacies of contemporary life among rulers and subjects in the Niger Delta.   
Ken Saro-Wiwa was an environmental activist clamouring for better 
representativeness in the management of the oil resources in Ogoni land, a small 
community in Rivers State on the coast of the Gulf of Guinea. Ogoni and indeed the 
entire south-south region, is embodied in Bayama community. The film has two key 
features: meetings and protests. Every scene was either a meeting to celebrate political 
actions and ineptitude by the community chiefs or a protest by the community youth, 
and in some scenes, both blended to underline the filmmaker’s call to action: ‘Wake up 
and fight, Bayama!’ which was the theme song of the film. Thus, the film “wages a 
political critique through the language of melodrama” (Larkin, 2008: 182) and 
stereotypical characterization. George (Nnamdi Eze), leader of the youth group in 
Bayama plays the lead role and Saro-Wiwa’s character, who is executed by hanging 
following a questionable judicial sentence by a military tribunal handpicked by General 
Sani Abacha (Gen Abas). UP Oil is Shell, as Kalu Anya revealed to me in an interview 
(K. Anya, personal communication, February 20, 2012). Eze has also played the lead 
role in similar protest films depicting Niger Delta crises (Agina, 2013).  
The film is melodramatic. Kolker (2006) writes of melodrama as a genre that 
expressed rewards for virtues and punishment for crime, combines the personal with the 
political...while expressing other ideals of “self-sacrifice for the cause of others... and 
the strenuous pursuit of freedom from oppression” (p. 218). It shares the conventions of 
exaggerated emotions, employs lively music, partly a call to moral action and depicts 
some excesses among the chiefs to hook in and infuriate the audience (Larkin, 2008). It 
provides humour to defuse the atrocious actions of the community chiefs such as 
dispossessing indigenes of huge plots of land and distributing a bag of salt among many 
land owners in recompense. Oil Village is also every inch a protest film which can be 
discerned first from the title and then through wide shots of the delta waters, oil pipes, 
installations, polluted plots of land, hungry and sad faces of indigenes. The title of the 
film connotes a country’s rich natural resources, so big as to generate three-quarters of 
national income. But the title ‘village’ (small, rural, rustic) contrasts immediately with 
the immensity that ‘oil’ evokes (at least in Nigeria). The thematic and aesthetic choices 
in the film are determined not only by the happenings in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, 
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but also in all postcolonial African states. Oil Village thus conveys in Alamu’s (2010) 
thoughts “the intense feeling that urbanization and industrialization have created an 
excessively volatile and unstable Nigerian society” (p. 167). Further, the Head of State, 
Abacha (Sam Obeakheme) features when a Shell Oil worker is killed by the angry 
youth, thus alluding to the point made earlier on the ‘strength’ of violence to attract 
official attention (Barber, 1987).  
Like many Nollywood films, characterisation is shallow. The main actors seem 
insufficiently motivated, without a ‘life’ outside the visible parts of the unfolding 
narrative. It not clear what families the characters belong to, what jobs they do, what 
schools, if any, they attend. George runs out of a modest bungalow, dressed in simple 
clothes, when he is needed to fight for the youth, and when the action is over, he is not 
seen again. The chiefs live in semi-posh houses, are richly-clad in traditional outfits, 
drive cars and binge on meat and beer. Speaking often about money, the evidence of 
which their houses and personal effects demonstrate, we neither see an office nor the 
transaction of licit business. In spite of this flaw, the film manages to carve out 
historical detail in what Ugochukwu (2014) refers to as an “unusual treatment of 
history” (p. 130). Without anchorage, a prologue or an epilogue, the viewer is left to 
decode the signs and subtexts that point to the historical figures of Saro-Wiwa and 
Abacha, the latter easily achieved due to the signifying presence of military uniforms 
and sunglasses typical of Abacha. 
 
6.5.1 Setting and Plot 
Oil Village, which is pre-occupied with a national historical subject, is a 2-part 2001 
Nollywood film that tracks the long-standing battle between inhabitants of a fictional 
Bayama community in the Niger Delta region, the federal government and the oil 
prospecting multinational Shell (represented by Cliff and Wilson in UP Oil). The 
Bayama youth forum representing the community is aggrieved over the incessant 
plunder of their plots land with no accruing compensation. The village chiefs meet with 
executives of the oil companies at regular intervals to seal business deals. The monies 
remitted to the local chiefs for the development of Bayama people and their fatherland 
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is siphoned and directed to personal aggrandisement. It is not surprising that the 
community incites a youth protest and gunplay which results in multiple deaths. 
Shot on location in parts of Imo State (Naze, Oguta, Nnebukwu, Mgbele and 
Orsu), Oil Village has similar characteristics in terms of location with Stubborn 
Grasshopper. It was revealed to me during an interview with Simi Opeoluwa, director, 
Stubborn Grasshopper, that Sam Onwuka the producer of both films was capable of 
shooting two movies at the same time and on the same set. Having written both stories 
before going on location, similar scenes or those that required the same actors were shot 
in repeated takes especially if such actors had to appear as uniformed men. That strategy 
was undoubtedly a cost-saving measure. It is, however, impossible to tell at this point 
how such actors responded to such shooting demands. This is because Opeoluwa, when 
prodded, declined making further comments on the practice (S. Opeoluwa, personal 
communication, July 7, 2014).  
The film has a rural setting with its rustic look and thick vegetation, both 
features of the towns mentioned above. But that does not affect the national significance 
of its subject. It is expository in style and its historicity is strengthened by the brief 
feature of a former Head of State (Gen. Sani Abacha) who is called Gen. Abas in the 
filmic narrative. Without doubt, the themes of greed and corruption rather than 
militancy are flagged. Only once is the supernatural played up to indicate the supremacy 
of integrity over the rapacity of Bayama chiefs. But this is one out of the many 
perspectives from which the beleaguered Niger Delta region has been examined.  Such 
films provide viewers the mental hooks on which to hang the memories of historical 
people, national and regional events and protest movements.  
The town crier, informant and bearer of the king’s message – delivered in Pidgin 
– brings to the attention of the inhabitants the resolutions from the Council of Chiefs’ 
various meetings either with the oil company, UP Oil or among its members. This 
narrative technique opened up for viewers as well as for Bayama indigenes the 
negotiation and decision making spaces that they were not privileged to have been part 
of. It also revealed the derisive reactions of the local inhabitants to such announcements.  
Public protests revealed the dissatisfaction of the youth of Bayama. They were 
excluded from every negotiation with the oil company. The king addresses the people 
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first before asking them what their problems were. One would have thought that he 
would seek to hear their problems first before any address (even though his address was 
brief). When fellow youths were killed, the king told them to make arrangements for 
their burial...not promising any aid save palace representation. It is not clear if that 
implies financial assistance as well. In spite of the public and peaceful protests, the king 
was seen to be distanced from his subjects by addressing the dead as ‘your colleagues’ 
rather than the typical ‘our people’  
Because of its rural setting and characters, the film adopts the use of proverbs, a 
well-documented form of African oral tradition in the dialogues. In a critical sense, the 
use of proverbs in Nigerian films and particularly in Oil Village draws on the historical 
and linguistic tradition of African oratory. Nigerian, like Indian films are talky. Nayar 
(2008), writing about Bollywood’s oral contours notes that “nothing exists within a 
character that is not said” (p. 165). And it is not only the words or the speaker that 
matters, but the style of telling, the linguistic codes, some of which are repeated below:  
 A single finger cannot pick the lice from your head (at the first youth protest).  
He who the cap fits, let him wear it. It is a question of trying to make yourself 
comfortable with your position (when Mbolo was eating voraciously).  
Let me tell you, you crab who is comfortable with cool water will soon find out the 
difference between cool and hot water (when Osaro rejected the N50m in the presence 
of the chiefs).  
Your Highness, no right thinking man dares to touch the tail of a living lion, no one 
(when three youths were killed and were taken to the palace) 
Nayar (2008) contends that while some critics may discredit such pithy sayings 
as sticking to tradition, appealing to clichés and therefore bereft of originality, such 
expressions are in fact original because they are not “housed in personal admittances or 
intimate confessions, but in publicly shared truths or memories...in forms of utterances 
that are guarded against change because they render knowledge easily transportable” (p. 
165). Elsewhere, Fabian (1997) argues that “popular culture owes its existence to highly 
creative and original processes” (p. 18), which reminds in a different way of Barber’s 
(1987) description of popular arts as syncretic, expressive and inclusive.  
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Several dialogic strands are used to repeat the message “Wake up and fight, 
Bayama”. The soundtrack of the film is itself a narrative on its own, half-accompanying 
and half-completing the unfolding visual images on the screen. Ekwuazi cited in Agina 
(2011) commented on the soundtrack of Nigerian films, writing that they often lack 
creativity because of the way they are rendered.  However, Kolker (2006) reminds that 
in melodrama, “music provokes the emotions and made connections between what the 
characters on the screen and the viewers in the audience were supposed to be feeling” 
(p.218). 
Magical realism and recourse to the supernatural is invoked when Osaro was 
shot in his house in an assassination ploy by the chiefs. The bullets bounced off his 
body without piercing it. He denies any mystical powers, and says to his assailants 
“when a person is fighting a just cause, God in his infinite mercies will give such a 
person divine protection.” This sort of deus ex machina is common in Nollywood 
(Adejunmobi, 2003), often criticised for its lack of creative resolution to problems. 
Turner (2006) rightly claims that “a film which arbitrarily ushers in a solution without 
the support of a generic convention or without foreshadowing is in danger of offending 
and irritating audiences” (p. 121). But the technique is also justified by filmmakers as 
the presence of God among Christian believers, which is prevalent in Nigeria, and 
which the camera has no other way of depicting (K. Anya, personal communication, 
February 20, 2012). 
Again, Oil Village adopts the omniscient perspective, providing information 
known only to the specific characters concerned with the action and dialogue of each 
particular scene. The chiefs have no knowledge of the youth forum discussions and vice 
versa.  
 
6.6 Stubborn Grasshopper: Character and Genre 
An interesting parody in its shades of politics, ethnicity, democracy and history, 
Stubborn Grasshopper speaks to its audience of the political highlights of the period 
between June 12, 1993 and June 8, 1998: national elections and Gen. Abacha’s death 
respectively. In his writing on Indian cinema, Nandy (2008) points out that “the popular 
cinema is the slum’s point of view of Indian politics and society and, for that matter, the 
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world” (p. 74). Nandy’s ‘slum’ is in fact a metaphor for Barber’s ‘people’, those who 
are systematically denied access to the official channels of communication, the lower 
middle-class, Okome’s (2003) urban sub-altern (taken from Gayatri Spivak’s famous 
1988 essay Can the Subaltern Speak?) and those who “propel both the engine of civic 
life in Third World society and the ambitions of its modernizing elite” (Nandy, ibid.) 
Here too, character stereotyping is deployed. The protagonist, Sam Obeakheme 
(Alba), portrays Abacha’s role in Oil Village. As Mbembe (1997) opines, “the image is 
never an exact copy of reality...it is always a conventional comment, the transcription of 
a reality...into a visible code, which becomes in turn a manner of speaking of the world 
and inhabiting it” (p. 152). In Stubborn Grasshopper, Obeakheme (Alba) and his 
cohorts take on the accents of the ethnic groups (particularly Hausa and Yoruba) they 
represented with the exception of Gen. Babangida’s character, Badmas, who 
surprisingly spoke with a marked Igbo accent, probably because his role was only 
marginal. He featured only in the first 25 minutes of the 3-hour film, and often 
represented in a low-angle shot. Also represented in low angle shots is the figure of 
Alba, the dictator.  
Scholarly opinion on Babangida’s role in the film admits that the film was 
“surprisingly sympathetic to Ibrahim Babangida” (Haynes 2006: 528), but that seems to 
contradict the notion of causality in narratives. Babangida’s character, Gen Badmas, or 
at least his (in)action, was the catalyst that drove the story in its direction. I argue that 
the film was unsympathetic to his character because had he not annulled the election 
and stepped aside, his junior colleague, Alba, would not have stepped in forcefully – a 
detail the filmmaker did not want viewers to miss. Given the inordinate ambition of 
Alba, he probably would have sought power at all costs despite Badmas’s pleas. But, 
the low angle shots through which Badmas was portrayed conferred a superior position 
on him, and as one capable of exerting influence on others. Further, Badmas’ complicity 
just as Chief Nze’s and Alba’s was dramatised with equal determination, and within the 
boundaries of the resources available to the producer.  
Mbembe (1997) reminds us that in representation, “what was important was the 
capacity of the thing represented to mirror resemblances” (p. 152). Therefore, the 
echoing of characters and voices in Stubborn Grasshopper leaves no doubt as to the 
events and people being mirrored.  The images hold up their referents with admirable 
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and historical clarity. The characters seem but are not well motivated, and the drama 
plods on in a chronological order up until Abacha’s death which is one of the main 
points the filmmaker wanted to make. Gen Alba, the lead character in this film is not a 
fully developed character, yet his motivations, thoughts and actions are revealed with 
trenchant criticism. The character flaws, inordinate ambition and sexual desire, which 
lead to his ultimate downfall, was played up relentlessly and I daresay, remarkably. 
Else, how could those years of brutality have ended without this hamartia? His 
obstinacy from which the film title was derived, and to which further attention is drawn 
in the next chapter, had plunged the country he led into the throes of economic and 
political instability. At the dictator’s death, popular opinion described it as a “coup from 
heaven” (in Maier, 2000:1) 
It is difficult to determine with exactitude which film genre Stubborn 
Grasshopper is because it combines the features of docudrama, melodrama, biopic and 
historical drama. It does not nearly exhaust the features of any one genre yet it displays 
with varying degrees of success, certain characteristics of each. Ebbrecht (2007) points 
out that the genre of docudrama posseses “extra-textual features that underline the social 
importance of political or historical topics and discourses...” (p. 39). Although Stubborn 
Grasshopper possesses no “extra-textual features”, yet its ‘documentary’ properties are 
palpable. The facts of Abacha’s private and public life are provided: ascent to power, oil 
deals, marital and extra-marital relationships, relationships with politicians and so on. 
Even some details of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections are projected. In an 
interview with the producer, he confided his intentions were to tell Nigerians the truth 
about Abacha at a time of copious conflicting reports (S. Onwuka, personal 
communication, October 16, 2013). Arguably, the filmmaker’s opening disclaimers “all 
resemblance to persons living or dead is unintended” do not discredit the documentary-
like features of the film, thus affirming Kolker’s (2006) point which reminds us that 
“popular culture appears to be in a steady state of assertion and denial, of claiming the 
importance of what is shown and then denying that it really means anything” (p. 187). 
In fact, in the screening of this film before post-graduate students, some of them walked 




Further, Haynes (2006) observes that the second part of the film fits more 
closely the melodramatic genre since it focuses on the protagonist’s domestic affairs. 
Writing about Indian popular cinema, Vasudevan (2011) lists the properties of 
melodrama as “emphasis on loss of family, of community, and the difficulties of 
achieving romantic fulfilment, and an exhibited high contrivance in narrative 
mechanisms...” (p. 10). By exhibiting melodramatic features such as fusing the excesses 
of Abacha’s private and public life with fast-paced music, it simultaneously slips into 
the ‘biopic’ genre, when he was at the helm of affairs of the Nigerian State. Kolker 
(2006) maintains that the “melodrama can be understood as an overarching narrative 
form that controls all films that aren’t comedies” (p. 232). So, while it cannot be denied 
that Sam Onwuka and Simi Opeoluwa plunged into the political past to cart away the 
details represented in the film, it is obvious that the defining elements of several genres 
are at work. The film also employs mimetic conventions that provoke laughter and 
ridicule without wholly belonging to comedy. Although Stubborn Grasshopper does not 
provide accurate descriptions of places and dates, neither through its camera work nor 
dialogue, it has in the words of Haynes (2006) remained as close as possible to history: 
but in general all the twists and turns of the history of the regime are 
represented faithfully and in detail, from the bloody suppression of the 
rioting in Lagos after the annulment to the forced resignation of the head 
of the Interim National Government, the violated understanding with 
Abiola, the assassinations of Kudirat Abiola and NADECO leaders, the 
arrests of Generals Diya and Yar’Adua, and so on. The film sticks close 
to the historical record in so far as it has been established, and otherwise, 
in cases where certitude is impossible or has not yet been established, it 
follows common assumptions and speculations that must not be more 
extraordinary than the truth (p. 527). ` 
 
6.6.1 Setting and Plot 
Majority of the events depicted in the film occurred in Lagos, South West Nigeria, but 
the film was shot in Owerri, South East Nigeria for security reasons. The producers 
feared that shooting in the west, the south west or north had the potential of truncating 
the production schedules because as Neville Ossai, production manager revealed to me 
“the military guys were still around and we did not want anybody to disturb us” 
(personal communication, March 23, 2013). 
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Dialogue like in other Nigerian films, and as stated above, is a key technique for 
supplying information to the audience and taking forward the sequence of (in)actions in 
the narrative. The film Stubborn Grasshopper is no exception. Dialogue between 
characters Alba and Badmas, Badmas and security officer, indeed, between and among 
characters was frequently tainted with ethnic colourations. I add the well-utilised vox 
populi to the strategy under dialogue since it is a form of conversation aimed at 
achieving the same purpose of narrative advancement, the difference being with the 
nature and orientation of the addressee. Sam Onwuka and Simi Opeoluwa, producer and 
director respectively, wanted to express the opinions of the populace which is why the 
vox populi was introduced. Haynes (2006) notes that the first part of the film deployed 
an “elaborate apparatus for measuring public opinion”, but not the second perhaps 
because “public opinion had reached the point of utter disgust but also of helpless 
impotence in the face of the regime’s willingness to shed blood” (p. 528). The 
filmmaker did not spare the audience the details of Abacha’s (Alba) private life, 
although that did not elicit any commentary from the populace in the film. 
Like in Anini, narrative advancement is achieved through the media. Television 
broadcasts are used to announce election results and later its annulment. The national 
newspaper, The Punch, with caption “PETROLEUM MINISTER SACKED FOR 
INEFFICIENCY” (53:20minutes) serves to reveal Alba’s wanton appointments and 
dismissal. In this particular case, soon after the minister tries to reason with the Head of 
State on the rationale behind sending petrol to other African countries when there were 
long queues in Nigerian petrol stations, he is relieved of his appointment. Although the 
newspaper caption serves its purpose, it betrays an anachronistic entry since the story 
unfolding is between 1993 and 1998. On the same 2003 newspaper, another caption 
reads “governors spent derivation fund on 2003 campaign. Before 1998, Nigerians were 
not even sure that another election was going to take place, let alone a campaign. In 
fact, it was unthinkable at that time due to the ruthless dictatorship of the political 
helmsman. Upon assuming office, Abacha ensured that governors were sacked and civil 
formations were abrogated. There were only military administrators.  
The film is a mimetic presentation of Nigeria (its military government and its 
ethnic chauvinism) through the language of satire. It claims, in its opening, an 
unintended and fictional portrayal of the events depicted in the film, but as Sam 
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Onwuka noted, it was a strategy to escape the sledge hammer of the Censors Board 
(personal communication, October 16, 2013). Stubborn Grasshopper also adopts a strip 
of comedy to ease the tensions related to the task of the telling, a telling which was 
gruesome as it was menacing. Alba had an elocution trainer to brush up his English 
pronunciations which were heavily accented by his Hausa. After a couple of attempts, 
Alba dismisses the trainer with a wave of hand suggestive of his carefree attitude to 
matters of grave importance. Finally, the film also adopts an omniscient narrative point 
of view, supplying information which were previously generally known but now 
directed at a mass audience, presented with ‘insider-precision’.    
 
6.7 Half of a Yellow Sun: Character and Genre 
Directed by Biyi Bandele, a UK-based Nigerian theatre director, Half of a Yellow Sun 
(HOAYS hereafter) was his debut feature film on an $8m budget, a huge amount by 
Nigerian filmmaking standards. The historical drama, an adaptation of Chimamanda 
Adichie’s novel ‘Half of a Yellow Sun’, will be treated for the purposes of this study, 
solely as another film rather than its fidelity (or not) to the novel. This is a strategy that 
places all the films discussed on equal terms: as constructions of a political past and in 
this instance, a portrayal of 1960-1970 Nigeria.  
Bandele’s protagonist, Olanna (Thandie Newton) is well-motivated, a round 
character who surpasses herself both in acting and in self-discovery as she searches for a 
fulfilling life: academic profession and love. Missing background information on her is 
provided through dialogues. A strong-willed and independent woman, Olanna takes 
major decisions without a modicum of consultation with her parents. Her twin sister, 
similarly motivated is the self-conceited manager of their wealthy father’s estate. Her 
arrogance and glamorous lifestyle make her less attractive to the audience, which is 
evidenced by her comments on her necklace. Obsessed by expensive necklaces – a 
useful prop that attracts British Richard Churchill (Joseph Mawle) to her – she says: 
“the necklace will feature in tomorrow’s ‘Lagos Life’. That will be my way of 
contributing to our newly-independent country. It will give fellow Nigerians something 
to aspire to, an incentive to work at” 
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Another important character in this film is Odenigbo, an Igbo university lecturer, 
whose ideological leanings pit him against the British and indigenous non-Biafran 
supporters. In one of his meetings with friends and some university people, he argues: 
“my point is the only authentic identity for an African is his tribe.” After a brief diatribe 
against Britain for its political machinations in Nigeria, he drives his point home: ...but I 
was Igbo before the white man came.” His unapologetic Biafran stance supports the 
film’s overall agenda, which is to deny the Federal Military Government a voice while 
portraying the marginalisation of the Igbos. No footage of the secessionist’s counterpart, 
Gowon, was seen.  Only those of the Igbo leader, Ojukwu, occasionally appeared to 
further confuse the non-Nigerian viewers.  
HOAYS is conceived as a period drama that draws the look of the past into a 
111-minute long film narrative. Without tightly focusing the concept of causality 
regarding the Civil War, but admirably tracking the geographical space in which the 
narrative unfolds, the film rapidly settles into a melodrama, exploring some effects of 
the war on co-habiting couples, “wherein their difficulties of achieving romantic 
fulfilment” (Vasudevan 2011: 10) are portrayed. As a historical text, major courses of 
the ethnic war were left unaddressed, leaving viewers unfamiliar with contemporary 
Nigerian history well out of the narrative. At the announcement of the first coup through 
a radio broadcast, the panic-dialogue between Olanna and Odenigbo drowned out 
relevant bits of information which the broadcast was meant to supply. The film’s efforts 
at historical construction are subsequently overtaken by romantic relationships.     
 
6.7.1 Setting and Plot 
Set in Tinapa studio and Creek town in Nigeria and London, the film begins with 
Nigeria’s Independence from British rule, but ends with the emotional pain associated 
with war-related losses of family members as Olanna and Odenigbo are separated from 
their parents, the first by distance, and the second death. Besides, Olanna’s twin, 
Kainene goes missing and hundreds more are displaced. Like Battle of Love and Across 
the Niger, HOAYS uses texts in addition to maps, flags, newsreel and radio broadcasts 
to connect missing links for instance for viewers unable to tell Aba from Kano. It also 
projects the war as buffeting the lives of four lovers and rivals who must separate and 
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unite as the battle rages and bates in their locations. HOAYS does not provide the 
catharsis of the other two films. It wonders curiously through south eastern Nigeria, and 
Kano to reveal mindless killings, the brutality of the northerners which seems to project 
a present day Nigeria ridden by the bullets and bombs of the terrorist group, Boko 
Haram. It is Olanna (and sometimes in Odenigbo’s company) who travels the most as 
dictated by her emotional dispositions.  
Plot points were advanced through the radio broadcasts and newsreel, but twice 
the audio broadcasts are suppressed by background music or character dialogue, losing 
important historical information. The Civil War breaks out while Olanna is in Nsukka 
with her lecturer lover, and although their relationship is tried by infidelities and 
parental disaffection, Olanna’s devotion to Odenigbo strengthens. Foreshadowing was a 
technique repeatedly deployed in the narration. In the film’s opening, national 
independence foreshadowed that of Biafra; Odenigbo’s mother’s tirade at her first 
meeting with Olanna prefigured the war on the levels of class and ethnicity. The twins’ 
separation foretold Kainene’s loss.  
The cinematography is excellent and delicate; long takes ensure visually 
appealing frames while the shot/reverse shots reveal professionalism yet to be 
accomplished with finesse in Nollywood. The closing credits give away the foreign 
crew thus accounting for Guy Lodge’s description of HOAYS as a film that “exudes 
BBC-style polish.” There are numerous wide shots internally and externally partly to 
bring all the subjects and objects into focus (Kolker, 2006). Thus, suggesting that 
HOAYS frames all human conditions, especially the class divide and the vulnerabilities 
occasioned by war. Such shots capture the Independence party celebrations, the new 
Biafran State celebrations and the war scenes. The camera work symbolically tells the 
story of the minority in Nigeria: where they live, how the political class treats them and 
how they react to imperative societal pressures.   
From the foregoing, the narrative texture of Nigerian films is similar in many 
ways regardless of genre. More attention is given to setting, costume and dialogue than 
any other aspect of the construction. Location and set design are important, but not as 
much as dialogue presumably because the story is in the dialogue. Arguably, the 
narratives appear to lack depth due to their superficial characterization, but as Okome 
has argued, the filmmakers speak to deep-seated anxieties which are imposed on them 
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by the postcolonial order of society and governance. The use of media outlets to 
substitute and fuel dialogue is useful, gaining grounds and lends reasonable credibility 
to the narratives.  
This chapter has examined the different narrative techniques employed by the 
filmmakers in constructing the past. It approached the films individually, with varying 
depth, to account for the nuances reflected in each film. The narratives and their modes 
of telling are indicative of the common features of the Nigerian people; however, the 
films that deal with the political history of Nigeria show no marked differences in their 
processes of narration from other genres of film. The only difference is the use of 
footage and newsreel. In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that certain factors 
prohibit filmmakers from political history. One of the ways by which they have 
overcome those inhibitions, particularly censorship, is by disguising and allegorising the 
characters and events represented, by the use of anchorage sub-texts and other elements. 
Therefore, unmasking the narratives and how they signify as this chapter has 
















IDEOLOGICAL READINGS OF THE FILMS 
7.1. Introduction 
“... for the majority of African people, the arts are the only channel of public 
communication at their disposal” – Karin Barber 1987:2 
Obvious from the last chapter which addressed the narrative techniques of the videos, is 
that Nollywood narratives are similar in content and form. Re-constructions of the past 
are conceived as stories in much the same way as other narratives – romantic dramas, 
comedies, cultural epics and so on. But putting together such films on meagre budgets 
admits compromises which are embedded in the dialogues. Such dialogues may contain 
ideological nuances which this chapter seeks to uncover. In this section, the films being 
studied as past political constructions are presented in response to the third research 
question guiding the thesis: in what ways do the films promote or subvert the dominant 
ideology of the historical period they represent? By projecting a certain ideology in 
video films, others are invariably muted or repressed.  
What these films have in common is that all are made in contemporary times but 
set in the background of one military dispensation or another within the post-colonial 
period of Nigeria (1967-1998). Taken together, they portray images of military-led 
Nigeria as a country in search of nationhood but without what one might call an ideal 
thought leadership. Such glimpses of the past are refracted in the country’s current 
political landscape with the single difference being that civilians are now at the helm of 
affairs. There are ethnic affiliations and tensions in all films. Dissimilarities border on 
the uniqueness of each military regime and other institutional differences that each 
military dictator allowed. Read as the filmmakers’ voice in national discourse, the films 
do not attempt to portray blow-by-blow accounts of the past with the mild exception of 
Stubborn Grasshopper, but to lend their voices to national conversations, as one 
filmmaker Sam Onwuka said, “I wanted to say something about Abacha” (personal 
communication, October 16, 2013). As Barber (1987) notes, the arts are the media 
through which ordinary people speak to power as well as to themselves. And “in 
extreme cases, meaning is communicated simply by the fact that the performance takes 
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place at all in very repressive regimes, simply continuing to come together to perform 
and participate is a statement of identity and defiance” (p. 2).  
Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria’s first president (1963-1966) defined ideology as a 
body of assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociological programme 
(Azikiwe, 1979: 1). Brummett understands it as “a systematic network of beliefs, 
commitments, values, and assumptions that influence how power is maintained, 
struggled over, and resisted” (2010: 99). In their study of ideology in contemporary 
Hollywood cinema, Ryan and Kellner (1988) point out that thematic and formal 
narrative conventions are ideologically motivated, and while a reading of such 
conventions might yield deep insights to American politics of a given period, the 
political movements might equally inform the thematic engagements of Hollywood. 
While both authors state that not every Hollywood narrative film is ideological, they do 
affirm that films make social and political arguments about history and about the 
cultural contexts from which they originate, are disseminated and consumed. Kellner 
(n.d.) goes on to develop these thoughts by calling prudently for a multi-perspectival 
approach to ideology critique, and at the same time cautioning against incompatible 
methodological strategies for the sake of multiplicity. This chapter follows Kellner’s 
position because his proposal recognizes that ideology critique must demonstrate 
awareness of the specific task and goals at hand and therefore adopts a contextual, post-
structuralist reading of the films to unpack the ideologies that they speak to. This is 
because Kellner admirably moves beyond a monolithic notion of ideology as class 
domination, which positions the concept as the identification and rejection of the 
economic interests of the capitalist class. Instead, he calls for a broader understanding of 
ideology discourses since ideology is embedded in figures, concepts, images, theoretical 
positions, myths, genres and the cinematic apparatus. Thus highlighting the benefits of 
“the exploration of how ideology functions within popular culture and everyday life and 
how images and figures constitute part of the ideological representations of sex, race 
and class in film and popular culture” (p. 3).  
The idea of ideological critique in the following sections also draws from 
Barber’s (1997a), and Brummet’s (2010) thoughts with emphasis on the prevailing 
cultural and secular ideologies as well as the political culture of Nigeria as depicted in 
the films. Barber draws on Pierre Macherey’s insights to analyse the ideological 
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materials inherent in two Yoruba plays on oil wealth in Nigeria. For Barber, an author’s 
“themes, conceptions and language constitute ideological materials that are available in 
the particular position in society that he or she occupies” Such ideological materials are 
employed to furnish the work of art with an author’s “harmonizing intent” (Barber, 
1997a: 92). I interpret Barber’s harmonizing intent as Brummet’s “web of convictions” 
(p. 99) that authors have, which Kellner argues are manifested in themes, conceptions 
and language. And, it is important to point out too that Kellner makes reference to 
ideology being hidden in themes, conceptions and language as well as in “cinematic 
apparatus and strategies” (p. 9). If, as Lacey (2009) observes, “the power of ideology 
lies in its ability to present itself as natural as common sense” (p. 108), then ideology in 
the sense used here is culturally and contextually derived, employing class distinctions, 
ethnicity, and other determinants of economic power in Nigeria with caution. Brummet 
(2010) argues that ideology is thrust forward through arguments, which the producers of 
popular culture wish the consumers to assume or believe. Meaning is socially 
constructed (Hall, 2013; Lacey, 2009; Marenin, 1987) by filmmakers and audiences. 
Having sketched a useful concept of ideology, attention is now turned to 
poststructuralism as an enabling ideological paradigm to Nigerian films that depict the 
past. 
Poststructuralism accommodates a contextual critical approach and calls 
attention to several elements within a film text which other theoretical approaches, 
notably structuralism, ignore. Kellner argues that:   
a text is constituted by its internal relations and its relations to its socio-
historical context and the more relations articulated in a critical reading, 
the better grasp of a text one may have. A multiperspectival method must 
necessarily be historical and should read its text in terms of its history 
and may also choose to read history in the light of the text (n.d: 18).  
 
Poststructuralist film theory grew out of the deficiencies inherent in structuralism. 
Reading a film solely through its internal structures often disregards the plurality of 
meanings encoded by filmmakers and decodable by viewers, a point which Hall (2013) 
made. It also negates the socio-cultural contexts from which the cultural productions 
emerge and in which they are consumed. Further, a single ideological reading of texts 
suggests that meanings are one-sided or absolute. They are not. As such, the readings 
below posit that Nigerian video films are contested terrains that represent multiple 
172 
 
underlying conflicts and control of power within Nigeria (Barber, 1987, 1997a; Haynes 
and Okome, 2000; Kellner, n.d.). These films are direct addresses to political power but 
they also x-ray slums and launch missiles at the lower class who are just as gullible, and 
occasionally as intoxicated by power and ethnic chauvinism.  
To buttress the point of reading the videos as bottom-up and horizontally, Karl 
Maier counters Chinua Achebe’s famous expression on the problem with Nigeria being 
that of failed leadership by quoting Ishola Williams: “a leader does not come from 
heaven; he comes from a group of people. If the people are good followers, they will 
choose the right leader.” (Maier 2000: xxviii). Hence, to grasp the political 
constructions in the videos, one would have to understand the governments over the 
years and perhaps, more importantly, the people because as Kellner argues, “texts 
require multivalent readings that will unfold the contradictions, contestatory marginal 
elements, and structured silences of the texts” (p.12). We would also have to understand 
what the film assumes and promotes as well as what it silences and subverts. Within the 
films under study, there are subversive elements that challenge the filmmaker’s claims, 
to such an extent that the text is not entirely under the control of the producer (Barber, 
1987).  
 
7.2 Films 1-3: Battle of Love, Across the Niger and Half of a Yellow Sun 
7.2.1 Ethnicity, War and the Quest for National Unity 
Ekwuazi (1991) in Film in Nigeria wrote, “as of now the Nigerian Civil War may be 
something of a taboo subject, but a safe prediction is that this will not always be the 
case. In the course of time, Nigerian filmmakers will break into this hitherto forbidden 
territory...” (p. 166). Ten years later, the prediction is realised by Nigerians, although 
later in 2003, Antoine Fuqua directed Tears of the Sun (2003), which is an American 
portrayal of western aid during the Nigerian Civil War. Battle of Love is the first 
Nigerian video film to venture into the memory of the Nigerian Civil War, and for that 
it occupies an important place in the entire collection of Nigerian video films. Across 
the Niger was made as an after-thought and on the strength of the success of Battle of 
Love, which is a typical practice in the production of Nigerian video films. It is 
interesting however, that the success of both films was not sufficient to attract other 
173 
 
Nigerian filmmakers to explore the same or similar conflicts in the band wagon attitude 
characteristic of Nollywood (Amata, personal communication; Novia, 2012). Up to 
date, the only other Civil War film is Half of a Yellow Sun because as Achebe (2012) 
once pointed out, one has to be bold and courageous, even daring to approach the 
memory of that 3-year long battle.  
There is a growing body of literature on the origins, nature, and dynamics of 
ethnicity in Nigeria. The films discussed in this section, Battle of Love, Across the Niger 
and HOAYS have no other focus than that of flagging the prominent position that ethnic 
chauvinism occupies in national and political life in Nigeria. What ideological positions 
do Battle of Love and Across the Niger promote or subvert in Nigerian politics and 
history? The following paragraphs attempt to put the notion of ethnicity in Nigeria in 
perspective. In addition to that, ethnic chauvinism, the belief that one ethnic group is 
culturally superior to that of others, and that political leadership must emerge from 
one’s ethnic group regardless of electoral procedures or other dictates of the rule of law, 
is examined. 
In 1967 Nigeria, the political and ethnic rumblings that began in the 1950s and 
particularly in the mid-1960s with two coup d’états erupted in a violent two and half 
year war. The tensions were the result of fear of dominance by one ethnic group over 
the other. I underline the word ethnic because the idea that one is Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa 
or belongs to any other tribe has indelibly marked the life and culture of the Nigerian 
people in the political or non-political sphere. Marenin (1987) attempts to ‘theorise’ 
political culture by alluding to several distinct features one of which is “the view that 
competition, manipulation, and self-interest are the essence of politics” (p. 268). 
Omitted from this idea is the fact that most competitions or manipulations are 
negotiated on the premise of the contender’s ethnic group.   
The first Nigerian coup, in Jan 1966, saw the murder of Ahmadu Bello 
(Northern Nigeria Premiere) and Tafawa Balewa (Nigerian Prime Minister), Hausa 
civilian men in government. The coup was executed by young Igbo soldiers with Major 
Chukwuma Nzeogwu as the key plotter. A senior military Igbo officer, Ironsi, took over 
government. Ironsi was said to have delayed the execution of the coup plotters, and 
surrounded himself by Igbos through administrative appointments. In the North, the 
apprehension of the coup plotters was greeted favorably in certain quarters and in 
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others, with a studied silence.  This gradually changed to resentment, culminating in the 
May 1966 riots throughout the North during which most Easterners residing in the 
North were attacked and killed. This is what is referred to in most war literature as the 
pogrom. 
On the 26th of July, a counter coup which saw the death of Ironsi was staged. 
Gen. Yakubu Gowon took over power.  This vindictive move by the northerners further 
deepened the ethnic acrimony in the country and placed Nigeria not on the brink of war 
but right in the middle of it. For as Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, Head of the Eastern region 
said, “we are finished with the federation; it is all a question of time” (as cited in 
Atofarati, 1992). Neither the 9th August 1966 peace conference nor the early 1967 
conciliatory meeting of the Supreme Military Council in Ghana could reunite the 
country. The Igbos had suffered brutality at the hands of the Hausas with the few 
survivors returning as refugees to the East at the behest of Ojukwu. Officially, the war 
did not begin until Ojukwu declared the Republic of Biafra on 30th May 1967. The two 
entities – Federal Military Government of Nigeria and Biafra – spent the month of June 
preparing for what is today called the Nigerian Civil War (also known as the Biafran 
War).  
It is this political situation that formed the background narratives in Battle of 
Love, its sequel, Across the Niger, and HOAYS. The war was portrayed with varying 
degrees of Igbo representation and less of the Hausas. HOAYS does not portray the 
Hausas at all. Indeed, it is curious that since 1970 when the war ended, it is the Igbo 
narratives that have largely occupied literary and artistic attention. In HOAYS, 
cinematic presence is denied the opposing ethnic group, a move which is as ideological 
as its portrayal in the first two films. If as Brummett (2010) points out, ideologies are 
read through arguments, and “arguments make claims about what people should do and 
assemble reasons, evidence why people should do those things” (p. 99), then HOAYS 
invites us to see the Hausas and non-Biafrans through bombs, guns and machetes. 
Through its cinematic optic, they are silenced and repressed. Not a single Nigerian 
soldier or Hausa is visible in HOAYS unlike in Battle of Love and Across the Niger in 
which brutal northerners are juxtaposed with humane ones; vindictive ones changed to 
selfless ones, even martyrs. One reason for that may be that the Igbos were the less 
powerful of the conflicting parties with less sophisticated weapons, fewer soldiers and 
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trained personnel and without the immediate Western backing that Nigeria had at the 
time (Achebe, 2012). The three films converge at certain points in their unity of 
narrating Biafra, yet there is a marked divergence in their ideological leanings. 
The Igbos were severely disadvantaged, hence they attracted more sympathy. 
Another plausible reason is that the narrators are either Igbo or are from a minority 
ethnic group, Urhobo. The story concept of Battle of Love and Across the Niger were 
Kingsley Ogoro’s (producer), even though he hired writers and directors to execute his 
idea. Another portrayal of the Civil War, Half of a Yellow Sun, was originally written by 
an Igbo. This underscores Okoye’s (2007a) point on the narrators projecting their own 
versions of the story which are often constructed through their peculiar positions, 
personal circumstances and are unlikely to conform to official narratives. He states that, 
“when the oppressed people undertake the reconstruction of their past, the writing of 
their history, they contest the official versions by presenting another perspective, one 
which is also inevitably discursive and ideological” (p. 3). 
Thus HOAYS, set in Calabar and London, on an $8m budget (£5.1m) differs in 
its own representation of the war because unlike Ogoro, Bandele (director) does not 
envision a new or better Nigeria. Nationalist sentiments are not within his frame of 
narration. In fact, the film seems to uphold an alternative nationalism to “One Nigeria”, 
one which seems to challenge the disruption of Ojukwu’s formation of an independent 
Biafra. Odenigbo’s character embodies this, which is reflected in his emphatic 
comments: “my point is that the only authentic identity for an African is his tribe. I am a 
Nigerian because the whiteman created Nigeria and gave me that identity...but I was 
Igbo before the whiteman came” (HOAYS 24:14). Furthermore, he disagrees loudly 
with Adeabyo when she says that secession is not the option to security. Chukwuma 
Okoye (2007a) submits that “historical texts are discursive and fundamentally 
ideological for they are positioned renderings intended to align the reader with or 
against other contesting positions. These texts thus defend the position of their 
producers but marginalize those of others” (p. 3). HOAYS marginalises voices like 
Adebayo’s. Bandele denies viewers a northern version of the war by adopting a 
predominantly Igbo narrative to tell the story of marginality which does not lead to a 
new or better Nigeria. Why should it? One may ask. Okoye provides an answer, because 
its occupants have not always consented to “staying together or pulling apart. When the 
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oppressed people undertake the reconstruction of their past, the writing of their history, 
they contest the official versions by presenting another perspective, one which is also 
inevitably discursive and ideological.” (p. 3). This is also corroborated by Lacey (2009) 
who states that “[texts] suggest rhetorically that they are offering a window on the 
world” (p. 104), whereas their values are hidden beneath the images, dialogues and 
gestures.   
Conversely, Battle of Love and Across the Niger clearly had an agenda for unity 
and reconciliation with the ‘One Nigeria’ mantra they adopted and used frequently 
while the films lasted. The Hausa and Igbo couple (protagonists) must overcome the 
ethnic prejudices of their respective families in order to get through the war as Prince 
Dubem (the Igbo soldier) had to flee the north, leaving his wife Rekia, (Hausa) behind 
to wait for his return (whenever that would be) and to the romantic advances of a rival 
lover, Bako (a Hausa soldier). It must be recalled that One Nigeria was the title of a 
documentary made in 1969 by Ola Balogun, one of the earliest Nigerian filmmakers. 
This unification agenda subverted ethnic chauvinism to promote the ideal that marital 
and familial relations, and by extension, national life were superior to ethnic 
differences. 
The two lovers Dubem and Rekia symbolise the warring factions of the country 
– Igbo and Hausa – who must unite for a new and stronger Nigeria to emerge in 
Ogoro’s vision. Indeed the fruit of the inter-ethnic marriage is multiple deaths including 
Dubem’s and his uncle’s but not before Dubem’s son is born from his Hausa wife. It is 
through the child’s grandfather (the king of the village) that the filmmaker’s meaning is 
intensely realised. He apologises to Dubem who, after listening to his father’s apology 
finally dies by the bullet from a kinsman. It was a particularly emotional scene where 
the camera pans the landscape from Dubem dead on the floor, to his wife also on the 
floor where she was delivered of her baby, to the lady formerly groomed to marry the 
prince who now cuddles the child of the woman she hated and to the king. This 
construction of lovers fleeing from hateful murderers in the north at the outbreak of war 
signifies the pursuit of a stable and illusory Nigeria. The pursuit has many losses yet it 
had to be undertaken if a new Nigeria, as elusive as it appears to be is to emerge. 
Writing on nationhood, Okoye (2007a), notes that it is “an elusive ideal perennially 
imagined and pursued in spite of, or perhaps even because of the impossibility of its 
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realization” (p. 2). The argument in the films is clear at times and at other times, 
somewhat muddy.  
In Battle of Love and Across the Niger, the Hausa northerners are positioned as 
the hateful, barbaric insurgents who charge into people’s homes and charge out with 
blood-stained machetes. Methodically and obdurately, they murdered innocent Igbo 
civilians regardless of the times and spaces of encountering them – at homes or in the 
streets. This depiction, while not appearing gruesome on the screen signals the 1966 
massacre of the Igbos in northern Nigeria. In fact, one of the killings is done off-screen; 
only the sound of a gun-shot is heard. But the filmmaker is intent on a united Nigeria. 
Therefore, he strains to de-emphasise the killings by providing what he calls “a 
balanced picture” (K. Ogoro, personal communication, August 29, 2013) at the end of 
the film.  At the end of Battle of Love, a Hausa man, Bako, who had earlier ordered the 
torture of Dubem, now assists the couple’s (Dubem and his wife) escape. Ogoro was by 
that, alluding to the idea that although the northern collective spearheaded the Igbo 
massacre, which led to the war, there were still a few humane ones who knew how to 
rise above regional and ethnic grievances. The northerners were portrayed as malicious 
and sympathetic at the same time, but the same can hardly be said of the Igbos who 
were cinematically positioned as perpetrators of internal strife, within their own 
communities.  
 
7.2.2 Intra-ethnic Conflict 
The supremacy of the Igbos argued above is turned on its head in the intra-ethnic 
conflicts portrayed in the films. Such conflicts depicted in Across the Niger are not of 
the same scale as the well-known known ones in Nigeria such as the Aguleri/Umuleri, 
Tiv/Jukun or Ife/Modakeke. It was neither a battle for land, territory or other natural 
resources. It was the result of inordinate greed and the desire for political favours. It was 
not ethnic chauvinism but another manifestation of Marenin’s (1987) political culture: 
the pursuit of self-interests. 
In spite of Ogoro’s idea of a balanced picture, it cannot be said that the Igbos 
were depicted equally because of the intra-ethnic conflict sown into the narrative fabric. 
Whereas the Hausas are at war with people from a different ethnic group, the Igbos are 
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not only at war with the Hausas, but also among themselves, with their kinsmen. 
Although the filmmaker tries to portray the easterners in the full scale of their strengths 
and weaknesses, the concept of treachery introduced on eastern soil and among family 
members at war times reflects an alternative reading of the Igbos during the war period. 
For it turns the narrative into an unintended castigation of the Igbos, one which Ojukwu, 
the secessionist leader had to contend with. A member of the Igbo king’s cabinet 
provides intelligence to Hausa soldiers who are bent on decimating the Igbos. The same 
man sends his niece unsuccessfully to seduce the prince so that her entry into the royal 
family – by marriage or contrived pregnancy – will ensure a dignified position for him 
in future. It is this same man’s bullet which was aimed at Rekia, Dubem’s Hausa wife, 
that accidentally kills Dubem, the prince. In two scenes before this catastrophic scene, 
and following his family’s rejection of his Hausa wife, Dubem foreshadows this intra-
ethnic conflict when he said in Igbo, “after fighting in the war front, do I return home to 
continue fighting?” A close-up of Dubem reveals facial displeasure not associated with 
the character while on ‘enemy’ grounds in the north. What the filmmaker effectively 
constructs is a people at war with themselves and with their neighbours thus instituting 
a culture of fear and suspicion among kinsmen. This mildly challenges Marenin’s 
(1987) political culture, which he notes reflects “a strong commitment to communal 
norms and affiliations” (p. 268). 
The fear of ‘ethnic’ domination that pervaded Nigeria in the 1960s parallels 
Odenigbo’s mother’s fear in HOAYS, thus leading to an attack against Olanna at their 
first meeting. That attack was not a private tirade between Mama and Olanna alone. It 
was done in the presence of two other Igbos – Amala and Ugwu – in a shot/reverse shot 
that polarised the educated and the illiterate, the traditional and the modern, typical of 
Nollywood narrative conventions. With Ugwu and Amala behind Mama as she 
lambastes Olanna, the world of the illiterate seems to evoke the 1960 fear of 
domination, this time by an educated ‘stranger’. The fact of Olanna’s ethnic identity is 
in fact of no consequence at this point in the narrative. What matters is that her boldness 
in moving in with her lover, an unheard of practice in 1960 Nigeria, must be strongly 
resisted. Mama’s struggle for power over Odenigbo, then, is everything and is pursued 
by every means (Claude Ake in Maier, 2000: xv), particularly her verbal strength and 
her status as mother in Odenigbo’s house.     
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7.3 Film 4: Anini 
7.3.1 Ideological Positions in Anini: The Environment vs. the Individual  
“The Anini story is both street and political theatre: a small man challenging the power 
of the state and its corrupt minions, and succeeding. That Anini threw some of his gains 
to the crowd makes the play even more real, as if the actor and the observer merge in 
the flutter of Naira notes across the proscenium's edge” (Marenin 1987: 270). The point 
omitted by Marenin here is that it is not a small unaided man that challenges the 
government, rather it is a small man empowered by the agency of paramilitary forces 
and the political elite. This is an important consideration as it also zooms in on the 
filmmaker’s agenda.   
Anini’s life in the city is complicated by the company he keeps not by the 
decisions he makes. Such company are not decided on by the protagonist; he finds 
himself among them. The argument put forward by the filmmakers is that it is not 
Anini’s fault, but rather his environment, the Nigerian system and factor that corrupt 
him. His opening address while on a hospital bed is a disclaimer, “I did not plan to steal 
for one day”, a pronouncement which seems to extenuate his vices and position him as a 
victim of a debilitating society. Even Anini’s attorney at the end of the film while 
addressing the judge on his client’s behalf says that “Anini was acting under divine 
obedience and therefore without complete free will”. Such deterministic portrayal 
betrays a common trait in the Nigerian socio-political sphere in which an external factor 
is often held to be responsible for the social and political ordering of the society rather 
than internal personal traits. An evidence of this is found in Okwudiba Nnoli’s (1980) 
argument in Ethnic Politics in Nigeria in which he states that “in Nigeria, the colonial 
urban setting constitutes the cradle of contemporary ethnicity” (p. 35). He goes on to 
argue that the British are responsible for Nigeria’s socio-political status today.  
Twenty years after the official exit of British colonial rule, during which time 
Nigeria had six indigenous Heads of State and Presidents, ethnicity was still referred to 
as an instrument of colonial governments in the negative sense. Even if the colonial 
legacy of ethnicity was detrimental to the political ordering of the state, six successive 
governments are sufficient to undo the trappings of ethnic chauvinism. Furthermore, 
Onyeozili (2005) reported that “imperial policing orientations and preoccupations have 
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been maintained and strengthened by postcolonial governments in Nigeria” (p. 36), 
without providing adequate reasons for the decisions to maintain and strengthen the 
colonial practice. He goes on to suggest that the retention of colonial practices might be 
responsible for the anomalies encountered in state apparatuses such as the police.  These 
positions are indeed problematic because they do not provide evidence for such claims, 
but they do buttress my point on the Nigerian tendency to hold external factors 
accountable for personal or collective inadequacies.  
There is a theme of ‘friendship’ running through the entire narrative, which 
lends credence to the argument that in Anini, the individual is disempowered. Anini is 
taken to Benin from his home town by a friend, Marcus; he acquaints himself with 
Amos at his first workplace. Amos later becomes the friend that initiates him into 
robbery. During a police raid in a hide-out for gangs, Anini gets arrested and Amos 
disappears. While in prison, he is bullied into becoming friends with Kingsley Eweka’s 
gang on the strength of his driving skills which he reveals upon interrogation by Eweka 
himself; he also becomes friends with George Iyamu, the police officer, who double-
crosses him. Each friendship leads him to the next one. When he is caught by the police, 
he is in the company of a lady friend. Even the last two important scenes in the film, 
Anini is accompanied by his gang and Iyamu. Similarly, the friends who introduced him 
to the good life also led him to petty malpractices, and later, to organised crime. 
Through these friends, the filmmaker subtly apportions the blame of Anini’s descent 
into crime to his friends – they make him ‘prosper’ financially while at the same time, 
they place him at loggerheads with his society and the state. Barber’s (1987) comment 
on the extent on meaning in texts is illuminating: “Texts generate surplus meanings that 
go beyond and may subvert, the purported intentions of the work. Thus, never wholly 
under the artist’s control, they have the capacity to pick up subterranean currents of 
thought that society itself may be unaware of” (p. 4) 
According to Marenin (1987), it was clear that “there was little about Anini or 
his acts which set him apart from the myriads of other armed robbers and gangs which 
operate in Nigeria, seemingly without much hindrance from the police” (p. 261). Anini 
was an ordinary citizen on whom the folk-hero status was imposed. He was framed by 
the media as an ‘outlaw’, ‘The Law’, ‘the magician’ (Marenin, 1987). From the 
argument above, and drawing from Marenin’s observation, Anini did not solely 
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challenge the state and the government and succeed. He was ‘empowered’ to do so by 
the corrupt police officers who fed him weapons and security intelligence, and this is 
exactly the position reflected in the film because as Lacey (2009) remarks, “texts 
conceal their values in order to convey an argument without appearing to do so” (p. 
104). Although the film does not show this, Anini and his gang revealed after their 
arrest that Iyamu had provided them with information that facilitated their bank robbery. 
Olurode (2008) in The Story of Anini points out that “Iyamu did supply Anini with both 
information and ammunition – the two most vital resources in the world of crime and 
ironically also in the world of crime detection and prevention” (p. 75). In fact, there is 
sufficient evidence to discredit his supposed magical powers (Marenin, 1987; Olurode, 
2008) since the purported powers failed after Iyamu was arrested and kept out of 
circulation, and could therefore not feed Anini more information.   
The point here is that the individual is disempowered in Anini through the denial 
of his free will and the accentuation of environmental/external factors (Lacey’s 
concealed values). Throughout the film, he initiates actions that are only reactionary in 
intent. Things happened to him; he did not make anything happen. Arguably, his lack of 
education may have stripped him of initiative but the supermarket he owned in another 
city, Ibadan, does seem to contradict the idea of his lack of initiative. Even the decision 
to settle scores with the police after his friend and mentor was killed was motivated by 
Iyamu’s (the police officer) treachery. It was a vengeful decision borne out of anger and 
frustration. To crystallise the point on Anini’s re-actions, the film director responded to 
his vision in telling the story of Anini thus: “we wanted to tell a story about a character 
that existed and to see this character from the challenges of his environment and to see 
why he became who he became” (F. Amata, personal communication, February 16, 
2012).  
 
7.3.2 The Politics of Policing Crime in a Post-colonial State 
The Police in Nigeria has never been regarded with much respect (Onyeozili 2005; Hills 
2008). Even the slogans conspicuously displayed in various police stations, ‘The police 
is your friend’, has failed to attract popular goodwill towards this group of law-
enforcement agents. During Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979-1983), the size of the 
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police force was increased from 10,000 to 100,000 with a consequent growth in staff, 
weapons and equipment expenditure (Falola and Heaton, 2008). As at 2008, Hills 
(2008) observed that the number had grown to 325,000 thus enabling the government to 
employ the police in curbing opposition, often through violence. In October 1986, the 
Police Force was restructured under General IB Badamosi’s administration to have 5 
directorate arms namely operations, criminal investigations, logistics, supplies and 
training (Enwefah, 2012) thus justifying the increase in expenditure. It was in December 
that year that Lawrence Anini was arrested by the police, in a way restoring public 
confidence in the police force. Amata’s film does not leave out the moment of the arrest 
thereby delivering what arguably is a balanced portrayal of the Anini story and the 
police force.  
Anini was produced in 2005 when the Inspector General of Police (IG), Mustafa 
Balogun, under President Obasanjo, was dismissed from office to face charges on 
corruption, electoral violence and money laundering. Upon Balogun’s dismissal, 
Sunday Ehindero took over the affairs of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) from January 
2005 until 2007 when Obasanjo’s tenure ended. As soon as Ehindero stepped in, he 
began large-scale police reforms which were mainly supported and approved by 
Obasanjo who, as Hills (2008) points out in her broad review of the police in 2005, gave 
heed to popular demands for police reforms. Therefore, the film Anini was greeted with 
open arms since it was a tacit acquiescence to the much needed police reforms in 
contemporary Nigeria.  
Hills (2008) observed that policing Nigeria is an arduous task, often 
compounded by high urbanisation rates and teeming unemployed youths when 
compared to the 325,000 policemen serving a population of 150M.  But the more 
important issues that render policing somewhat nightmarish are “insufficient funding, 
lack of resources and training, poor working conditions and low pay” (Hills, 2008: 218). 
To demonstrate this, Hills compares the offices of the police station in Garki, a suburb 
of Abuja, the capital city, to the affluent government office spaces not too far from the 
police station. There is a stark contrast between the spaces which screams of inequality 
and imposes psychological torture on the police officers who are on the lowest rungs of 
the ladder. The scenario is one of privilege versus deprivation; the privileged positions 
are to be coveted, but only if police officers act violently or dishonestly (Hills, 2008).  
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“Corruption is endemic at every level, with the police regularly heading 
Transparency International's list of the most corrupt institutions in the country” writes 
Hills (2008: 219), a position which Onyeozili (2005) corroborates. In the light of these, 
Anini is a response to why and how crime thrives in post-colonial Nigeria. It is a deep 
assessment and commentary on the status quo which offers viewers avenues for 
understanding the dynamics of policing crime in Nigeria not just in 2005 but nearly ten 
years down the line. The filmmakers projected salient commentaries on the political 
order of the Nigerian state through the lens of Anini. I argue that Anini brings to the fore 
some of the most debilitating effects and costs of governance to the Nigerian people – 
when the supposed protector becomes the tormentor (Mbembe 1997, 2002). Inter-state 
travel within Nigeria in private automobiles is slowed down due to roadblocks mounted 
by policemen. This conforms to Hills’ (2008) argument that police corruption “ranges 
from the constable who extorts N20 (8p) from motorists at checkpoints – and most 
drivers arrive at checkpoints with N20 in their hand – to the senior officers who take 
their subordinates' allowances” (p. 219). The sums of money extorted from innocent 
travellers are often higher than N20, and in most cases dependent on the negotiation 
skills of the traveller. An omission by Hills, however, is that popular wisdom attributes 
these extortions to the poor salaries of the policemen, and to allow an exercise of power 
by the agents of the state who otherwise find no legitimate means of asserting their 
presence.  
An understanding of this practice therefore is necessary to shed light on the 
nature of police extortions from armed robbers. Anini admits viewers into the 
negotiating space between robbers and policemen. The film has a lot to say about the 
operations of the NPF in 1986 when the film was set, and today, twenty eight years after 
Anini’s execution. In a poignant scene in which Anini laments his distressing 
encounters with the police to his girlfriend, the dynamics of ‘policing’ crime are 
summed thus:  
Look o, the same police wey dey give us information,  
Na the same police wey dey give us gun. 
Na the same police wey dey give us ammunition 
And na the same police wey dey harass us.  
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And if we no settle police 
Na im be say police catch armed robber  
In other words, armed robbers are apprehended only when there is no transfer of money 
or when one of the robbers threatens to undermine the directives received from their 
police-informant. That was the case of Dis-is-me (Segun Arinze) whose refusal to 
suspend robbery operations due to pressure on ASP George brought about his murder 
by the latter. Undoubtedly, this submission, while not representing the totality of the 
position of the NPF, does underscore the complicity of some police officers in criminal 
operations.  
After the N50,000 wey I give ASP George,  
dey still kill Kingsley and Kele...no, no, police, police, police, wetin! eh 
For this town, no be for this town?  
I go show all the police wey dey this town na me be Lawrence Nomayagbon Anini.  
I go use their blood paint wall...  
Further, when innocent people report crimes to the police station, the policemen 
are known to alter such cases to make the complaints look dubious, often to protect 
powerful interests. Onyeozili (2005) aptly describes this phenomenon together with 
other factors that militate against the preservation of law and order by the police. 
Among such factors, he highlights god-fatherism, nepotism and ethnicity as well as 
other questionable practices associated with the police (pp. 40-44). While other official 
institutions in Nigeria may and can be accused of god-fatherism and questionable 
practices in varying degrees, its perpetuation by the Police Force reveals an alarming 
situation in which the sacredness of lives and property is severely threatened by its 
constitutional protectors. It is this reason that results in a near absolute lack of 
confidence in the police, a point made by Onyeozili, Hills and other social justice 
researchers.  
More recently, the politics of policing crime has taken other dimensions in 
Nigeria. Another indication of god-fatherism and political culture in operation is that the 
terrorist group, Boko Haram, has defied eradication because of alleged links with the 
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political elite. Some efforts by the NPF and the Nigerian army have proved abortive 
owing to perceived political interests by the wealthy class of politicians. James Forest, 
in his lucid report on Boko Haram, confirms links between the Islamic sect and elitist 
northerners: 
The group’s financing has also been allegedly linked to specific 
individuals with power and access to resources. Given the extensive 
system of patronage in Nigeria, this should come as no surprise. Several 
of these individuals have been arrested, but some were killed before any 
judicial process could determine their guilt or innocence. For example, 
on 31 July 2009 Alhaji Buji Foi – former Borno State Commissioner for 
Religious Affairs – was arrested and taken to Police Headquarters in 
Maiduguri, where he was publicly executed on 31 July 2009...(Forest, 
2012: 71) 
 
 This sort of cronyism sticks out in the film, Anini, like a sore thumb. Forest provides 
considerable details of other similar support from political and economic support that 
further sheds light on the Anini story. This exposes the full picture of the 1986 scenario 
given that Kingsley Eweka (Baba K in the film) was the son of the Benin Monarch at 
that time, although it was pointed out by Henry Legemah that the royal family had no 
direct involvement in the armed robbery operations. Legemah added, “there was no 
controversy whatsoever; yes, Kingsley was royalty but he was a Judah and that was all” 
(H. Legemah, personal communication, May 29, 2014) 
According to Hills (2008: 223), “the starting point for any discussion of policing 
in Nigeria is that the Nigeria Police’s primary task is regime representation and 
regulation, rather than serving the public as such.”  This is in consonance with the point 
on inequality which this section makes, and which is supported by Marenin’s (1987) 
political culture as “alienation from the state and society in general” (p. 268).  The level 
of economic inequality and political class dominance in Nigeria is high. It is aggravated 
by government executives who use public funds to disproportionate private gains. In the 
film, the police commissioner shot by Anini’s gang is flown abroad for treatment while 
hundreds of others attacked and maimed by the same gang are left to receive medical 
treatment in poorly-equipped hospital facilities and sometimes, at the hands of unpaid 
physicians. In fact, the police became more determined in the plot to unravel the 
mystery of Anini’s operations after the “embarrassment” of shooting the commissioner. 
Further, it was also only when Gen. Badamosi, the Head of State, queried the Police IG 
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on Anini’s whereabouts (Marenin, 1987) that search efforts were intensified. Just as the 
Nigeria Police is undeniably accountable to the political elite, so are other state 
apparatuses such as the Censors Board and other film agencies.    
 
7.3.3 Probing the Past against the Present Realities 
Owing to the recent practices of the National Film and Video Censors Board (NFVCB) 
in which films that satirise the government or its agencies are prohibited from 
exhibition, the filmmakers have had to adopt alternative ways of representing the 
political past. The argument here is that Anini is a productive way of reconstructing the 
past to make social and political commentary without drawing the ire of the Censors 
Board given the on-going censorship mechanism. The filmmaker focuses on a villain’s 
attempt at disrupting the orderly co-existence of citizens while indicting the police in its 
complicity. All wrong doers are exposed even if they are not prosecuted. Henry 
Legemah, the film producer, received a letter of commendation from the Censor’s 
Board after it received the application for classifying the film. Would the Board have 
commended him if he had focused solely on and victimised the police? Would it, if he 
dwelt only on Gen. Badamosi or the Bendel State Administrator? That is to be seriously 
doubted. In an atmosphere of stiff opposition to any idea of talking to or about the 
government, Anini offers an alternative in the way described by Barber (1987). Other 
Nollywood films especially the ones discussed in this work did not receive a similar 
commendatory message from the Censors Board.  
Censorship has also been understood in terms of its utility as some filmmakers 
are kept on their toes, thus making them answerable to the censorship officials and their 
audiences for the images and sounds they project. This idea, espoused by Rajinder 
Dudrah and Jigna Desai (2008), implies that censorship needs not always be conceived 
as a “repression, negation and erasure” of creativity; but rather, as a productive tension 
between state power and indigenous creativity (p. 6). This is even more pronounced 
now that it is more fashionable to speak more of classification rather than censorship. 
This means that filmmakers must take cognisance of such current realities when 




7.4 Film 5: Oil Village 
7.4.1 Filming the Saro-Wiwa Story: A tip of the Iceberg?  
What Oil Village tells viewers about the most important natural resource of the most 
populous African country is reminiscent of Barber’s (1987) warning that the “genres 
billed as entertainment usually talk about matters of deep interest and concern to the 
people who produce and consume them” (p. 2). It is a “popular reaction to the petro-
naira” to borrow the title of Barber’s (1997a: 91) essay on the subject. The film deals 
with the issues surrounding the politics of crude oil in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria, 
and all of the vocabulary and ideological discourse about the region: wealth, revenue, 
poverty, marginalisation, deprivation, corruption, and pollution.  
In 1979, Eddie Ugbomah made a film on oil and the delta titled Oil Doom. From 
the synopsis the filmmaker provided me with after an interview with him, “the film is 
the story of oil Nigeria (sic) where the owners of the land are killed and denied their 
birthright” (E. Ugboma, personal communication, August 2014). The film was inspired 
by the early 1970s oil boom in Nigeria, which was followed by gross mismanagement. 
Barber (1997a) argues that oil wealth was not the result of hard work or merit, but was a 
feature of commercial capitalism that enriched government officials and middlemen 
from the private sector. Graham Furniss articulated the point carefully:  
With the major rise in world oil prices in 1973, Nigeria began a decade 
of unparalleled expansion. Huge amounts of hard currency oil revenues 
were accruing daily to the central government coffers. Bureaucracies at 
national, state and local level burgeoned and money was easily to be 
made through government contracts (Furniss, 1996: 4) 
 
With the increase in government revenue came an “enormous rise in state expenditure” 
(Falola and Heaton, 2008), which led Ugboma to predict through his film, that if the 
expenditure remained unchecked, the boom was sure to cascade to a doom. Naturally, 
he was criticised severely in different quarters for making such “prophetic and 
problematic” statements (E. Ugboma, personal communication, August 24, 2014). Such 
criticisms awaited Sam Onwuka and Kalu Anya, who like Ugboma were critical of the 
government and the multinational oil companies for their conspiracy against the Niger 
Delta indigenes.  
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Oil Village was inspired by the well-known and widely-documented narrative of 
the last years of the environmental rights activist and writer, Ken Saro-Wiwa. In 
Nigeria’s petroleum-dominated economy in the 1990s, the activities of the oil 
companies, notably Shell, backed by the government often led to ecological hazards. A 
number of Nigerians, especially Saro-Wiwa could not stand unconcerned at the land and 
water pollution caused by Shell. His protest to preserve the lives and land of the Ogoni 
(a small community in Rivers State of Nigeria) people from further destruction led to 
his conviction and death by hanging in 1995 by Gen. Abacha, who authorised and hand-
picked a tribunal for that purpose. The film fictionalises a tiny bit of these events to 
enable viewers create a vision of the fate of opposition voices in the Abacha 
administration.  
The film’s portrayal of Saro-Wiwa is marginal, reserving only the second half of 
the story for the figure of the Ogoni activist. Two reasons for that are proffered. First, 
the filmmaker’s budget was restrictive. At the time the film was made, film budgets 
were below N1m (£4,000). Second, research on a full Saro-Wiwa film would have 
demanded more time and skills which were not common in 2001 when the film was 
made. Indeed, in the first part of the film, nothing remotely approximates Saro-Wiwa. 
Kalu Anya, director, reported that they had the environmental activist in mind but were 
wary of mixed reactions and especially the Censors Board so they didn’t want to give 
away the focus at the beginning. Much more happened to Wiwa that Kalu and Onwuka 
do not let viewers see. “These...gaps, are equally significant because they represent the 
silences, the things the text cannot say, thus revealing to the critical reader the limits of 
a particular ideological position” (Barber 1997a: 92). 
Like many Nollywood films dealing with real events and people, Oil Village is a 
tip of the iceberg because the full scale of the occurrences in the Delta region is not 
transmitted in the film. Infact, it falls far short of the realities. But the film is useful in 
showing up the capitalist ideals of private wealth at all costs, whether it be legitimately 
acquired or not. It is in fact the ruling class that has total control of the material 
resources and as depicted in the film, circulates the resources among very few hands, 
who fail to see the rationale in engaging in productive work when greasing the wheels 
of the export-import economy is so often much more lucrative (Barber, 1997a: 93). The 
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majority are dispossessed of land and the means of making any living (Barber, 1997a; 
Furniss, 1996). 
As a tip of the iceberg, Oil Village problematises Brian Larkin’s (2008) 
“aesthetics of outrage” in which he claims that Nollywood films are “based on continual 
shocks that transgress religious and social norms and are designed to provoke and 
affront the audience” (p. 184).  It is ironical that, contrary to Larkin, outrageous events – 
such as 100,000 people’s means of livelihood being wiped out within days due to 
massive oil spillage – are downplayed and portrayed only through dialogic exchanges as 
in Oil Village. One filmmaker provides an explanation for the displacement of the 
“aesthetics of outrage”, “These actions which are meant to sensitize the viewers are 
difficult to film because of financial constraints and security reasons” (F. Okoro, 
personal communication, April 6, 2013), and also possibly because the Nigerian 
audience is already familiar, through local and foreign documentaries and other media, 
with the images of devastation common in the Niger Delta.  
In another sense, Larkin’s (2008) aesthetics of outrage is uprooted from the 
reaction shot and embedded in the dialogue, which mirror their capitalist sentiments. 
That personal wealth acquisition is the prerogative of the ‘community elites’ is 
evidenced in their language and their conception of leadership. The moral transgressions 
and excesses which Larkin writes of are located in the actors’ conversations, in the 
rhetoric of dialogue and soliloquy. Granted that Oil Village is a tip of the iceberg in 
comparison to the Saro-Wiwa story, it is difficult to assert Larkin’s position regarding 
this film and others dicussed in this research. Indeed all of them present the crux of the 
history and period they enact through dialogue rather than through shots that provoke 
“bodily reactions of revulsion” (Larkin 2008: 190). But they retain Larkin’s moral and 
social aberrations through their visions of modernity. In this sense, I argue that Larkin’s 
analytical position is useful to the extent that it employs boundaries and categories of 
films rather than blanketing all southern Nigerian films as embodiments and elicitors of 
outrage.   
 But the dialogue here is different from that analysed by Barber since it carries 
with it images that promote the capitalist agenda and images that inscribe themselves as 
sites of tension and dissonance. Oil Village subverts the first and promotes the second.  
In the first, chiefs drive cars, hire and fire employees, give £20,000 (N5m) gifts, and are 
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the only ones capable of speaking the white man’s language. In the second, a group of 
young men are transformed into resistance fighters, crusaders of justice and even 
distribution of resources.  
 
7.4.2 The Filmmaker’s Lament of Delta Spills, Inequality and Injustice 
The role of the filmmaker and what ideology he promotes or subverts is a function of 
his own background and contexts of production.  Ideology is also conveyed 
unconsciously. A good number of the films portraying the Niger Delta are made by 
Igbos or ethnic minority filmmakers as pointed out by Agina (2013). These groups of 
people feel obligated to tell the stories that the government at federal, state or local 
levels fail to tell. Most of the narratives are spawn through the voices of displeased 
people who want a greater participation in the distribution of income generated from 
crude oil taken out of their plots of land.  
In addition to lamenting the oil spills, Sam Onwuka in Oil Village explores the 
twin concepts of inequality and injustice, which are the most important elements that 
the film invites viewers to consider. Inequality is perpetuated by the chiefs of the 
Bayama Community Development Committee (BDC) who, because of their privileged 
position in the royal cabinet, control the funds allocated to the community for its 
multifarious development projects. The chiefs sit at a ‘meeting’ to distribute the cash 
among themselves. When Osaro, the voice of conscience is presented with his, he cries, 
“if I who has (sic) no oil well get N50m (£179,000), what about those who own the oil 
wells?” The BDC executives reprimand him immediately. Later, they try unsuccessfully 
to kill Osaro. The film continues with the chiefs meeting regularly to share more spoils 
and discuss no development projects. At one meeting, they plan to scuttle the federal 
government’s intervention in the distribution of funds for the youth projects. The youths 
are by now frustrated. It is not long before they take to armed struggle and resistance.  
The plots of land desired by the oil companies are valued and their owners are to 
present themselves to the BDC to claim the equivalent in cash. These land owners are 
offered incredibly less sums of money. For instance the man who is owed N1m (£4,000) 
is offered N10,000 (£36), - one-hundredth of the total. It is not only the land owners 
who are incensed by this conduct. The entire youth forum is supportive of those 
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dispossessed of their property, not by the oil companies, but by the chiefs purportedly 
representing them. A woman exclaims, “N5m (£17,900) cannot restore the life of my 
husband who died of “heart attack when his cocoa and banana plantations were taken 
away from him.” Again, the aesthetics of outrage is demonstrated through words. One 
who is owed N50m (£179,000) is offered N50,000 (£179) while the fictitious names and 
persons organised by the chiefs are paid the largest sums of money, N100m (£358,000) 
and N80m (£286,000), under the watch of the government official. Such is the response 
of the government both in the past and in present times. It often makes a move to 
redress the grievances of the people, but does not see the process through. Hence, the 
government staff is inert; no critical investigations of the payments and non-payments 
are made. In two scenes, he sits, watches, listens and does exactly what the Bayama 
Development Chiefs ask him to do. In fact, one of the community youths calls him “a 
goat because the whole illicit transaction was committed under his nose and he could 
not see it.” It is this sort of deprivation and injustice that largely accounts for militancy 
in the Niger Delta regions. The film projects a class struggle wherein the dominance of 
the upper class is framed as dubious, undemocratic and pretentious, all of which are the 
result of oil spillage and their reactions to it.  
 
7.4.3 Explaining Violence and Militancy in the Delta 
Maier’s (2000) observation on power and violence is illuminating. In Nigeria, everyone 
is ‘power-thirsty’. They want to jump queues, get through the traffic before anyone else, 
and be rewarded financially for little or no favours at all. Hence Maier’s understanding 
of the people and government of the country is summarised thus: “stake a claim over a 
piece of territory, a government office, or an oil field and use your authority to obtain 
financial reward” (p. 40). There could not be a more apt description of the Niger Delta 
scenario. A common feature of the Delta region is one fraught with physical, 
environmental and psychological violence caused by political domination and 
marginalisation. Incessant pleas by the local inhabitants of Bayama in Oil Village fell 
on evidently deaf ears. Indigenes are left without an option but to take up arms in order 
to gain attention. The government responds with counter attacks and the restiveness of 
the mostly unemployed youths is fuelled. In other protest films of the Niger Delta genre, 
the inhabitants kidnap oil workers to continually make themselves heard (Agina, 2013).  
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An exchange of fire between Bayama youths and the oil workers leads to the 
death of three Bayama youths. Upon assembling the corpses in the palace before the 
king and chiefs, they are told to go and bury the dead while inaudibly adding ‘so that we 
can continue to feed off you’. In the next scene, the protesters donned militants’ garb, 
brandished leaves, machetes, and had red pieces of cloth tied around their heads, thus 
heralding their readiness for armed struggle. The Niger Deltans live in squalor and not 
too far away from them, there are mansions and luxury facilities built on their natural 
resources. Their grievance is aggravated by government efforts to silence their initially-
peaceful protests. Oil Village clearly traces, through peaceful negotiations to vengeful 
killings, the paths that lead to militancy. Three deaths lead to another in the opponent’s 
camp and even the chiefs cannot stop the spiralling effects nor can they remain 
untouched for much longer periods. Ogundiya (2011) provides a clear outline of the 
issues of neglect that lead to militancy in the oil-producing regions and fuel the violence 
therein. Soon, the chiefs are the target of the now-vicious youth group. The result of 
their death is the tribunal that claims the lives of the protesters by hanging.  
“Because national revenues...were distributed on the basis of population and not 
according to where they came from, minorities in the delta had little to show for the 
riches literally gushing from their land” (Maier 2000: 54). Oil Village thus argues that in 
this context, the situation in the delta is not the result of a single 
governmental/multinational (or non-governmental) policy such as revenue allocation or 
misconduct. It is an upper class domination and struggle for the power –even through 
violence – once possessed by colonial rule (Mbembe, 2002). The film’s optic navigates 
through numerous historical factors such as financial impropriety, inordinate greed and 
government inertia, to signal past and present marginalisation in the region and thus 
echoes what Barber (1987, 2014) called the voices of those who are denied access to 
official channels of communication.  Such minorities did not only own the land from 
which oil was extracted, they also had their livelihoods tied to it. As fishermen and 
farmers, they depended on the continued fertility of the river and soil to eke out a living. 
But with the violent dispossession of their land, the marginalised and aggrieved 
indigenes resort to armed struggle, which makes the film a political exposé on the roots 




7.5 Film 6: Stubborn Grasshopper 
7.5.1 The Metaphor of the Grasshopper & 'Wahala' in Onwuka's Artistic Vision 
That Nigerians’ economic problems – past and present – were caused by the military 
(Ajayi, 2007) is one of many arguments espoused in Stubborn Grasshopper. Directed 
by Simi Opeoluwa and produced by Sam Onwuka, Stubborn Grasshopper is a 2001 
portrayal of the private life (‘unofficial history’), and last years of the late Gen. Sanni 
Abacha (Sep. 20, 1943 – Jun. 8, 1998), former military Head of State and Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces in Nigeria (Nov. 17, 1993 – Jun 8, 1998).  The film begins 
with a slim portrayal of the 1993 presidential elections, and voting. Gen. Ibrahim 
Badamosi Babangida (Gen. Badmas, in the film) and Abacha’s predecessor is seen in a 
low angle shot walking to the polling both to vote. As he strides along, the ballot boxes 
with ‘WEC – Wahala Electoral Commission’ boldly printed on them are visible.  
To equate Abacha to a grasshopper, and Nigeria to the Republic of Wahala – as 
portrayed in the film – are at once instructive and satirical. Sam Onwuka, alludes to an 
Igbo proverb that reads: ukpana ukpoko gburu, nti chiri ya, that is, ‘the grasshopper 
killed by a train is a deaf one’. The Igbos used the proverb to refer to various kinds of 
obstinacy. A moving train is said to ‘warn’ the living creatures on its tracks before 
approaching them. Therefore any creature caught on the rail must either be deaf or 
stubborn; whatever the case, it gets killed. For Onwuka, it is the obduracy demonstrated 
by military heads of state that plunged Nigeria into its numerous political problems 
‘wahala’, and consequently, they too must face their demise. Wahala is both the Yoruba 
and pidgin for a confused state of problematic events. Official and unofficial versions of 
Nigeria’s political past are interwoven in this narrative to provide a glimpse of the 
country’s wahalas – specifically the authoritarian ideology on which the military based 
their leadership – and what the filmmaker called the “truth of the Nigerian situation” (S. 
Onwuka, personal communication, October 16, 2013).    
 Onwuka’s metaphors are instructive and original. Like the grasshopper, Alba 
knew when to leap away from trouble so much so that only an internal force – the 
machination of his cronies in the film – is able to bring him down. Joseph Obi’s analysis 
of Soyinka’s Season of Anomy is useful to this analysis. Of the novel, Obi writes that it 
uses characters of various walks “to undermine a brutal and corrupt regime headed by 
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an alliance of military men and civilians. Their main strategy is the surreptitious 
reeducation and politicization of the commonfolk...”(Obi, 1994: 407). The film’s 
metaphoric construction of Nigeria tells of dictatorship all over Africa by employing the 
qualities of the insect. Voracious, active, quick in flight and migratory, grasshoppers are 
practically insatiable and are able to eat up to 16 times daily. This parallels Abacha’s 
(Alba) rapacious appetite for wealth, power and debauchery, his speed in identifying 
and exterminating opposition, and his reluctance to be dissuaded from his political 
ascent even by former military heads of state (Egya, 2011; Maier 2000; Soyinka 1996; 
Obi 1994).  
Abacha’s obstinacy and authoritarian outlook is depicted in several scenes in the 
film: when he insists on being the next Head of State after Gen. Badmas in spite of the 
latter’s dissuasive pleas. It is important to note that Abacha, and in fact the military, did 
not have any business ruling the country in 1993 because elections had been held and 
the president elect had been announced. His ambition led him to scuttle the on-going 
democratic process in order to occupy the Aso Rock Villa (the Nigerian Presidential 
Complex). He is repeatedly framed as an intolerant and fearless man particularly after a 
pronouncement, when he puts on dark sunglasses and stares into the camera in a close-
up. Next, when there were riots on the streets due to the annulment of the election, he 
remains adamant. His response to his predecessor was that “there would always be 
casualties for every rise to power.” Later, when his economic policies caused a nation-
wide fuel scarcity, he rejected the reform proposals from his advisers and instead fired 
and murdered some of them. So, Onwuka’s idiomatic description was not only fitting, 
but was also illuminating in characterising the Nigeria that the military envisioned.  
 
7.5.2 Babangida, Abacha and the Rhetoric of Democracy in Stubborn Grasshopper 
The military never took their eyes off political power or governance. “The focus on 
superficial dimensions of liberalisation overshadowed a more sinister programme that 
involved dismantling institutions of civil society, entrenching arbitrary rule, and totally 
militarising the political landscape” (Ihonvbere, 1996: 198). The transition to civilian 
rule which the military advertised for over a decade was simply a rhetorical device 
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aimed at distracting the populace from their real agenda. From the film, it was clear that 
the promise to deliver the country to a civilian president was a façade.  
Babangida steps aside within the first half of the film making it truly an Abacha 
(Alba) story. Nigerians therefore awaited the swearing in of the president elect, and the 
definitive return to the barracks of the military executives.  National events took a 
different and unexpected turn, however, when 11 days later, Babangida announced the 
annulment of the election results. He claimed that only an insignificant number of the 
country’s population had voted. The protests in Lagos, and most of South-west Nigeria 
in support of Abiola, were massive… Even Soyinka echoing Achebe later wrote: 
On June 23, 1993, the day of the arbitrary annulment of the national 
presidential election, the military committed the most treasonable act of 
larceny of all time: It violently robbed the Nigerian people of their 
nationhood! A profound trust was betrayed, and only a community of 
fools will entrust its most sacred possession – nationhood – yet again to a 
class that has proven so fickle, so treacherous and dishonourable 
(Soyinka, 1996: 8-9) 
 
In the above statement, Soyinka censured both the ruling government and a fraction of 
civilians who believed that Babangida and later, Abacha acted for the interest of the 
people by delaying the hand-over to civilians. The film was so popular when it was 
released that it boosted the acting career of the lead actor, Sam Obeakheme, who was 
reported to have said that playing Abacha made him famous. This popularity contrasts 
Onwuka’s unsupported claim that the film sparked protests at its release, especially 
when read in the light of Haynes’ (2006) assertion that “Abacha had no real friends and 
consequently attacking his regime once it was over is politically safe” (p. 529).  
The main point here is Abiola’s contested political mandate and the failure of 
two successive military regimes to honour his electoral victory. The military only paid 
lip service to the idea of a democratic Nigeria. It was not to be, at least not through their 
actions. The late General Sani Abacha came into power in the Nigerian state after he 
masterminded the seventh (and final) coup d’etat in the nation’s political history on 
November 17, 1993. It was a period during which he ousted Chief Ernest Shonekan, 
Head of the National Interim Government, from power under the guise of state 
insecurity. This happened four months after Shonekan took over power in Aso Rock. 
Admittedly, Abacha had been called upon through personal letters and editorials from 
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the civil society to restore the June 12 elections result and guide the country back to 
civilian government. Earlier, Shonekan had been selected because he was from the same 
ethnic group as Abiola, and put in charge of the government by General Ibrahim 
Babangida, following international pressure to hand over to a civilians.  
Stubborn Grasshopper re-enacts the events that led to the annulment of 
Nigeria’s fairest democratic elections throughout its political history in 1993 by Abacha 
in an autocratic move akin to Mbembe’s (1997) description of Camroonian Paul Biya. It 
chronicles with little disguise the ascent to and exit by death of Abacha in 1998 with 
snapshots of events that occurred during the period. Through a semi-violent/bloodless 
coup, Abacha ousted the Head of the Interim Government and declared himself the 
Head of State. The figure of Chief Moshood Abiola, winner of the annulled elections, is 
depicted in the film to highlight the objectionable regime of Abacha and his hit men. In 
1994, when Abiola in a similar move, declared himself the President-elect of Nigeria by 
virtue of his victory in the elections that year, Abacha had him arrested and jailed for 
treason.  
When Cash (Abiola’s character) is given audience, he is first caught asleep. 
Although Abiola embodied the civilian elite, he was perceived by many as inefficient 
and politically inept (Maier, 2000). Alba says to Cash, “I told you we are ready to give 
you contracts in place of that (his mandate).” But Cash rejects the offer, and after 
Saleko is thrown out in a November 17, 1993 bloodless coup by Alba, he declares 
himself president at the suggestion of Chief Nze. Frantically, Alba asks for Cash’s 
arrest. At this point, WADECO intervenes. Alba is notified and he asks Terror (Clem 
Ohameze) to control the situation, his euphemism for eliminating any threatening 
voices. Images of pistols changing hands were rife in Stubborn Grasshopper. Dissident 
voices were immediately silenced by murder to deter further protests. Such was the 
language of the military that Nigeria witnessed in the 1990s, which Stubborn 
Grasshopper took to the screen.  
 
7.5.3 Stubborn Grasshopper: Political Violence, Corruption and the Military 
By political violence is meant aggressive acts meted out to civilians by those in power 
or their agents. Political assassinations grew in Abacha’s time, among them was 
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Abiola’s senior wife, Kudirat Abiola (Cash’s wife in the film) played by Eucharia 
Anunobi. A major murder operation is planned in which Alba’s son (Ramsey Nouah) 
gives the orders. This takes place in Lagos and thereafter the operators were 
compensated with N20m (£72,000) each and instructed to “leave the country and lie 
low till tensions reduce”. Abacha’s top security aide, Hamza al-Mustapha, (Major 
Terror, in the film) was to accompany the soldier to Lagos and hand him over to the 
Police Commissioner who was a supporter of the military government. Thus, criminal 
offenses were perpetuated and hushed among the political elite.   
A lot of money was earned in foreign currency during the military regimes and a 
lot more was equally squandered. Without revealing the staggering sums of money in 
question, Soyinka (1996) narrated the cement scandal of the 1970s and 80s, in which 
Nigerian military government had to pay demurrage for delayed vessels of cement in 
the ports of Lagos which stretched “fifty nautical miles away” (p. 81). The total amount 
of money paid by the government during the period was “at least a hundred times the 
annual budget of several African nations put together” (p. 81). In Stubborn 
Grasshopper, Alba is heard saying to his sons, “grab what you can, now that I am the 
Head of State”.  Government money was treated as personal asset, without 
consultations. Maier (2000) described the cash flow succinctly: “General Sani Abacha 
[ran] Nigeria not so much as a country but as his personal fiefdom. Billions of dollars 
were siphoned off into overseas bank accounts controlled by Abacha, his family or his 
cronies, while the masses simmered in anger at their deepening poverty...” (p. 3). An 
instance of Maier’s claim was played out in the film as the Republic of Malebo deal 
(referring to the Malabu Oil Deal), which entailed sending oil from Nigeria to another 
country on the basis of personal friendship with Abacha (Alba). The Minister of 
Petroleum advises against the move to Alba’s fury. On hearing this, the CSO suggests 
that the minister be relieved of his duty since his retention in office is perceived to 
undermine the dictator’s authority.  
Before the petroleum minister’s dismissal, Alba meets with him to discuss an oil 
business transaction, in which the latter says he has paid in $20m dollars to his foreign 
account through his son. That amount, the minister says, is affecting the importation of 
refined products, resulting in the shortage of fuel. Alba’s response is, “ask the masses to 
wait...if they can’t, we’ll use force on them.” This scenario was well reflected years 
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before by Fanon (1961) who wrote that post-colonial national leaders are “completely 
ignorant of the economy of their own country” (p. 151) because their understanding of 
nationalism is simply the “transfer to the natives the unfair advantages that were the 
legacy of the colonial period” (p. 152), and later by another postcolonialist, Soyinka, 
when he wrote:  
Abacha has no idea of Nigeria. Beyond the reality of a fiefdom that has 
dutifully nursed his insatiable greed and transformed him into a creature 
of enormous wealth, and now of power, Abacha has no notion of 
Nigeria. He is thus incapable of grasping what is being said to him by 
some entity that speaks with the resolute voice of the Civil Liberties 
Organization, the Campaign for Democracy, the National Democratic 
Coalition, the market women, civil servants, student unions, labour 
unions, the press and so forth. None of these could possibly be part of his 
Nigerian nation, and it is only by eliminating them in toto, by silencing 
such alien voices, that Nigeria can become the entity that he recognizes 
(1996: 15) 
 
Soyinka’s comments summarise the political situation of the country which informed 
the production of the film. Alba saw nothing other than his political ambition and rise to 
power. Neither internal pressure nor lobbying by the organisations mentioned by 
Soyinka above nor external pressure implied in the letter from the “international 
community” shown to him by Badmas, his predecessor, was capable of changing his 
mind. The filmmaker thus frames Alba’s military ideology as irrational, unjust and in 
the words of Obi (1994), as “life-negating... aberrant...ruthless and convulsing with 
carnage” (p. 407). Similarly, Egya writing about poetic response to the military period 
of Babangida (Badmas) and Abacha (Alba) noted “that these dictatorships are 
considered the highest point of military oppression in Nigeria may have accounted for 
the elevated levels of rage and mournfulness among...poets. Most of the poets, 
themselves unfortunate victims of the oppression...” (Egya 2011: 50).  
Without a good knowledge of Nigeria, and especially the country’s political 
history, the film Stubborn Grasshopper would be lost on the viewer, one of the evident 
flaws of Onwuka’s attempt at constructing a political past. Just as Soyinka’s Open Sore 
of a Continent is a puzzle to a foreign audience, so is the film which, although it 
disguises Nigerian history under Abacha, arguably reflects deeply that period of 
heightened political despotism, one in which Soyinka himself was a victim.  The film 
was made at a time when a foreign audience or Nigerians in the diasporas did not matter 
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much in the politics of distribution and exhibition of Nigerian film. It simply addressed 
an issue and a period, which the filmmaker believed to be in the front burner for most 
Nigerians because it dealt directly with their means of livelihood, daily transportation, 
health and security. Curiously, the depiction of these disturbing political situations has 
not favourably altered the socio-economic lives of the filmmakers or the audience. 
Arguably, the film generated conversations and controversy at its release (S. Onwuka, 
personal communication, October 16, 2013), but its immediate effect on social change 
or a more democratic system of governance is yet to be seen in spite of civilians’ control 
of power.  
 
7.6 In Conversation with One Another  
This section reads the films together, in conversation with one another and as a unified 
whole through which filmmakers construct a political history of Nigeria between 1967 
and 1998. A common thread that runs through the six films is the military confines 
within which each film is set. It is important to note, however, that the 32-year period 
was not entirely military-led.  
Between 1979 and 1983, Shehu Shagari was elected 6th president of Nigeria, 
until he was overthrown in a bloodless coup by Ibrahim Babangida. And in 1993, Ernest 
Shonekan served for three months as the Interim National Government leader until an 
Abacha-led putsch forcefully ushered him out of office alive. Barring these two brief 
periods, the military had a stronghold on Nigeria, which is why military ideology can be 
read in the films and the films as Haynes argued could only see the light of day from the 
post-military era. As far as state organisation goes, the military subscribed to forceful 
exercise of power, subjugation of the country, authoritarian domination, suspension of 
the constitution and the deployment of socio-economic factors to entrench control 
(Ajayi, 2007: 1-8). In fact, because the military have controlled political power for half 
the period of Nigeria’s independence, Ajayi suggests that democratically elected leaders 
have little but military styles of leadership to adopt.   
The last addition to the selection of films, HOAYS, begins with Nigeria’s 
independence in 1960 but runs quickly to the military coup that defines the political 
situations mirrored in the other films. The authoritarian ideology then is alive in the 
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films, milder in Anini and less so in Battle of Love, Across the Niger and HOAYS. It is at 
its least mildness in Oil Village and Stubborn Grasshopper, both of which envision the 
full wrath of the military in the Nigerian state.  
The civil war that formed the background of three films has also received 
conflicting and contesting reports in a large volume of academic and journalistic 
writings. Claims and counterclaims surged forward, personified in Odenigbo and Ms. 
Adebayo’s (HOAYS) dispute over the coup and subsequent war. Olanna’s symbolic 
intervention to calm frayed nerves did not amount to much just as interventionist efforts 
before 1967 within and outside Nigeria proved abortive. Each faction defended its own 
position without heeding the complexities of ethnic, religious and regional ideologies 
that successive military efforts defined and deepened.     
In the Nigerian political structure and culture, the military intervened for 
different reasons through successive coup d’etats.  According to Ajayi (2007), “the 
parochial activities of regionally-based political parties and their acrimonious struggle 
to control the centre also threatened to pull the nation apart many times before the 
military took over the reins of power in 1966” (p. 37). Similarly, Keith Panter-Brick 
observed the fall out of politicians arising from 1964 federal and 1965 regional 
elections, and the resulting breakdown of law and order in the regions (particularly the 
west) “were clearly the prelude to further more desperate measures involving in all 
probability the use of the army” (Panter-Brick, 1970: 14). Both authors highlight the 
severe regional conflicts brewing in the newly-independent nation, but also allude to 
personal interests and ambition disguised as party positions. Whatever the intention of 
the army, Ben Gbulie, one of the five plotters and executors of the January 1966 
provided his own account:  
The truth of the matter, of course, was that the January coup was a coup 
of the progressive elements of the Nigerian Armed Forces – an 
intervention clearly necessitated by the breakdown of law and order in 
the country. It was therefore neither an “Igbo affair” nor, for that matter, 
the affair of any other ethnic group connected with it. It was essentially a 
symbiotic operation conducted, in spite of its apparent shortcomings, in 
the best interest of the nation” (Gbulie, 1981: 152) 
 
This supposedly ‘noble’ and corrective claim, visually absent from the films, did not 
remain so owing to the multiple interpretations it received from political observers and 
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analysts including army officers of the period. In fact, it opened the flood gate to 
Yakubu Gowon, Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha – all former military Heads of 
State – to prolong their stay in political office after overthrowing the so-called corrupt 
leaders.  The destructive repercussions of war were repeatedly mouthed by Dubem and 
his travelling comrades (Battle of Love and Across the Niger) as well as by Odenigbo 
and his cronies (HOAYS) without directly connecting those pronouncements to the 
military intervention that led to the state of events they found themselves in. Worthy of 
note is the military background of Dubem and his fellow travellers, but not in any one 
instance in the film did they attribute their predicament to the actions of their 
colleagues.  So, there is a paradox in which military arrangements are at once criticised 
and lauded, subverted and promoted. Poised as the hero through whom the ‘One 
Nigeria’ mantra becomes a reality, Dubem is himself a blind and uncritical promoter of 
military ideology. He focuses on ethnic differences as the cause of the Nigerian scourge 
and de-emphasizes or completely ignores the military forces that dismantled the country 
whose creed he professes. Civilian Odenigbo on the other hand maintains strong ethnic 
affiliations which suggestively discountenances other ethnic groups (evidenced in his 
bickering with Adebayo, reported above) and the military.  
In Anini, the military is virtually absent. But the impact of their directives was 
evident in their subordinates’ actions. The directives ensured that their authority was 
maintained, and any threat to its maintenance was carefully resisted even if through 
violence as Mbembe (2002) aptly reminded. Thus, the threat to Babangida’s military 
administration posed by Anini and his gang was the motivation for the redeployment of 
army officers and policemen in the city where the armed gang operated. Non-
performing officers and those killed or wounded by Anini were substituted in the hope 
that their replacement would institute the ‘order’ that was necessary for Babangida’s 
continued stranglehold. Such redeployments like Parry Osayande’s and Eddy Edion’s 
are hardly greeted enthusiastically by the affected individuals. They were and still are 
the indirect means of exerting control, and have been transferred to democratic 
governments. Edion’s transfer from the Lagos Zonal office of the film Censor’s Board 
to Bauchi State parallels the military redeployments because “anything that did not 
recognize this violence as authority, that contested its protocols was savage and outlaw” 
(Mbembe, 2002: 26). Thus, Edion was the outlaw transferred because of his divergent 
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opinions on HOAYS from those of Patricia Bala, the Board’s Director General. Bala’s 
actions insinuated an arbitrariness informed by ethnic-colourations.   
In Oil Village and Stubborn Grasshopper, arbitrariness was not the only feature 
of military ideology; authoritarianism, commercial capitalism and political 
‘godfatherism’ loomed large. In both films, and as shown in their individual discussions 
above, Mbembe’s description of the postcolony is evoked. Whether through the 
community chiefs in Oil Village, and later through Abacha as depicted in the film, or 
again as through Alba (Abacha) in Stubborn Grasshopper, “at any moment, [they] 
usurped the law and, in the name of the state, exercised it for purely private ends” 
(Mbembe 2002: 28). Such private ends were often financial, leading to a steady decline 
of the Nigerian economy, without consultations, collegiality, negotiations or consensus. 
That Nollywood filmmakers, popular artists and those formerly criticised as being 
apolitical, are the bearers of these disturbing historical and political truths is reflective 
of Barber’s description of the social positioning of the Yoruba travelling theatre 
workers:  
[they] (primary school, informal sector) took a solicitous but superior 
attitude to the mass of the people, seeing their own role as being to 
educate and enlighten them, while respecting the custodians of cultural 
traditions; they claimed a status akin to that of a preacher, a teacher, or a 
journalist and saw themselves as more effective in these roles than the 
university dramatists (2014: xviii) 
 
Hence, the comments of the filmmakers interviewed corroborate Barber and profoundly 
reiterate the key points of this research: that the filmmakers are neither apolitical nor 
ahistorical, that they have delved into their country’s deep and dark past to mine the 
narratives, which they have constructed through the usual Nollywood story-telling 
narratives, and that the stylistic modes and conventions of narrating the past, couched as 
they may be for censorship reasons, reveal the society from which they emerged. And 
that such narratives are infused with the personal traits of the filmmakers.  
 The techniques of handling the films may raise ideological questions too as in 
some cases the unintended jump at the viewer. Anini was produced to highlight the 
antics of a “common criminal” but I argued above that a critical reading of the film 
unravels a celebratory approach to the business of armed robbery and particularly to the 
Lawrence Anini episode. Oil Village claims to tell a Ken Saro-Wiwa story, but that is 
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not made visible till the second instalment of the serially-constructed film. Battle of 
Love and Across the Niger are motivated by a united Nigeria agenda yet they fail to 
problematize the military’s role in the pursuit of ‘One Nigeria’.  
Ajayi (2007) and Falola and Heaton (2008) agree on the authoritarian rule of the 
military, seeking “to maintain power through oppression, coercion and the manipulation 
of the democratic process” (Falola and Heaton, 2008: 209). Even when the military 
handed over power in 1979 through elections, there was widespread belief that they had 
a vested interest in determining their successor (Ajayi, 2007), partly to cover their tracks 
and partly to perpetuate the indirect rule employed by the colonial government. 
Widespread rumours had it that the military was responsible for hand-picking the 
successor. The relationship between military rule and colonial regime was drawn by 
Mbembe in the following words:  
the lack of justice of the means, and the lack of legitimacy of the ends, 
conspired to allow an arbitrariness and intrinsic unconditionality that 
may be said to have been the distinctive feature of colonial sovereignty. 
Postcolonial state forms have inherited this unconditionality and the 
regime of impunity that was its corollary (2002: 26).   
 
Another common thread in the films is ethnicity, ethnic chauvinism and regional 
politics: for good and for ill, which has been discussed above. Before Nigeria’s 
independence, political parties were organised along ethnic lines and on the basis of 
godfatherism. As a pro-Biafran film, HOAYS was ethnically-skewed with the patronage 
system given a marginal representation at the Independence Day lunch in the twins’ 
home. In Oil Village, the community chiefs appointed grass-root folks chosen from the 
protesters’ ethnic groups to advance their pillaging course. In Stubborn Grasshopper, 
both military heads, Badmas (Babangida) and Alba (Abacha) selected civilians from 
civil society groups and planted them strategically among the populace both to gather 
intelligence on public opinion but also to placate the disaffected members of their ethnic 
groups, particularly the Yorubas.   
This chapter has attempted ideological readings of the films, which uncovered 
intended and unintended accounts of the portrayal of history in video films. As was 
shown above, the films are reflective of the ideological projects of the period each of 
them depicted and the period that produced them. It is informative to read the films in 
conversation with one another because of the common themes that they embodied. The 
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main point is that films are ideologically rendered, and ought to be read as such if the 
texts and subtexts are to be constructively deconstructed. As pointed out above, and 
inspired by Kellner (n.d.), the readings did not adopt as monolithic understanding of 
ideology either in the Marxist, Hegelian or any other notion for that matter. It simply 
drew out, from the political culture prevalent in the country of study, the glaring and 
less glaring systems of beliefs, themes, conceptions and language that reveal how power 
is acquired, maintained, struggled over (Brummett, 2010) or even ceded. That popular 
art forms such as video films are ideologically positioned revealed the validity of 
Barber’s (1987, 1997a), Okome’s (2003) and Okoye’s (2007a) thoughts on non-elite 
expressive art forms debating matters of deep interest where official channels of 



















JOURNALISTS’ RECEPTION OF FILMS 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that while the filmmakers approached their stories with 
particular agenda, some actual representations were shot through with meanings other 
than those originally intended.  One of the important contributions of this study is the 
idea that film-filmmaker-audience is a viable way of understanding the cultural 
productions and contexts of production in Nollywood, broadly understood. No study, 
however, has adopted as a method of enquiry the triangulation of films (textual 
analysis), filmmakers (interviews) and audiences (mainly interviews rather than survey). 
This chapter examines in a novel way the reception of ‘history’ in Nigerian films 
through the agency of journalists. It does not attempt to provide journalists’ readings of 
the films dealt with in the last three chapters. Rather, it focuses on a broad portrayal of 
the past in Nollywood films as perceived by journalists whose affinity and participation 
in the industry place them in a more privileged position of viewership than most other 
audiences.   
As identified above (chapter 3), previous Nollywood studies have either focused 
on one aspect of the industry or on multiple aspects taken together. Textual analyses 
have dominated the study of Nollywood. There have been few audience and reception 
studies of Nigerian films; presumably because both are more complex research 
procedures as Jackie Stacey (1993) rightly observes. Audiences are so diverse, difficult 
to gather in a location, often unwilling to participate in a researcher’s data collection 
process, not to mention their ever-changing tastes and preferences. It thus becomes 
necessary to assess their reception of films in places where they would ordinarily be: 
either in a beer parlour (Okome, 2007) or in a tertiary education institution (Agina, 
2011). But that marginalises those audiences who are neither found in beer parlours nor 
in higher education centres. This brings to the fore, the question related to who the 
audience is and how an audience might be identified. In defining an audience, Barber 
(1997b) espouses among other ideas that of a “listener’s intentional orientation” (p. 
362). This suggests deliberateness in giving one’s attention to a spectacle, a moving 
image, in addition to being prepared to associate meaning to that spectacle or image. In 
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a sense, an audience assumes the space between a moving image and its ‘meaning’, 
without implying any homogeneity in and of that meaning.   
After isolating a very small number of films that suited my selection criteria, 
viewing them repeatedly, speaking with the producers and directors of those films, and 
even analysing some in a recent publication (Agina, 2013), I was keen to enter the 
minds of an audience who were “intentionally orientated” to the film industry at the 
time of their production. Barber pointed out that: 
the best reason for studying audiences is that they have a hand in the 
constitution of the meaning of a performance, text or utterance. Cultural 
historians or anthropologists who study texts and performances in order 
to understand what people think need to look not only at the utterance 
but also at the interpretation of that utterance” (1997b: 356).  
 
The films were made between 2001 and 2013. The question, ‘how did, and how do 
people react to films like the Battle of Love/Across the Niger, Stubborn Grasshopper or 
Anini, for instance?’ engaged my attention for a long time. My reasoning was that the 
audience component would round-out the discussions on the topic: Nigerian filmmakers 
and their construction of a political past.  
However, measuring the reception of the films under investigation in this 
research posed a problem. Since the films were released between 2001 and 2013, it was 
difficult to assess what was said or written about them at that time. Efforts to gather 
information from newspapers that ran sections on Nigerian films at their release proved 
abortive (because of the lack of preservation culture. Even leading cultural journalists 
such as Steve Ayorinde and Shaibu Husseini could not provide any). No less 
problematic was gathering people – in ‘unnatural’ or contrived situations – to watch the 
films and discuss them afterwards, an experience which I already reported in the first 
chapter. For such people, the scenario was not entertaining; it was merely a constructed 
set up intended to assist a researcher gather data. Besides, there was also no guarantee 
that the responses of such people in 2012-2013, when the data was actively sought, 
would have been the same between 2001 and 2013 when the films were made (and if 
they had seem them then).  
Because of the lapsed time between the initial release and the time of this study, 
it was not considered appropriate to adopt the ‘screen and discuss’ method used in 
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Innocent Uwah’s (2013) study of Nollywood films and Igbo culture, in which he 
screened 10 minutes of each film and discussed it with research participants who were 
paid for their troubles. Further, Stacey’s comments are illustrative of the methodological 
challenge of measuring reception in this context. She states that “studying cinema 
audiences from the past adds further problems to questions of ‘access’ and additionally 
complicates interpretive strategies because of the role of memory in structuring 
audiences’ accounts of their viewing practices” (Stacey 1993: 263). An innovative 
strategy was therefore adopted to measure reception of the films being discussed long 
after their release. The exercise was intended to yield greater insights to methods of 
future reception studies of Nollywood and indeed African films.  
In Africa, Nollywood films have undergone mixed reactions and reception from 
the viewing population. Edited volumes such as Viewing African Cinema and Global 
Nollywood have specifically addressed the questions of reception within the continent 
and elsewhere, among Africans, African diasporic, European and American audiences. 
Both texts provide useful information on the trans-nationality of Nollywood and its 
reception in diverse socio-cultural contexts. Some of the contributions in the texts 
address specific films employed by the authors to demonstrate the dynamics of 
Nollywood’s contexts of migration. All of those contributions invariably adopt textual 
analyses and ethnographic approaches. Stacey (1993) observes that textual analysis has 
its own benefits and is indeed beneficial for understanding narrative styles, points of 
view, plot constructions, the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of narratives. But it does not completely 
answer questions about director/producer- motivations or cinema audiences without 
whom the social and political functions of the narratives do not have much force. Stacey 
notes that “audience studies continue to be a striking absence” (p. 262) in the broad 
spectrum of film studies. Much of what has been written in the past on Nigerian film 
studies have been on the texts themselves or on the institutions funding or regulating 
such productions. Relatively little, if at all, has been documented historically on film 
audiences and the dynamics of spectatorship. Stacey (1993) also rightly emphasizes the 
complexity of audience studies:  
Finding the material in the first place is a problem, since availability is 
clearly difficult in the historical study of film reception. Whether written 
in the past, or collected retrospectively by researchers today, the material 
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will always be shaped by discursive factors and will produce a very 
particular set of selective knowledges (p. 265) 
 
In spite of the paucity of reception studies conducted after or while viewing particular 
films such as Uwah’s (2013), some authors have conducted ethnographic studies which 
included participant observation (Krings and Okome, 2013; Okome, 2007), and surveys 
(Esan, 2008; Ashakoro, 2010 and Agina, 2011). Similarly, Krings (2004) writing in 
another context also notes the interrogation of “filmmakers, actors and especially the 
audience is important to understanding the assumptions made by researchers based on 
film texts alone” (p. 168). Reception studies are rare, yet they are important indicators 
of the interaction between filmmakers and audiences, and it is for that reason that there 
is sufficient basis for this chapter of my thesis.  
  
8.2 Journalists as Unique Audiences  
In the preface to the Nigerian edition of Nigerian Video Films (2000), the first academic 
publication on the videos, Haynes wrote, “already two fairly substantial bodies of 
writing have grown up around the videos. One is the prolific newspaper reporting and 
reviewing, which provide an extensive and lively chronicle of the industry” (p. xvii). 
That statement answers a methodological question in this research, even if it raises other 
legitimate ones. Film journalists, arts and culture editors write and speak about the 
Nigerian film industry on a weekly basis, and are identified in this research as 
information rich sources (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 28) which can be derived through a 
snowball sampling technique.  Writing about the events and sources of scholarship on 
Nollywood, Haynes again points out that: 
In Lagos, journalists produce a wealth of material on Nollywood... Oji 
Onoko’s useful book Glimpses of our Stars (1999) grew out of profiles 
he did for the African Concord magazine and ThisDay. Chidi Nebo, a 
columnist for The Vanguard, wrote a satirical book about Nollywood, 
Reel Blunders (2000). Shaibu Husseini has been doing a series of 
interviews with film people, publishing them weekly for more than five 
years in The Guardian; his editor, Jahman Anikulapo, is editing some of 
them into a book... Steve Ayorinde, formerly of The Guardian, whose 
reports on the Nigerian video industry as it began are essential reading... 
It would be productive if more journalists were coaxed into academic 
settings ... because they are a valuable resource for writing the history of 




Therefore, seventeen journalists who had reported Nollywood for a minimum of five 
years from 10 major newspapers (The Guardian, This Day, Business Day, Nigerian 
Tribune, National Mirror, The Vanguard, Entertainment Express, Saturday 
Independent, The Sun, 234Next) and two freelancers were sought through the snowball 
sampling, and interrogated. A total of 13 interviews – 8 face-to-face, 4 emails and 1 
telephone – were successfully conducted while four of them turned down interview 
requests for tight work schedules or official travel at the time. The journalists are first 
degree holders, mainly in Mass Communication. All reside in Lagos and like all 
journalists, claim to be poorly paid even though none of them divulged the actual sum. 
Other sources claimed a monthly salary estimate of N100,000 (£361). This has its own 
implications for reportage and information dissemination.  
This mediated interview strategy, with its own drawbacks, proved to be not only 
a useful approach in understanding Nigerian video film audiences, but also, a rich 
source of information (snowballing) on the film industry itself. The study recognises the 
academic (and other) scepticism, which may result from the declining state of Nigerian 
journalism practice including the lack of requisite skill in writing about film and 
unethical compromises which journalists often have to make.  For instance, Daniel 
Smith in his book, A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular 
Discontent in Nigeria, notes that the press itself has a credibility problem stemming 
from “the fluid lines between fact and fiction” (Smith 2007: 228).  
However, these considerations do not discredit the fact that this group of people 
know a lot about the film industry. One of the interviewees revealed to me the technical 
constraints he had regarding producing film reviews, but also added that critical reviews 
were not appreciated by his audience and editors (B. Njoku, personal communication, 
May 18, 2013). This point was corroborated by Nse Okon-ekong who noted that if he 
wrote critical reviews, his editor would “ask me to go and start my own newspaper” (N. 
Okon-ekong, personal communication, May 17, 2013). So, factors such as credibility, 
media ownership and leadership as well as technical abilities impinged on the 
intervention of the journalists as audiences. However, they proved to be a mine of 
information regarding film production and consumption in Nigeria, apart from being a 
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pragmatic approach to interrogating audiences in the face of the challenges mentioned 
above.   
In addition to these, the option of questioning journalists is legitimate because of 
the prominent roles they play. Film journalists maintain weekly and semi-weekly 
columns in Nigerian newspapers on the general state of the industry and of particular 
films and filmmakers. Most of them admitted to privileging actors’ lifestyles over 
critical film reviews to satisfy the fans of the actors. Steve Ayorinde, Jahman Anikulapo 
and Shaibu Husseini sit on the jury of awards ceremonies like African Movie Academy 
Awards (AMAA). Most of the journalists attend film premieres at cinemas, and 
particularly private or press screenings so that they can gather news for their weekly 
columns. They attend film festivals all over Africa and elsewhere. Therefore, I consider 
their expert knowledge and closeness to the film industry sufficient basis for their 
contribution to my work.  
The socio-cultural contexts of the journalists’ interpretation are taken into 
cognizance as an intervening element in speaking about the films and the industry. Also 
relevant are their knowledge and relationship with the film producers and directors, 
including an awareness of the dynamics of the medium of creating meaning. Memory 
interfers with an adequate reflection on the films because of the passage of time 
mentioned above. Olumide Iyanda, Editor, Saturday Independent, stated that he had 
seen most of the films that mattered in Nollywood, and those studied in this work, but 
he was unable to provide a scene by scene recollection of them (personal 
communication, May 24, 2013). Journalists’ dominant readings and perceptions of the 
industry are addressed by examining their understandings of the pasts the filmmakers 
portray, the motivation, the audiences, challenges of depicting the past and the future of 
the industry they are a part of.  
 
8.3 What ‘History’?  
From the interviews which were all conducted in Lagos, it was observed that the 
journalists, preferred the term ‘history’ to the ‘political past’ as distinguished in chapter 
2 above. Thus references were made to historical films even though in previous 
chapters, I have maintained the political and the past as two determining factors in the 
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choice of films for this study. Steve Ayorinde’s (National Mirror) comment on the 
political being interwoven with history and vice versa sets out the tone that the 
interviews followed. Does Nollywood portray Nigeria’s political past and what forms 
do those portrayals (if any) take?  Clearly, Hall’s (2001) assertion that decoding media 
texts do not necessarily and inevitably follow from the encoding process is borne out in 
the responses below. Variations of insufficient history, cultural epics as history or no 
history at all greeted the digital voice recorder on which the interviews were recorded 
and later transcribed. While the journalists confirmed mild representations of history, 
they also vehemently described what was believed to be an aversion or indifference to 
the topic of ‘history’. Subsequently, their italicised responses below ranged from 
comparisons between the early filmmakers discussed in chapters two and three above to 
its paucity and their substitution of ‘history’ films with cultural epics as the Nollywood 
historical genre:  
A.AJELUORU: With Ugbomah, history was taken seriously; indeed, 
history was it. It was something that informed and prepared young minds 
for the future, so they didn’t make mistakes of the past. So, for 
Ugbomah’s celluloid, history was prominent. His films reflected the 
importance of history like Death of a Black President, Oil Doom, Dr. 
Oyenusi and so on... But today, no; not enough is being done now. 
Indeed, not much to that effect. Nigerians still look forward to such films 
(May 28, 2013). 
S. AYORINDE: Nollywood has managed to respond to almost 
everything. A few will get a pass mark for historical representations 
(May 6, 2013). 
O. IYANDA: There’s very little history in Nollywood probably because 
the producers think that it wouldn’t sell. There is a popular saying in 
Nollywood that says, “na wetin the people wan see” translated as it’s 
what the people want to see (May 24, 2013).  
A. ABODURIN: Some of these filmmakers call the fictional epics 




D. AJAO: In the Nollywood context, no. Nollywood has not engaged 
with Nigerian historical events as much as it should. However, that 
might be asking too much of the industry. In my opinion, Nollywood did 
not start out to attend to the historical (June 3, 2013).  
J. ANIKULAPO: I don’t think we should generalise. Some have, but all 
cannot because they are purely meant for entertainment. Is it only when 
they talk about Politics that we will say they are socially conscious...You 
can’t push popular art to tell your history (May 11, 2013). 
The narratives given by the filmmakers in chapter four are different from the above, 
with the position of each respondent reflected in the comments. While the filmmakers 
tend to be defensive and point to the cultural epics as their ‘history’ or begin a litany of 
reasons why history is or is not evident in their films, the journalists state explicitly that 
constructions of the past are marginal if at all. Fred Amata, who directed Anini referred 
to his production as an action film, and in another instance as a library film, is not 
understood in such terms as shown in the reports by this group of audiences. Such 
differences, while not necessarily negative, do establish that “the degrees of symmetry 
in the communication exchange depend on the degrees of symmetry established 
between the positions of the producer and the receiver” (Hall 2001:510). The “structural 
differences of relation and position” (ibid.) make the codes of a ‘library’ or ‘action’ film 
negotiable and effectively negotiated. However, the “insufficient history” reported 
above meshes in an analogous way to the features of library holdings.  
On the specific films discussed in previous chapters most of which the 
interviewees had seen, but which they remembered vaguely, it was a mix of reactions:  
S. AYORINDE.: Across the Niger is a film that stands out in many 
regards. Overlook some technical drawbacks and you’ll see it was a 
good film. It’s a shame we haven’t seen anything like it since then. Was it 
successful? Yes. It didn’t do so well at [international] festivals though... 
As a work of art, it’s an accomplished film, beautifully told...with aspects 
of our history. I commend that film...   
Anini did not do too badly in terms of reception. It earned a few 
appraisals... (May 6, 2013). 
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A.AJELUORU: I’ve only seen Across the Niger ... and not the others. 
Kingsley Ogoro’s Across the Niger, although based on the Nigerian Civil 
War, is more a romance story than actually threshing up the political 
issues that caused the war. But indeed, it served as an important 
reminder about that tragic episode of Nigeria’s history; commendable 
effort (May 28, 2013). 
J. ANIKULAPO: Across the Niger may have been a little soft in the 
way it portrayed the past. It’s a story of love after all. The war was in the 
background. Oil Village is also a good film that is politically and 
historically conscious (May 11, 2013) 
O. IYANDA: Stubborn Grasshopper is a bold attempt to step out of the 
usual boundaries. I will not say more than that for now (May 24, 2013).  
Once more, differentiated readings of the films are evident. The films are not read 
within the dominant codes of production. Kingsley Ogoro reported in chapter four 
above said: I wanted people to come out of the theatre and think they had seen the war. 
But the readings suggest that rather than war, romance was read. Hall’s analytic 
“reference code” is relegated to the back in the audiences’ reading of Across the Niger 
as romance in war or war in romance, or even romance and war. Up to a point, the 
readings even become prescriptive, if not oppositional, as the comments below reveal.  
Regarding the question of constructing the past, the journalists were of the 
opinion that the industry has failed to demonstrate high aspirations by restricting its 
narrative options to the band-wagon paradigm. The band-wagon production model was 
confirmed by several filmmakers interviewed for this research. According to the most 
prominent ones among them, it was an anchor that held the prospect of success when 
the investment of a filmmaker’s entire savings was at stake. Repeating successful story 
lines with minor alterations and casting popular actors were precautionary measures that 
guaranteed dividends.  This situation effectively shut out un- or thinly-explored 
territories such as the construction of the past:   
S. AYORINDE.: Nollywood has imposed a limitation on itself from the 
beginning reducing its import to popular culture. If Hollywood is 
popular culture, and has produced a lot of history. Then why does 
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Nollywood limit itself so? The problems listed by Nollywood are not 
peculiar to it. Magazines, newspapers... struggle with funding, electricity 
supply and the like 
Not to make a foray into such narratives will be inadequate for an 
industry that is producing so much. It can’t all be rituals and romance... 
There must be some other engagement with aspects of history even if we 
have to express displeasure or engage directors in terms of conclusions 
and narrative styles (May 6, 2013).   
S. HUSSEINI: I think they have not fully exploited that genre yet… I 
mean ‘20 years’ after what is believed to be the birth of commercial 
movie making in Nigeria, there have been no significant movie shot on 
Nigeria as a country, its amalgamation, independence or even major 
landmark events (May 26, 2013).    
O. IYANDA: How come nobody has done a film about Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
Awolowo, Tafawa Balewa. We’ve seen Lincoln, The King’s Speech. 
When you look at the scale of Nollywood’s production and the number of 
films that touch on history, you find out that the latter is quite low (May 
24, 2013). 
D. AJAO: I would say the only record of Nigerian film of history 
crossing generations would be in the industry's 'dynasties' for want of a 
better word. The likes of the Amatas, the Ejiros and now Kunle Afolayan 
and his actor-brothers... (June 3, 2013).     
As discussed in the fourth chapter, Nollywood’s alternative to the past is the cultural 
epic that flooded the markets and graced the screens in the 1990s. Popularised by Andy 
Amenechi’s Igodo (1999) which had a male protagonist, the epics appeared in the form 
of remakes of Igodo and a host of similar narratives set in pre-colonial rural 
communities and parading actors dressed in leaves and raffia. Such representations were 
generally received with a combination of positive and negative reactions as Novia 




A. ABODURIN: The Igbos make some funny epic films. I don’t know 
where they get their own accounts of history from. They just look for one 
muscular guy who will play the hero...then the Yorubas do virtually 
everything. Then don’t forget that there is also the element of spirituality 
in all the epics. Some of them have good conflict but it is how to resolve 
the conflict rationally that is the problem...so they just go spiritual (May 
15, 2013). 
N. OKON-EKONG: The producers of such epic films are trying to fit 
into Western modes of African understanding. There was NEVER a time 
we wore raffia or jute bag as an item of clothing (May 17, 2013).  
These comments and those reported in the fourth chapter reveal that accuracy was not a 
feature to be pursued in the narrative of the past especially for the producers of the 
cultural epics. As was earlier pointed out, the sources of the stories included folk tales 
which no one bordered to verify for their levels of truth because they were constructed 
as moral lessons, didactic tools of the oral tradition. What seemed important then, was 
that the stories be decoded as messages from the past to aid the moral dispositions of the 
present times, rather than as veracious purveyors of historical facts.  
In her essay on audiences in Africa, Barber (1997b) justified the position that 
audiences are primarily constituted by the performance. It is the enthusiastic greetings 
with which performances are greeted that cause the producers of popular arts to 
mushroom. The popularity enjoyed by the producers of the cultural epics was therefore 
the element that stoked the fires of production. Were the audiences not as keen on 
viewing the ‘epics’, they would have died out naturally. This keenness ought not to be 
interpreted narrowly or necessarily as approval because as one of the filmmakers 
revealed, people watched the films so that they can criticise us (C. Ejiro, personal 
communication, November 2010) 
Closely linked to the challenges of constructing the past as reported by the 
journalists is the issue of funding, which is required to conduct adequate research before 
filming. As shown in the fourth chapter, the filmmakers are of the opinion that funding 
makes all the difference in a period piece. While that may be a plausible argument in 
their favour, there are reasons to doubt that adequate funding will not be trumped by 
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other interests: audience appeal, director’s motivation and perspective on a particular 
story. Although HOAYS challenges the assumption that funding will solve all the 
problems expected to arise when depicting the past, there is sufficient evidence from the 
filmmakers that budgetary constraints impinge on history in the video films. The 
journalists’ responses support the notion that research is ill-served:  
D. AJAO: I have seen a couple claiming to re-enact some civil war or 
the other, obviously not Biafra!  Part of the problem with Nollywood is 
poor research and in effect misrepresentation of historical fact... (June 3, 
2013).   
A.AJELUORU: But Nollywood treats history in a cavalier manner; it 
isn’t given its proper perspective. It’s all romance, voodoo and what-not 
(May 28, 2013). 
O. IYANDA: One of the challenges of making history is that you must 
do your research very well. If you have to go back in time to capture the 
essence of that time, a lot of things have to go into the production. It’s 
not the same as making a comedy or romantic story where you can call 
your friends and they appear and act as dressed. The props are 
important. You have to think of the cars of the time if that appears in 
your story. But today, you can grab a friend that has a Range-rover and 
you are good to go... Yes, it’s expensive but even if you want to do a 
historical movie in Nigeria, you don’t need half the budget of Titanic 
(May 24, 2013).   
Beyond the issues addressed above, filmmakers claim an interaction with their 
audiences that ensure their productions meet the latter’s demands. Their assumptions, 
often based on sales figures, are contested by the journalist-audience. This immediately 
suggests the complexities associated with assessing audience preferences for they are 






8.4 “Na wetin people wan see” 
In 2011, Chico Ejiro, popularly known as Mr. Prolific, gave two reasons why he 
was unlikely to re-enact Nigeria’s political past. The first is that he thought such a task 
belonged to the government. Ejiro added that he was not being supported by the 
government as a filmmaker and that such propagandist filmmaking belonged to the 
government of the day. He questioned the rationale behind making a film about the 
government if that was not guaranteed to yield any benefit to him. The second was that 
the audience, his audience was not interested in watching those films. Asked how he 
knew that with certainty, his replied revealed the industry’s informal and undocumented 
ways of assessing the reception of their films. For them, the success of a film was 
determined by the amount of money the producer’s account increased by. Ejiro’s 
comments were echoed and modified at different moments of my research by 
filmmakers and journalists.  
Even though Ejiro’s comments were similar to ‘na wetin people wan see’, it was 
Olumide Iyanda who used the Pidgin expression to refer to the well-known saying in 
Nollywood. I enquired amongst other journalists what they thought about Ejiro’s 
assertions regarding the audience:  
S. AYORINDE: What is driving the consumer pattern in Nollywood is 
not necessarily the theme but availability. Audience preferences dictate 
choice of subject e.g. romance over history but it’s a convenient and 
commercial way to look at art. No one has done any research to 
determine accurately what the audience prefers. It’s based on what they 
think and what sells at a particular moment. Nollywood’s audiences are 
housewives, retirees and students. The subject of history in film is for a 
more discerning audience (May 6, 2013) 
O. IYANDA: I would argue that it’s not particularly true that the 
Nigerian film audience is not interested in history. It depends on what 
you are packaging and how you are giving it to them. I give people the 
example of Fela on Broadway. Until it came to Nigeria, I’m sure very 
few people thought of doing anything on Fela. By the time it came, 
everybody was waowed about it. Everybody was going ooh and ah. So, if 
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you put that kind of commitment too into Nigerian films, yes, it would 
work. People may think that enough research has not gone into it.  
At the end of the day, I put the lack of history in our films down to the 
fear of producers. You see, it’s easier to make films on romance, comedy 
than the history ones. If you are making a film on 1914, everything in the 
film must be 1914. There mustn’t be any pure water sachet on the floor, 
no okada sounds...Films like that are subject to more critical reviews 
than your regular films.  There was a time a film was done on Oduduwa, 
and people questioned the use of Igbo characters for key roles, people 
who couldn’t speak Yoruba very well. As a typical example, in Oleku by 
Tunde Kelani, you see a poster of Brandy. Of course, a lot of people 
didn’t notice that, but Brandy is a 1990 phenomenon, and Oleku was set 
in the 60s. So even those you think are masters get it wrong once in a 
while.  
The people who will appreciate historical films are those who are 
cerebral and they will be critical of what they see. If the film becomes 
popular because people are talking about it, then more people will see it 
(May 24, 2013).  
Y. OGUNDARE: It’s not true that the audience will not patronise 
movies that deal with the past. People will buy quality productions, good 
directing and dialogue...People bought and watched Jeta Amata’s 
Amazing Grace (May 7, 2013).  
A. ABODURIN: Nigerians are intelligent. You don’t just force a 
slapdash production on them. Yes, there are some who’ll take anything 
but there are also some that are enlightened, who’ll see your trash for 
what it is and won’t waste their time on it (May 15, 2013).  
N. OKON-EKONG: Nigerian audience and history? They are hungry 
for it. Did you go to see Kakadu, the historical play? The hall was 
packed full! The filmmakers will have to bring their creativity to bear 
because its success will largely depend on how the story is told. The 
younger generation will benefit a lot from it. People want to see films 
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with strengths and frailties of significant Nigerians not just all the good. 
There are many stories to tell. The scriptwriter has a lot of 
responsibility. He/she can do so much especially if the story is woven in 
a careful and creative way (May 17, 2013)  
The apparent contestations in the comments above reveal one of the strongest claims of 
this research, which is the importance of the film-filmmaker-audience research 
paradigm. By interrogating a sole component of this paradigm, one loses the rich 
insights of the other two. Of course the questions asked of films, filmmakers or 
audiences will depend on the objectives of such an endeavour, but this approach shows 
up the deficiencies or blind spots of a single element. Furthermore, self-reporting is 
often embellished to enhance the speaker’s image, therefore alternative voices broaden 
the results of the research. Filmmakers are not solely motivated or demotivated by 
audience preferences as the above shows, but by other observable factors highlighted by 
journalists.  
The fourth chapter dealt at length on the motivation of producing the past as 
well as on producing films generally. Much of the information contained in the chapter 
drew on interviews with filmmakers and the researcher’s observation of industry trends. 
The same question of filmmaking motivation was addressed to the journalists and while 
the responses largely corroborated the initial findings, there were some interesting 
dimensions from industry reporters: 
Y. OGUNDARE: Some of the women want glamour so that they can 
meet rich men and obtain benefits. Some of the filmmakers are motivated 
the way pastors are, meaning they have an urge to spread a message of 
whatever nature. Most of them are there for material reasons, some for 
fame. Some are just passionate about the industry and love what is going 
on there. There are also some that are like ambassadors, making a 
change in their little corners without much concern for the money. 
Because their parents were there, they fell in love with it as children. 
Femi Adebayo is a lawyer and probably does not need the money...Sola 
Kosoko is also there and that is not because he doesn’t have the 
certificate to do something else (May 7, 2013).  
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A. ABODURIN: They are motivated by profit. Don’t forget that that’s 
how parts of Upper Iweka in Onitsha and Idumota in Lagos came into 
existence – to sell films. I’m not saying they should not go after profit. 
But they should seek to entertain, educate and break even at the same 
time...that’s how the Charles Novias of the industry operate (May 15, 
2013).  
O. IYANDA: I think that some of the filmmakers are motivated by 
passion, but there is also the band-wagon thing. I mean, why would 
someone who has acted in only two films want to be a producer or a 
director? But because everyone is doing it, they think they can do it too 
(May 24, 2013).  
A.AMATUS: Poverty contributed a lot. I think poverty is a motivating 
factor for these filmmakers. A lot of people graduated from school...no 
jobs. I think poverty fuels creativity because let’s face it there is money 
in filmmaking. The early filmmakers like OJ, Andy Best, JBM made a lot 
of money when they put their money in film. Then there is the urge to be 
a success story in your family, your community, your country. People do 
not want to be failures so they strive to make something out of the films 
(May 28, 2013).  
 
8.5 The Future of Nollywood   
On the future of Nollywood and past political representations, this audience contended 
that the industry is still largely fragmented and that is certain to yield adverse effects 
especially the ability to access funding which from the foregoing is a critical element in 
portraying the past. The future of Nollywood is dependent on how the present 
challenges confronting the industry are managed. Funding, distribution outlets, 
education and professionalism, environmental factors such as censorship and poverty-
based bickering are the most crucial problems underscored by the journalists as the film 
industry’s waterloo.   
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The problem of poor distribution competes with that of inadequate funding to 
thwart the burgeoning return to the cinemas. Nigeria has less than 20 cinemas across the 
country accessible to middle class families. The majority of Nigerians, who are poor, 
has no access to film screenings in multiplexes. Some governments such as Lagos State 
have pledged to erect community cinemas to cater to the vast majority of Nigerians 
living in urban slums. But that is a long term goal; and as Olumide Iyanda rightly 
pointed out, if the incumbent governor of Lagos State leaves his political office, the 
community exhibition centres are likely to go with him as history has repeatedly shown. 
Iyanda added: Cinema should not be made elitist...take it to Agege, Yaba...because that 
is where you have the crowds. In support of this, but from a different angle, Azuh 
Amatus noted that “it is sickening that in a country of 150 million people, a filmmaker is 
unable to sell 1 million copies of his films, no thanks to poor distribution outlets and 
piracy” (May 28, 2013).  
O. IYANDA: I have noticed something. More Nigerians watch 
Nollywood films today than they did 3 or 4 years before. Nollywood is 
doing something but don’t forget that you can also be a victim of your 
own success...therefore; they need to maintain the tempo of telling good 
stories (May 24, 2013).  
Y. OGUNDARE: ...funding, professionalism, good education and 
encouragement from the government, and environment. Everything that 
affects Nigeria affects the industry (May 7, 2013).  
The problems continue unabated. Film funding, the journalists affirmed, should emerge 
from the private sector while the government addresses issues of policy: economic and 
infrastructural. It has already been established by the filmmakers themselves, by 
scholars and by the journalists interviewed here that the filmmakers need to continually 
educate themselves in all aspects of filmmaking if they seek to be globally competitive. 
I will therefore focus on environmental factors that influence depicting a political past 
on film. As was pointed out in chapter four, HOAYS is a recent example of how 
censorship and socio-cultural factors affect the release of a film.  
The journalists drew my attention to the protracted tussle between the producers 
of HOAYS and the Censors Board which was followed with additional interviews and 
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visits to the Lagos office of the Board. The film, HOAYS, did not fare any better at the 
Censors Board than the Battle of Love and Across the Niger. In fact, it was worse 
because censorship as pointed out in chapter five is a deterrent in historicising an 
explosive society like Nigeria. The film was presented for classification on 10th April, 
2014. The State Security Service (SSS) was invited to view it in Abuja on the 1st of 
May. Within the period, a group of 276 school girls from Chibok, a rural community in 
North East Nigeria were abduction by terrorist group, Boko Haram (14th – 15th April). 
That affected classification of the film which was scheduled for its Nigerian premiere 
on 25th April because of its political slant. Between April and July when the film was 
finally classified, rumours of a ban, bribes, official and unofficial correspondences, loss 
of income and the redeployment of the Lagos Zonal Coordinator of the Board and other 
officials occurred. Even worse was the silence maintained by the Board following the 
rumours of a ban which was propagated by the media. Kene Mkparu, CEO of Film 
House Cinemas that bought distribution rights for the film wrote, “The continued 
unexplained delay in getting a formal response from the Board suggests that the Film 
has been banned even though there has been no formal communication to this effect.” 
Caesar Kagho, Acting Head, Corporate Affairs of the Board replied in a press statement 
“that the movie was not banned as speculated and that the board had dutifully exercised 
due diligence consonant with section 36 (1)(b)of NFVCB Enabling Law ACT 1993, 
CAP N40 LFN 2004, which stipulates that “a decision on a film shall ensure that such a 
film is not likely to undermine national security.” 
Mkparu revealed to me that the film was being held mainly out of political and 
ethnic reasons. He alleged that Gowon, Head of the FMG during the civil war was from 
the same ethnic group as Patricia Bala, DG of the Board, and that he had 
pleaded/warned that the war be completely forgotten. It is difficult to tell if Mkparu was 
solely motivated by economic reasons since his company had incurred significant losses 
in promotional materials for the botched premiere of the film. However, when I 
confronted the Corporate Affairs manager at the Board with this information, he neither 
denied nor confirmed it. Rather, he was visibly agitated and said to me in Igbo, “we 
have to be careful with what we say” (personal communication, August, 2014). 
Efforts to obtain an interview from Eddy Edion, who until July 7 was Zonal 
Coordinator of the Board failed. On August 31, 2014, he contacted me on Whatsapp: 
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“it’s my views on HOAYS that saw Ms. Bala posting me to Bauchi. My position was that 
as a theatrical/cinema presentation, it was ok for an 18 rating. But for home video, 
some edit cuts have to be effected. Bringing SSS and undue delay was wrong.” 
Interested in Edion’s response, I pressed further:  
A. AGINA: Were your views based on ethnic differences as portrayed 
in the film or on the explicit sexual scenes? 
No response! 
E. EDION: She (Bala) even brought in film producers like Mahmood 
Alli Balogun to review a film that the Board had not taken a decision on. 
I felt that was wrong and pointed this out to Bala. That was my offence. 
Trouble is when you put power in the wrong hands, disaster will follow.  
What the Board does effectively is to protect the government from public scrutiny and 
undue embarrassment while the filmmakers risk financial loss.  The result is a creative 
aversion or total avoidance of certain politically-charged issues. This was the case with 
the ban of a documentary Fuelling Poverty (2012) which I have argued elsewhere was 
more of a political move and less of national security concerns. The repressive 
tendencies of the Board leave little room for filmmakers to explore historical and 
political subjects. They tacitly decide to play safe by focusing on romantic comedies 
and melodramas although in the past, filmmakers like Tunde Kelani, Zeb Ejiro and 
Charles Novia are known to have couched their political statements in ways “that the 
Board will not be able to pinpoint anything” (Novia, 2012).  
Further, when films which smack of national politics are made, the producer 
now has the additional burden of timing its release or exhibition at an appropriate 
moment. Who would have known that the Boko Haram abduction will happen four days 
after submitting a film for classification? Another unidentified official met at the 
Board’s Lagos office said, “the country is not stable, look at Chibok, and it is the same 
Hausas that fought the war so you can’t make films that will incite violence” (personal 
communication, August 2014). Kene Mkparu and the producers of HOAYS were not as 
fortunate as Kelani whose film about military dictatorship was released when the 
dictator Gen Abacha died even though shooting began while Abacha was alive” 
(Haynes, 2007).  
224 
 
Kanayo O. Kanayo, a famous actor and the protagonist of Battle of Love and 
Across the Niger, said, “Bala does not know what she is doing. She is controlled. She 
applauded the film in Toronto and has now come to Nigeria to ban it. So what was she 
applauding?” (personal communication, July 24, 2014). Interestingly too, Ugboma was 
not sparing in his criticisms regarding the portrayal of ethnic violence in the film.   
An important point regarding the reception of HOAYS is that the 
disappointment felt and written about by western audiences on Bandele’s ‘dismissive 
history’ was not raised at all among some of the Nigerian audiences that saw the film. 
Three debatable reasons can be put forward: 1. Nigerian film audiences are less 
concerned about history than the foreigners; a conclusion that raises other questions on 
the historical consciousness of Nigeria’s movie going audience. 2. Familiarity with the 
novel could have filled in the missing links for Nigerian audiences to such an extent that 
what the film lacked, they made up for by recalling it in the novel. An important point is 
that the novel was on sale at Film House Cinemas, Lagos where the film premiered. 3. 
Borrowing from the idiom ‘in the land of the blind, a one-eyed man is king’, a third 
reason is that Nigerian audiences are not used to such (as HOAYS boasted) high quality 
production and acting in Nigerian films. HOAYS seemed to match a Hollywood 
production and at the same time provided familiar faces, contexts and stories that film 
lovers could relate to and had read. The foundation for this access and relevance had 
been laid by the novel. 
The chapter examined broadly the reception of popular ‘historical’ films to 
produce robust discussions on the film-filmmaker-audience paradigm. Although 
reception studies constitute a major component of media and communication studies 
with its own theories and methods, I argue that the fruitfulness of tapping into the 
journalists’ knowledge has enriched the study and made the exercise not only original 
but also worth replicating in other contexts.  This cushions the biases of filmmakers’ 
self-reporting as they “reproduce on the cultural level the fundamental conflicts within 
society...” (Kellner, n.d.). The journalists interviewed shed light on certain aspects of 
production and consumption of films in ways that no other audience can for reasons 
already stated above. This approach opens up the debate on measuring reception of 
films made long before a researcher becomes interested in examining them, and in the 
absence of requisite archival materials. The inclusion of this chapter was not to respond 
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to all the questions arising from examining reception, but to round out and make robust 
the discussions, arguments and contestations of constructing the past. In interrogating 

























9.1 Wrapping Up 
This study identified the growing number of films that examine the political 
constructions of 1967-1998 by Nigerian filmmakers. In analysing English language 
films produced in South West Nigeria, the study focuses on popular video films that 
reveal the symbolic practices by which the social and political meanings of the past are 
constructed. As well as how those meanings reflect Nigerian contemporary political 
culture. As Hall (2013) rightly observes, “it is social actors who use the conceptual 
systems of their culture...and other representational systems to construct meaning” (p. 
11). Apart from Nollywood, there are other indigenous film industries burgeoning in 
different regions of the country, notably the vibrant Kannywood. And it will be 
interesting to investigate how Kannywood constructs the political past. But for reasons 
mentioned above, the study deliberately excluded the Hausa film genres and similarly, 
left out indigenous language films to concentrate on the English language ones. This is 
not a shortcoming but a recognition of the need to adhere to a homogenous category that 
allows in-depth readings and interviews typical of qualitative research efforts such as 
this.  
The study adopted a number of theoretical thoughts to address the multi-
disciplinary nature of the study: African popular arts, post-structural cum contextual 
ideological critique and reception analysis in a post-colonial African state. Beginning 
with Barber’s theorisation of the popular productions, the study assessed how formerly-
disdained cultural art forms, particularly video films, engage with a country’s political 
past. This reveals the modes by which Okome’s (2003) urban sub-altern speak to and of 
the political power of the day and to themselves as well. By so doing, it contributes to 
the body of literature devoted to the political consciousness of the films previously 
described by Nigerian intellectuals as apolitical and a cottage industry which is giving 
Nigeria a bad image (Onyekakeyah, 2009). Nollywood narratives are constructed in 
similar ways regardless of genre, with the exception of footage intended to historicise 
the events. The use of flashbacks and metaphors is predominant, allowing for multiple 
and extended readings of the film texts.  
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Dialogues hold a special position in the films. Due to budgetary constraints and 
educational backgrounds, pre-production efforts are slim. This deficiency is 
accommodated in dialogues, which are used to fill in the visual absences. The 
ideological critiques drew largely from the social and political order of the country to 
flag the consciousness of state affairs among filmmakers. As was demonstrated above, 
the films contained elements that promoted and subverted the ideological projects of the 
periods and people represented by making them appear natural and commonsensical. On 
occasions, the filmmakers’ agenda were thwarted by the cinematic choices, which 
validate Barber’s (1987) assertion on cultural producers’ inadvertent loss of control over 
their art.  
If as Atton (2002) argues, “alternative media possess the capacity to generate 
non-standard, often infractory, methods of creation, production and distribution” (p. 4), 
then it is safe to assume that the films discussed in this research might be seen in the 
broad context of communication studies as alternative media. Throughout the chapters, 
Barber’s idea on the emergence of popular arts from people without access to official 
public communication channels was repeated. That idea shares a relationship with 
Atton’s alternative media, which originates from the grassroots. But if by alternative 
media, the transformational and radical character of underground press is meant, then it 
might be presumptuous to label Nollywood as such. For indeed, the capacity of the 
films discussed in this research to provoke social change is yet to be fully developed 
(Abah, 2009). The extent to which these Nollywood films might be conceived as 
alternative media in Lacey’s (2009) sense is also not fully admissible. Lacey suggests 
that “alternative media operate outside formal conventions...to disorientate the audience 
by suggesting the possibility of other ways of seeing” (p. 126). 
The methods employed to arrive at the findings include informal observation, 
textual analysis and interviews with filmmakers and journalists. The inclusion of 
journalists as unique audiences was the result of a methodological problem which this 
study creatively solved and proposes as a useful means of not only feeling the pulse of 
the film industry, but also of looking at films made in the past, for which reasonable 
documentation is absent. This reinforces the film-filmmaker-audience paradigm of 




9.2 Key Findings of the Research and Original Contribution to Knowledge   
In African popular arts studies, and in particular Nollywood, research triangulation is 
important because filmmakers and individuals rarely say negative things about 
themselves, hence the need to interrogate their colleagues and collaborators. In other 
words, self-reporting masks a whole range of abilities, motivations, feelings and 
reactions positively and negatively. Positively for those who choose to be modest about 
their achievements and negatively for filmmakers who tend to overstate their capacities 
and competencies.  
Readings of African popular arts reflected an understanding of cultural products 
as dominant sites of contestation, resistance and political power tussles (Stuart Hall, 
1998; Karin Barber, 1987; Chris Waterman, 1990). It also reflected art as the domains 
of cultural identity and hierarchical structures which shape and are shaped by the people 
that produce and consume them. However, existing literature also showed that, because 
popular arts are powerful and often resonate with the masses, they are equally deployed 
for political endorsements and national/community education, Kinsey Katchka (2000).  
Other findings include: 
 Every history is past, but not every past is history. Until the past is mediated and 
accounted for, it is not history. This mediation, as expected, is invariably 
positional and subjective. Scholars have a great tendency to use both terms 
interchangeably.  
 African film scholars note that post-colonial filmmaking in Africa was built on a 
decolonisation agenda (which means that the filmmakers looked backwards for 
stories and themes) whereas those of Nigerian film affirm that filmmaking is 
largely about contemporary issues and anxieties. This partly accounts for the 
insufficient academic attention given to films that depict the past, hence the 
uniqueness of this study. The political context of film production, distribution 
and consumption make the discourse of post-colonial theory a necessary tool for 
reading and interpreting the video films.  
 Murphy (2000) makes a strong case for the usefulness of post-colonial theory in 
unpacking the commonalities existent in African arts and culture, noting the 
229 
 
tendency of some theorists to disregard the differences inherent in various 
African states and cultures. He further observes that “post-colonialism explores 
links between African cultures in the light of their shared history of colonial 
exploitation and their rebellion against this oppression in its various forms 
(without assuming that this shared experience is identical in every African 
state)” (p. 248). As already mentioned, Nigerian film-makers did not set out with 
a decolonization agenda as their counterparts in the Francophone countries. 
What they sought to resist through their films is their own government’s 
repression, corruption and lack of accountability.  Therefore, Murphy’s position, 
while not adopted wholesale enabled an understanding of what filmmaking 
(cultural production) might look like in a post-colony.  
 Nigerian cinema has its roots in the Yoruba travelling theatre. The former is 
therefore heavily influenced by stage and later by television (W. Fanu, personal 
communication, August 9, 2012). The third chapter traced the link between the 
travelling theatre and the modern video film practice. 
 Directly relevant to my study are the articles of two film scholars – Chukwuma 
Okoye (2007a) and Françoise Ugochukwu (2014) because they make direct 
references to the notion of ‘history’ in the video films. The first examines the 
portrayal of the Nigerian Civil War in Battle of Love while the second 
interrogates the 1987 Kano riots in Love in Vendetta. Both reveal the points in 
which video filmmakers enter (and their degrees of engagement with) the 
historical discourses of ethnicity, nationhood, conflict and intercultural 
communication. Several other articles and book chapters describe the role of 
filmmakers as political commentators and keen observers of government 
agencies. 
 With reference to methodological literature, it was observed that scholars 
approached Nigerian videos on the basis of two paradigms:  
o theory-film-researcher and  
o theory-film-researcher-filmmaker  
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The first depends on textual analysis and interpretation by the researcher while the 
second performs textual analysis and interviews with filmmakers. When Nollywood 
audiences are studied, they are done in isolation, neglecting the reception of specific 
films and their producers. Recognising the merits of previous studies as well as the gap 
created by the inability of linking production to consumption, this study proposes a 
different paradigm: theory-researcher-film-filmmaker-audience (or the last three 
components since the first two are usually taken for granted in academic contexts). This 
was realised through textual analyses of specific films, interviews with the 
producers/directors/affiliates of those films and with ‘disciplined audiences’ (film 
journalists). Undoubtedly, this yielded a richer understanding of video films in which 
significant past events are re-enacted and the overall ‘health’ of the film industry 
measured. The theoretical insights from Barber’s African popular arts and ideological 
projects, Hall’s representation, Kellner’s ideology critique enabled the realisation of this 
unique assessment of the modes and codes of constructing Nigeria’s political past 
through video films.  
This study contributes to the discourse on historical and political representation 
in African video film. It perceptively recognises the possibilities, practicalities, 
boundaries and limitations of media representation and interpretation in post-colonial 
Africa. Through its findings, the study highlights the implications of constructing a 
political past for filmmakers, academics, policy makers and the general public. First, 
filmmakers ought to demonstrate a sensitive awareness of the socio-political 
subjectivities of their cultural milieu. By extension, historicising controversial political 
periods will necessarily continue metaphorically and marginally in such circumstances, 
if theirs and societal interests must be protected. Such representations ought to be 
creatively articulated to express alternative critical voices without drawing the ire of the 
Censors Board. Filmmakers must also hold consultations with historians and 
stakeholders in a bid to ameliorate potential unintended consequences of their films for 
better quality narratives.  
Second, academic debates on Nollywood’s modes of representation and its local 
and global impact are on the increase. Africans on the continent and in the diaspora are 
avid consumers of Nollywood films as attested to by Krings and Okome (2013) in 
striking similarity to Bollywood’s rise and consumption in “the Indian subcontinent and 
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among the South Asian diaspora” (Thussu, 2006: 200). This study affords fresh, unique 
and inclusive perspectives on motivation, narration, ideology and reception of video 
films that envision Nigeria’s political history. It posits alternatives to dominant 
theoretical and methodological positions on the study of African popular arts, and 
contributes to Daya Thussu’s notion of ‘the rise of the rest’ in reference to local and 
global information flows of Bollywood and other media producers from the global 
South. It further imparts a critical Nigerian perspective to the de-Westernising agenda of 
film scholars who question the imposition of western film theories and thought on 
African realities, as succinctly argued by Sholat and Stam (1994) and Petty (2012).  
Third, policy makers, with particular reference to the NFVCB, must adopt a 
responsible disposition to filmic narratives and their creators. The tendency towards 
dictating or legislating film content has repeatedly failed, and when scrutinised is often 
seen to promote official agenda. This has detrimental effects on artistic expression 
especially when such creative prowess is directed at re-enacting national ‘histories’ on 
screen. Policy makers and regulators have to collaborate with filmmakers in creating 
sustainable and enabling environments rather than ‘lording’ it over them. This has to be 
actualised in a democratic administration if we are to go beyond the rhetoric of freedom 
of expression, mindfully exercised.  
Fourth, the general public stands to benefit from enhanced film histories if the 
preceding three sectors are taken into consideration. As observed by the journalists 
interviewed in this study, the Nigerian audience is waiting for historical films, which for 
reasons espoused in the thesis are few and far between. At a time when the subject of 
history is being expunged from school curricula, might the audio-visual version not hold 
any promise for the historical consciousness of film audiences?  
 As already stated in different sections of this work, no research effort is 
absolute; none can claim the monopoly of knowledge on any discipiline. The 
recognition of this leads to other questions that the insights from this research might 
raise. If this work has provided answers to the questions of motivation, narrative 
techniques, ideology and reception of a small number of films produced in south west 
Nigeria, it will undoubtedly raise similar (or different) concerns about the filmmaking 
practices in other parts of the country, and indeed the continent. The objective of the 
research was not to generalise the findings to all Nigerian or African experiences, but to 
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contribute to the debate on the politics and implications of Nollywood’s system of 
representation through negotiated images of the past.  
 
9.3 Suggestions for Further Studies  
Suggestions for further studies include examining indigenous language films in their 
representations of the past and perhaps a widening of the time frame. This study limited 
its time frame to 1967–1998, which incidentally was predominantly military-led. The 
period in question has repeatedly seized the optic of many a poet, dramatists and 
novelists because of the prominent position that the events of the period occupy in the 
political history of Nigeria. However, what constituted the optic of literary figures 
became the blind spot of video filmmakers for reasons espoused in chapter 5 above. 
Without attempting to draw clear-cut parallels between literature and film, it was 
necessary to focus on this approach because Nollywood has become the most powerful 
producer of culture in sub-saharan Africa (Haynes) and is difficult to ignore (Okome) its 
productions.     
It would be interesting to adopt the theory-researcher-film-filmmaker-audience 
paradigm for other film genres particularly the cultural epics, the Christian/religious 
films, the Hausa films, the romantic comedies which are fast becoming the dominant 
genre in Nigerian films today and possibly the diasporic Nigerian film. Also useful 











SELECT FILMOGRAPHY  
Films Year Director 
76 ???? Izu Ojukwu 
Across the Niger 2004 Izu Ojukwu 
Afonja 2002 Jare Adeniregun 
Alpha 1972 Ola Balogun 
Amazing Grace  2005 Jeta Amata 
Anini 2005 Fred Amata 
Arugba 2008 Tunde Kelani 
Battle of Love 2001 Simisola Opeoluwa 
Battle of Musanga 1995 Bolaji Dawodu 
Being Mrs Elliot 2014 Omoni Oboli 
Black Goddess 1975 Ola Balogun 
Blues for a Prodigal 1984 Wole Soyinka 
Bound for Lagos  1962 Edric O'Connor 
Bullfrog in the Sun 1971 
Jurgen Pohland/Francis 
Oladele 
Cindy's Notes  2008 Izu Ojukwu 
Crude War 2011 Ugezu J. Ugezu 
Cry Freedom 1981 Ola Balogun 
Culture in Tradition 1963 Esso World Theatre 
Daybreak in Udi 1949 Terry Bishop 
Death of a Black President 1983 Eddie Ugbomah 
Dinner with the Devil 1975 Sanya Dosunmu 
Domitilla  1996 Zeb Ejiro 
Dr. Bello 2013 Tony Abulu 
Dr. Oyenusi 1976/7 Eddie Ugbomah 
Egg of Life  2003 Andy Amenechi 
Fight for Freedom 1977 Ola Balogun 
Gone with the Wind 1939 Victor Fleming et al. 
Half of a Yellow Sun 2013 Biyi Bandele 
Heart of Stone 1995 
 Hotel Rwanda 2004 Terry George 
I will Die for You 2004 Charles Novia 
Ichabod 1993 Izu Ojukwu 
Igodo 1999 Andy Amenechi 
I'll Take My Chances 2011 Desmond Elliot 
Invasion 1897 2014 Lancelot Imasuen 
Invictus 2009 Clint Eastwood 
Jenifa 2008 Muyideen Ayinde 
Jodhaa Akbar 2008 Ashutosh Gowariker 




Koseegbe 1996 Tunde Kelani 
Lagaan 2001 Ashutosh Gowariker 
Liquid Black Gold  2008 Ossy Okeke Jnr. 
Maami 2011 Tunde Kelani 
Militants 2007 Moses Inwang 
Moral Disarmament 1957 
 Mortal Inheritance 1996 Bond Emeruwa 
Muzik Man 1976 Ola Balogun 
October  (One) 1  2014 Kunle Afolayan 
Oil Doom  1978 Eddie Ugbomah 
Oil Village 2001 Kalu Anya 
One Nigeria 1969 Ola Balogun 
Osuofia in London 2003 Kingsley Ogoro 
Saworoide 1999 Tunde Kelani 
Sitanda 2007 Izu Ojukwu 
Stubborn Grasshopper 1 & 2 2001 Simisola Opeoluwa 
Tears of the Sun 2003 Antoine Fuqua 
The Child 2009/10 Izu Ojukwu 
The Last Vote 2001 Andy Amenechi 
The Patriot 2000 Roland Emmerich 
The President Must Not Die 1983 Zeb Ejiro 
Titanic 1997 James Cameron 
Vendor  1990 Ladi Ladebo 
White Waters 2007 Izu Ojukwu 
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APPENDIX A  
Filmmakers’ Interview Questions 
Introduction 
In the interviews conducted with filmmakers, general questions relevant to the research 
such as filmmaker’s background, industry constitution, genres, filmmaking costs, thrills 
and challenges were asked. Specific questions regarding cast, themes, narratives and 
reception of individual films were also asked.   
1. Can you give a bit of your biography? 
2. When did you begin your filmmaking career? 
3. Where did you train?  
4. What is your major motivation for making films? 
5. What role, if any, does your ethnic background play in the kinds of stories you 
choose to tell? 
Genres 
6. Do you have a preference for any particular genre of films? Which and why? 
7. Generally, what informs your choice of stories or themes? 
8. To what extent has the Nigerian film industry portrayed any aspect of Nigerian 
history (historic period, events or individuals)?  
9. Why did you choose to tell the Ken-Saro Wiwa story in Oil Village? 
10. What motivated the film Stubborn Grasshopper knowing that the protagonist is 
considered by Nigerians to be a villainous character?  
11. There is an assumption by Nigerian audiences that the portrayal of history in 
Nigerian films (civil war, coups, Niger Delta & Isaac Adaka Boro/Ken Saro-
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wiwa, Nigeria’s successes at football e.g. 1994 African Cup of Nations, 1999 
elections etc) is deliberately avoided. What would you say about that?  
12. It is perceived that satire is used as an excuse by filmmakers to justify their lack 
of research or in-depth storytelling. Would you agree or disagree with this 
statement. Why?  
13. Does Nollywood have the potential to retell any bit of Nigerian history?  
a) Why do you think so?  
14. “The Nigerian audience is not interested in history films” How would you react 
to this statement made by a Nigerian filmmaker?  
Filmmaking Experience 
15. What has been your most rewarding film financially?  
a) And artistically? 
b) How do you fund (have you funded) your films?  
16. What has been your most discouraging experience?  
17. What would be your dream story?  
18. What challenges do you have as a filmmaker? 
19. What has been your most inspirational experience as a producer and director?  
20. Can you give an estimate of total production cost of Oil Village and Stubborn 
Grasshopper 
21. What was the experience like on:  
a. Oil Village; 
b. Stubborn Grasshopper? 
22. And how does that (revenue and experience) compare with other productions of 
yours?   
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23. What is the typical/average length of your productions from pre-production to 
premiere/CD/DVD release?  
Reactions to Nollywood from the Intelligentsia. Please respond to each  
24. Femi Osofisan “For we cannot but remark that, however popular the films may 
be, and however much in demand, the picture that the majority of them present 
of our world is one that we must not only interrogate, but indeed reject very 
strongly, if what we seek is the transformation of our society into a modern, 
progressive state.”  How would you respond to this assertion? 
25. Steve Ayorinde “Not to make a foray into historical narratives will be 
inadequate for an industry that is producing so much. It can’t all be rituals and 
romance etc. There must be some other engagement with aspects of history even 
if we have to express displeasure or engage directors in terms of conclusions and 
narrative styles.” What is your opinion on this? 
26. Reuben Abati “There is a crying need for professionalism in Nollywood. The 
industry, despite its popularity and impact is gradually being overtaken by 
home-grown mediocrity. Every actor and actress is a potential producer, movie 
director and screenplay writer. This "jack-of-all-trades" mentality reduces the 
quality of the output.” Would you consider this a valid statement? 
27. Filmmakers and critics have tied the problem of piracy to a lack of adequate 
distribution outlets. Would you lend your voice to that? 
28. Funding is a big problem in the industry and it is also the source of many 
conflicts. What do you make of the recent government interventions aimed at 









Journalists’ Interview Questions  
Introduction  
In the interviews conducted with journalists, general questions relevant to the research 
were asked, but I often began with ice-breakers. These were comments on the 
journalist’s previous writing on Nollywood or a particular film, director, producer or 
actor. Naturally, such ice-breakers varied according to the interviewees. For instance, 
the statement below opened the interviewing process with Steve Ayorinde, which he 
wrote in 2012.   
“…as one who reckons that appreciation of cinematic arts is in his DNA, I join the 
celebration of this growing industry, with the fervent hope that its next 20 years will 
produce more of quality than quantity…with a rich history that is not tainted.”  
1. Can you speak about the idea of quality you mean: subjects, ideas, themes 
presented, collaborations or what? 
2. How long have you reported Nollywood and the creative industries?  
3. What do you think is the motivation of Nigerian filmmakers beyond the much-
reported commercial incentive?  
4. Do you think there is an appreciable number of films depicting our national and 
political history?  
5. If you were to identify a filmmaker who has attempted retelling Nigeria’s 
political past, who would that be?  
6. Was he successful at it and why/why not? 
7. How is history produced and transmitted in Nigerian films – celluloid or video, 
from Eddie Ugboma to present filmmakers  
8. What is the prevailing ideology in Nollywood? Has that changed over the years 
– before and after 1992? 
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9. How is history consumed in the celluloid and video film culture? The Nigerian 
audience is not prepared for it. How valid is that statement? 
10.  Are you familiar with the cultural epic genre e.g. Igodo? To what degree do 
they depict any aspect of Nigerian history?  
11. To what extent has Nollywood engaged with historical events, people, periods? 
12. Do you think it has been successful at such attempts, why/why not? 
13. Have you seen Across the Niger, Oil Village, Anini, Stubborn Grasshopper, 
Amazing Grace, Love in Vendetta? 
14. Can you share your thoughts on each of them/the ones you saw and wrote about 
when they were released?  
15. Nollywood ought to be appreciated more as a product of a renaissance than 
circumstance. What do you mean please? 
16. Nollywood as art is often compared to popular music and literature in Nigeria. 
Some critics have argued that “Nollywood still lags behind its music and 
literature cousins in critical appraisal (of what and who?) and global laurels.” 
What are your comments on that?  
17. Similarly, “Nollywood is yet to produce its own Fela, Wole Soyinka and Chinua 
Achebe as music and literature have done with resounding acclaim.” What are 
your thoughts on that statement particularly when those literary scholars were 
politically and historically conscious?  
18. In what ways can the media aid production, circulation and consumption of 
Nigeria’s political history in Nollywood, bearing in mind that censorship might 
deter the portrayal of history with political undertones? 
19. Do you think journalistic writing can compel the powers that be to create 
enabling environments for film practitioners? How so? 
20. In your opinion, has the NFVCB aided the industry’s possibilities in narrating 
history or not? 
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21. Some filmmakers are of the opinion that historical films will not be appreciated 
by Nigeria’s movie lovers, hence their avoidance of the genre. What do you 
think of that assertion?   
22. What do you consider to be Nollywood’s biggest challenge in general and 
particularly with respect to producing history? 
23. Has the government’s two-time financial intervention addressed the film 





















List of Interviewees 
Filmmakers  
   
S/N 
Date of 
Interview Interviewees Designation Duration 
1 16-Feb-12 Fred Amata Dir, Anini 87 minutes 
2 20-Feb-12 Kalu Anya Dir, Oil Village 69 minutes 
3 24-Jul-12 Bayo Awala Producer 53 minutes 
4 09-Aug-12 Wale Fanu 
Film-maker and 
technician 67 minutes 
5 12-Feb-13 Tunde Kelani  Dir, Oleku 70 minutes 
6 13-Feb-13 Kemi Adesoye Screenwriter 138 minutes 
7 23-Mar-13 Neville Ossai 
Co-producer, Stubborn 
Grasshopper 18 minutes 
8 29-Mar-13 Andy Amenechi Director 131 minutes 
9 04-Apr-13 Chikezie Donatus Film-maker/marketer 32 minutes 
10 06-Apr-13 Franklin Okoro Producer 69 minutes 
11 26-Apr-13 Amaka Igwe Producer 20 minutes 
12 25-Jul-13 Zeb Ejiro Producer 77 minutes 
13 21-Aug-13 Ishaya Bako Director 22 minutes 
14 23-Aug-13 
Alexis Onome-
Egborge Film editor 39 minutes 
15 23-Aug-13 Bobhope Iregbu Production Manager 40 minutes 
16 29-Aug-13 Kingsley Ogoro Producer, Battle of Love 43 minutes 
17 13-Sep-13 Bond Emeruwa Film director/CONGA  94 minutes 
18 07-Jul-14 Simi Opeoluwa Dir, Battle of Love 90 minutes 
19 16-Oct-13 Sam Onwuka Producer, S. Grasshopper Telephone 
20 30-May-14 Henry Legemah Producer, Anini Whatsapp 
21 25-Feb-13 Emem Isong Producer E-mail 
22 Turned down Izu Ojukwu Dir, Across the Niger 
 23 Turned down Tade Ogidan Producer 
 
     
     Journalists 
   24 11-Apr-13 Rukaino Umukoro Tell Magazine 48 minutes 
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25 06-May-13 Steve Ayorinde National Mirror 64 minutes 
26 07-May-13 Yejide Ogundare Nigerian Tribune 47 minutes 
27 11-May-13 Jahman Anikulapo The Guardian 63 minutes 
28 15-May-13 Akintayo Abodurin Nigerian Tribune 65 minutes 
29 17-May-13 
Nseobong Okon-
ekong This Day 72 minutes 
30 18-May-13 Ben Njoku Vanguard 49 minutes 
31 20-May-13 Funke Osae-Brown Business Day E-mail interview 
32 24-May-13 Olumide Iyanda Saturday Independent 43 minutes 
33 26-May-13 Shaibu Husseini Freelance/The Guardian E-mail interview 
34 28-May-13 Anote Ajeluoru The Guardian E-mail interview 
35 28-May-13 Azuh Amatus Entertainment Express 61 minutes 
36 03-Jun-13 Derin Ajao Freelance/234 Next  E-mail interview 
37 Turned down  Victor Akande The Nation 
 38 Turned down  Sola Balogun The Sun 
 39 Turned down  Hakeem Lasisi  The Punch 
 40 Turned down  Okey Uwaezuoke This Day  
  
 
